[VIDEO] Uzbekistan Flexes Integrated Air Defence Power by Firing Chinese and Russian Missiles in Major Live-Fire Exercise

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Uzbekistan’s Armed Forces have conducted a strategically calibrated and highly consequential live-fire air defence exercise in early February 2026 that underscored Tashkent’s deliberate transformation into a multi-layered, multi-origin air defence power capable of countering complex aerial threats across Central Asia’s increasingly contested strategic airspace.

The exercise, staged across the vast steppe and desert expanses of Uzbekistan, featured the simultaneous operational employment of Chinese-supplied long-, medium-, and short-range surface-to-air missile systems alongside legacy Russian platforms, signalling a doctrinal shift toward diversified procurement, redundancy, and survivability in air defence architecture.

In a region shaped by Afghan instability, unmanned aerial system proliferation, cruise missile diffusion, and renewed great-power competition, Uzbekistan’s decision to integrate Chinese FD-2000B, KS-1C, and FM-90 systems with the Russian S-125 Neva/Pechora reflects a calculated response to evolving threat vectors rather than symbolic military theatre.

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, framed this transformation during his February 2025 visit to the Center for Innovative Technologies, stating, “We must strengthen the competitiveness of the defense sector by developing new products and incorporating advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and robotics,” a declaration that directly links air defence modernisation to national technological sovereignty.

This statement, issued amid Uzbekistan’s accelerating defence reforms since 2016, contextualises the February 2026 exercise not as an isolated drill but as an operational validation of a broader military-industrial and doctrinal realignment away from single-supplier dependence.

Footage of missiles launched by day and night against simulated aerial targets revealed a force testing not only kinetic performance but also sensor fusion, command-and-control resilience, and interoperability between disparate Eastern air defence ecosystems.

The exercise demonstrated Uzbekistan’s capacity to orchestrate layered engagements from high-altitude strategic intercepts to low-altitude drone defence, reflecting an understanding that modern air defence effectiveness is determined by networked integration rather than platform singularity.

By visibly synchronising Chinese radar-guided interceptors with Russian radio-command legacy systems, Uzbekistan signalled to regional actors that its airspace is no longer defended by isolated batteries but by a coordinated, adaptive, and increasingly autonomous defensive grid.

This evolution carries direct implications for Central Asia’s strategic balance, positioning Uzbekistan as a credible airspace gatekeeper amid shifting geopolitical fault lines stretching from Afghanistan to the Caspian basin.

Uzbekistan’s deliberate exposure of this hybridised air defence construct through a live-fire event also serves as a strategic signalling mechanism aimed at both state and non-state actors, demonstrating that Tashkent possesses not only the hardware diversity but also the doctrinal maturity to manage saturation attacks, multi-axis incursions, and technologically asymmetric threats in a rapidly evolving regional battlespace.

From an operational economics perspective, the integration of Chinese and Russian systems enables Uzbekistan to optimise cost-per-intercept ratios, distribute wear across missile inventories, and mitigate lifecycle risks associated with sanctions, supply-chain disruptions, and geopolitical coercion, thereby enhancing long-term force sustainability without sacrificing deterrent credibility.

At a higher strategic level, the exercise underscores Uzbekistan’s emergence as a pivotal security node in Central Asia, where airspace control increasingly intersects with energy corridors, transnational infrastructure, and regional stability, positioning Tashkent to exert disproportionate influence over crisis escalation dynamics despite its formally non-aligned defence posture.

From Soviet Inheritance to Strategic Diversification of Air Defence Architecture

Uzbekistan’s contemporary air defence posture is inseparable from its Soviet inheritance, having absorbed the remnants of the 73rd Air Army and the 15th Air Defence Division upon independence in 1991, including the S-125 Neva/Pechora systems that once formed the backbone of low-to-medium altitude protection across the Turkestan Military District.

The S-125, designed during the Cold War to counter aircraft, helicopters, and early cruise missiles, provided Uzbekistan with a foundational but increasingly constrained capability defined by limited engagement envelopes, analogue electronics, and susceptibility to modern electronic countermeasures.

With engagement ranges of up to 35 kilometres and altitude coverage between 100 metres and 18 kilometres, the S-125’s two-stage solid-fuel missile—armed with a 70-kilogram high-explosive fragmentation warhead—offered reliability but lacked adaptability against contemporary low-observable or saturation threats.

Despite upgrades such as Pechora-2M variants, the system’s radio-command guidance architecture imposed operational limitations against agile targets manoeuvring under heavy electronic warfare conditions.

For much of the post-Soviet period, Uzbekistan relied on Russian maintenance, training pipelines, and joint exercises, including counter-insurgency focused drills such as Hamkorlik-2025 at the Termez training ground.

However, the resurgence of Taliban control in Afghanistan, coupled with Russia’s military and economic absorption in Ukraine, introduced strategic uncertainty into Uzbekistan’s reliance on Moscow as its sole air defence partner.

This recalibration coincided with China’s expanding footprint in Central Asia under the Belt and Road Initiative, which provided not only economic infrastructure but also pathways for military-technical cooperation.

