Xi’s Strategy to Confront America Has Failed – Analyst

Chinese President Xi Jinping orchestrated a carefully choreographed display of power and diplomacy through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin and the largest military parade ever staged in Beijing, designed to project China’s emergence on the world stage.

Both events were meticulously crafted to send an unmistakable message of strength to Donald Trump, serve as a warning to Taiwan, and subtly remind regional rivals that China’s power remains unrivalled in Asia while increasingly challenging America’s dominance.

Yet despite efforts to shape this new narrative and cement a China-led coalition, lingering mistrust, deep historical animosities, and alliances built on fragile, short-term interests suggest these partnerships will not endure.

The SCO Summit, the largest in its history, was framed by Xi as a platform to rally states against American hegemony.

Meanwhile, the Victory Day parade – commemorating the 80th anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II – showcased China’s most advanced military hardware, from hypersonic missiles to directed-energy weapons and unmanned submarines, all meant as a stark warning to Washington and Taipei.

Warnings and Clear Signals

The inclusion of Indonesia and Malaysia as guest participants was a strategic move by Beijing, signalling its intent to extend influence beyond its Eurasian core partners.

In Xi’s strategic vision, the SCO summit and Victory Day parade were not mere commemorations, but platforms to consolidate a China-led order on the global stage.

It also sent a subtle signal even to close partners such as Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin – that China retains superior military capacity compared to them, and in the long run, Beijing enjoys the advantage of proximity.

While some analysts emphasised that the public appearance of Chinese, Russian, and North Korean leaders together symbolised unity, this does not necessarily translate into long-term cohesion.

The primary motive behind Xi’s showcase was to deter Taiwan from challenging Beijing’s claims, whether through military force or a declaration of independence.

By linking the commemoration of World War II victory to present challenges, Xi reinforced the historical narrative that China will resist secession as it once resisted foreign invasion – a pointed message to Taipei that the People’s Liberation Army is prepared to fight if provoked.

It was equally a direct message to Trump: withdraw or risk facing a new axis of power, as Beijing declared it would not bow to U.S. tariffs or technology sanctions, but instead was ready to openly confront Washington with its allies.

The warning was twofold – to Taiwan, never to contemplate independence, and to Trump’s America, that containment strategies would fail.

With Us or Against Us

The narrative carried the unmistakable tone of the classic “you’re either with us or against us” strategy – join China’s bloc or remain aligned with the U.S.-led system.

As Xi declared in his speech, the world must choose between peace or war, though in reality “peace” is interpreted differently depending on ideological leanings.

The core message was clear: join China’s new power club and reap the benefits of its markets, investments, and security partnerships – or side with Washington and face retaliation under its anti-China agenda.

China’s state media highlighted the SCO’s size – representing 43% of the world’s population and 23% of global GDP – as proof that a “Global South alternative” under Beijing’s leadership could rival the West, framing it as a fairer model than Western systems.

Both the SCO and BRICS were promoted as providers of unconditional financial support, trade systems capable of challenging the dollar’s dominance, and cooperation unbound by democracy – an attractive offer to states long frustrated by Western sanctions and human rights conditionalities.

The implied threat was that fence-sitters risk marginalisation if China’s bloc continues to gain momentum in power and effectiveness.

Washington, for its part, views this emerging coalition as a growing and genuine threat to the global order it has upheld for decades.

Xi’s Time Trap: The Dangers of “Peak China”

Xi’s aggressive moves are driven by urgency.

China is approaching the peak of its national power, with its window of opportunity narrowing before economic stagnation and demographic decline slow its rise.

The “Peak China” thesis, advanced by Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, argues that as China’s rapid ascent plateaus, it remains powerful enough to be dangerous.

Historically, great powers at their zenith often turn more aggressive, fearing impending decline.

As Beckley contends, when a rapidly rising power hits prolonged economic slowdown, it often doubles down on expansionist policies to consolidate influence both domestically and abroad.

Xi’s current assertiveness may reflect a “now or never” mentality – facing internal decline and a shrinking timeframe to achieve his “100-Year Marathon” vision by 2049, while contending with America’s resurgence under Trump, Beijing may see this as its best strategic moment to assert dominance.

Xi’s tightening grip at home and doubling down abroad mirrors the behaviour of powers at their peak.

Domestically, political control has hardened, while externally, China is accelerating naval expansion and military modernisation to deter American intervention.

These steps fit within Beckley’s concept of “mercantilist expansion,” using state power to secure resources and global military presence as buffers against slowing domestic growth.

For Xi, the time to reshape the world order around China is now – before its relative power declines and before Trump’s America reasserts itself to maintain a wide power gap.

Cracks in Xi’s Bloc: Distrust and Temporary Alliances

Xi’s attempted coalition is held together by shared threats, but undermined by deep-rooted mistrust and historical grievances.

Even as Xi courts Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, both sides remain wary.

Beijing and Delhi fought a border war in 1962 and clashed again as recently as 2020 in the Himalayas.

India remains deeply suspicious of China’s strategic intentions, resents Beijing’s support for Pakistan, and sees its Belt and Road expansion – particularly the “String of Pearls” strategy – as an effort to encircle India.

Sino-Russian ties are equally fraught.

Historically, Russia has been uneasy with China’s rise, particularly along its long Siberian frontier and across Central Asia, with Cold War rivalries lingering in the background.

Today, Russia has become a feeder economy to China, with its industries and technologies increasingly dependent on Beijing.

Putin needs Xi’s support to weather Western sanctions, yet the Kremlin is cautious not to rely too heavily on Beijing.

Moscow maintains robust defence ties with India and continues to supply advanced weaponry to New Delhi, signalling its intent to balance against overdependence on China.

Indeed, Russia trusts Delhi more than Beijing, a partnership rooted in Cold War alignment.

Competition between Moscow and Beijing is intensifying, from influence in Central Asia to power in the Arctic and global arms markets.

Although they share a common adversary in Washington, there is no binding alliance – their “no limits” partnership would likely fracture if core national interests collided.

For Moscow, Beijing remains a potential future threat, and vice versa.

The same reality applies to North Korea.

Pyongyang owes part of its survival to Chinese support, yet fears Beijing’s grip, particularly regarding its nuclear programme which Kim Jong-un is determined to safeguard.

Historically, Pyongyang has played Beijing and Moscow against each other for its own gain.

Kim’s rare appearance alongside Xi and Putin in Beijing was a propaganda win for China, but North Korea’s loyalty remains far from guaranteed.

Pakistan may be increasingly important to China given massive investments there, but Islamabad still seeks U.S. assistance and cannot fully detach from Washington.

Central Asian SCO members harbour their own doubts, carefully balancing between Moscow’s security umbrella and China’s economic pull while safeguarding their national interests.

Many are wary of Chinese debt-laden infrastructure deals and its growing regional footprint.

The Trust Gap in the SCO

The SCO lacks binding commitments and institutional depth compared to formal alliances.

Its charter avoids mutual defence obligations, focusing instead on general cooperation against terrorism, economic links, and political dialogue.

Despite ideological camaraderie and shared opposition to the West, in a Taiwan or South China Sea conflict there is no guarantee that Russia or Iran would come to China’s aid.

Global South states participate in SCO initiatives to avoid offending Beijing, but most pursue hedging strategies, wary of China’s expansive territorial claims, especially in the South China Sea.

Ultimately, Xi’s coalition lacks the deep trust and institutional integration that underpin Western alliances, which combine security, values, and economic interdependence.

Xi’s gambit has so far failed to undermine the resilience of the U.S.-led order, particularly in the realms of security and economics.

Collins Chong Yew Keat
Strategic, Security and Foreign Affairs Analyst
University of Malaya