Uzbekistan’s gradual pivot toward Chinese air defence systems thus emerged as a pragmatic hedge against supply chain vulnerability, geopolitical over-reliance, and capability stagnation.

The February 2026 exercise operationally validated this shift by demonstrating that Soviet-era systems could be retained as depth layers while Chinese platforms assumed primary interception roles.

Chinese Missile Systems as the Backbone of Uzbekistan’s Layered Air Defence

The introduction of Chinese air defence systems has fundamentally reshaped Uzbekistan’s defensive envelope, beginning with the FD-2000B, the export variant of China’s HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile system, first tested by Uzbekistan against aerial targets in 2021.

With an engagement range estimated between 250 and 300 kilometres and altitude coverage reaching approximately 50 kilometres, the FD-2000B extends Uzbekistan’s air defence reach deep beyond national borders, enabling early interception of strategic aircraft, cruise missiles, and select ballistic threats.

Capable of achieving speeds exceeding Mach 4 and employing dual-mode guidance systems, the FD-2000B offers enhanced resilience against electronic countermeasures and low-observable targets, attributes critical in modern contested airspace.

Complementing this long-range layer is the KS-1C, or HQ-12, a medium-range system designed to bridge the gap between strategic interceptors and point defence assets.

With engagement distances ranging from 5 to 70 kilometres and altitude coverage up to 27 kilometres, the KS-1C provides high-probability interception against tactical aircraft, helicopters, and cruise missiles at speeds approaching Mach 3.

Weighing approximately 900 kilograms and carrying a 100-kilogram warhead, the KS-1C’s semi-active radar and radio-command guidance allows flexible targeting in dense threat environments.

At the lowest tier, the FM-90 short-range system—derived from the French Crotale design—provides close-in defence against drones, helicopters, and low-flying aircraft within 15 kilometres and altitudes of up to 6,000 metres.

This tri-layered Chinese architecture enables Uzbekistan to respond proportionally across the threat spectrum while preserving missile inventory efficiency.

The February 2026 Exercise as a Live Test of Interoperability and Doctrine

The February 2026 live-fire exercise unfolded as a deliberate simulation of multi-vector aerial intrusion, combining high-altitude, medium-range, and low-altitude targets to stress Uzbekistan’s integrated air defence network.

Visual evidence from the exercise showed FD-2000B launchers elevating canisters and executing long-range intercept profiles consistent with strategic bomber or cruise missile engagement scenarios.

KS-1C batteries followed with rapid sequential launches against medium-altitude targets, demonstrating salvo coordination and radar cueing integration across multiple engagement zones.

FM-90 systems were employed against low-flying drones, highlighting Uzbekistan’s recognition of unmanned systems as a primary asymmetric threat in Central Asian security calculations.

The inclusion of S-125 Neva/Pechora systems provided legacy redundancy and allowed commanders to evaluate cross-system cueing and fallback engagement capacity.

Daytime firings tested optical and radar tracking under clear conditions, while night launches validated all-weather capability, thermal tracking, and crew proficiency.

The synchronisation observed during the exercise indicates a matured command-and-control structure capable of managing heterogeneous systems under unified operational doctrine.

This operational coherence underscores Uzbekistan’s transition from platform-centric defence to network-centric airspace denial.

Geostrategic Implications and the Path Toward Defence Autonomy

Uzbekistan’s decision to publicly demonstrate Chinese-Russian air defence integration carries significant geopolitical signalling value, reflecting a calibrated balancing act between Moscow, Beijing, and emerging Western security interests.

By reducing exclusive reliance on Russian systems while avoiding overt alignment with NATO frameworks, Tashkent positions itself as a strategically autonomous actor within Central Asia’s evolving security architecture.

China benefits from this alignment through expanded defence exports and deeper military-technical influence, reinforcing its strategic depth westward.

Russia, while retaining legacy ties, faces gradual erosion of defence primacy as Uzbekistan explores alternatives perceived as cost-effective and technologically current.

The exercise also resonates regionally, as neighbouring states such as Turkmenistan pursue similar layered defence strategies in response to Afghan instability and drone proliferation.

Domestically, Uzbekistan’s investments in AI, robotics, and indigenous systems such as the Lochin UAV series and Arslan 8×8 armoured vehicles signal a long-term ambition to internalise defence production.

Potential future acquisitions, including advanced Chinese combat aircraft to replace ageing MiG-29 and Su-27 fleets, would further consolidate this trajectory.

The February 2026 exercise thus represents not merely a military drill but a doctrinal milestone in Uzbekistan’s pursuit of resilient, diversified, and sovereign air defence capability in an increasingly multipolar strategic environment.

At the strategic-industrial level, Uzbekistan’s diversified air defence posture also enhances its leverage in defence negotiations by reducing vendor lock-in, enabling competitive technology transfer arrangements, and creating the conditions for selective localisation of maintenance, repair, and overhaul capabilities that directly support long-term defence autonomy.

Collectively, these dynamics elevate Uzbekistan from a passive security consumer to an active shaper of Central Asian airspace security norms, allowing Tashkent to influence regional threat perceptions, interoperability standards, and crisis-management mechanisms while insulating itself from abrupt geopolitical realignments driven by external power rivalries. — DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA