US Fires Over 150 THAAD Missiles Defending Israel, Raising Alarm Over Missile Stockpile Depletion

In a stark illustration of modern missile warfare’s growing intensity, the United States military reportedly expended over 150 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors during Israel’s 12-day war with Iran in June 2025, raising serious alarms about the vulnerability of America’s own missile defense reserves.

According to a Wall Street Journal report citing US officials, THAAD operators working alongside Israeli forces launched interceptors at a blistering pace to intercept waves of incoming Iranian ballistic missiles targeting Israeli cities and strategic installations.

This unprecedented expenditure accounts for nearly 25 percent of the THAAD interceptor missiles ever ordered or delivered to the Pentagon, based on Department of Defense procurement records.

 

“Operating alongside Israeli systems, THAAD operators burned through munitions at a furious clip, firing more than 150 missiles to shoot down the waves of Iranian ballistic missiles, according to U.S. officials,” the report stated.

The urgency and volume of launches highlight both the strategic necessity of layered missile defense and the extraordinary logistical and industrial burden such sustained operations impose on even the most advanced militaries.

At a unit cost of approximately USD12.7 million (RM59.5 million) per interceptor, the THAAD system—developed by Lockheed Martin—delivers critical exo-atmospheric interception capabilities, designed to eliminate short- to intermediate-range ballistic threats in their terminal phase.

However, their replenishment is slow and costly, driven by complex manufacturing processes, limited annual production rates, and finite congressional allocations.

In 2024, the Pentagon procured only 11 THAAD interceptors, and projections suggest it will acquire just 12 more by the end of 2025.

At current acquisition rates, the US may only add between 25 to 37 THAAD missiles by 2026—placing a full restocking timeline in the three- to eight-year range, a dangerously long window in a world of escalating multi-theatre tensions.

The 12-day Iran-Israel conflict marked the largest combat deployment of THAAD interceptors in history and underscored the fragility of existing US missile defense stocks in the face of high-intensity missile saturation attacks.

Though the United States maintains seven THAAD batteries globally—including deployments in South Korea, Guam, and the continental US—only two were rushed to Israel at the peak of the conflict, a deployment that proved barely adequate given the volume of Iranian missile launches.

Compounding the situation, Israel reportedly faced a critical shortage of interceptors mid-way through the war, prompting the United States to seek emergency resupply from key regional partners.

Washington is believed to have requested Saudi Arabia to transfer some of its THAAD interceptor inventory to help sustain Israel’s defense posture, but Riyadh declined.

“During the war, we asked everyone to donate,” one US official told Middle East Eye. “When that didn’t work, we tried deal-making. It wasn’t aimed at one country.”

This rare public admission of supply desperation reveals the thin margin within which the Pentagon operates when managing global THAAD allocations.

The United States also reportedly deployed Patriot missile systems and Navy-launched SM-2 and SM-6 missiles to support the Israeli air defense effort during the same conflict.

But it was THAAD that bore the brunt of intercepting high-trajectory ballistic threats, which Iran launched in waves targeting Israeli airbases, critical infrastructure, and population centers.

In the absence of sufficient THAAD coverage, Israeli cities may have suffered catastrophic damage from Shahab-series and Zulfiqar-class ballistic missiles—many of which carry heavy payloads and demonstrate unpredictable flight paths.

The high operational tempo of THAAD batteries throughout the 12-day campaign provided real-world validation of the system’s intercept capabilities but simultaneously exposed a glaring vulnerability: unsustainable munition exhaustion rates in large-scale missile warfare.

The strategic implications of this depletion are not lost on Washington’s defense planners, especially given current tensions in the Indo-Pacific, where the United States is preparing to counter increasingly advanced Chinese missile systems, including the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle and DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

If a Taiwan Strait scenario were to erupt into full-scale conflict, US Indo-Pacific Command would likely require THAAD deployments across Guam, Japan, and the Philippines—placing overwhelming pressure on an already-depleted inventory.

Moreover, in the Korean Peninsula, North Korea’s continued ballistic missile launches—many aimed at simulating saturation attacks—further justify expanded THAAD readiness, but those needs now compete with Middle East resupply and domestic replenishment demands.

With Lockheed Martin facing capacity constraints, there is growing pressure within Congress and the Pentagon to ramp up THAAD interceptor production through multi-year procurement authorities and expedited funding streams.

Yet, even with increased funding, the sheer industrial complexity of THAAD’s kinetic kill vehicle production, integration of radar and fire control systems, and real-time command architecture make surge manufacturing timelines challenging.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been directed to evaluate accelerated production timelines and industrial base expansion, though it remains unclear whether such efforts can restore strategic depth before another flashpoint emerges.

For Israel, the war validated the integration of foreign high-altitude defenses into its existing multi-layered air shield, which includes Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow-2/Arrow-3 systems.

But for the United States, it exposed how even the most advanced missile defense architecture can buckle under prolonged strain without sufficient industrial resilience and stockpile redundancy.

The broader lesson emerging from the Israel-Iran war is clear: in an era of missile-saturated conflict, success is no longer determined solely by technology, but by sustainability—how fast you can reload.

What Is THAAD?

THAAD—short for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense—is a truck-mounted, mobile missile defence system developed by Lockheed Martin under the direction of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

It is uniquely designed to intercept short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their terminal phase, as they re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere on the way to their targets.

Unlike conventional missile systems that use explosive warheads, THAAD interceptors employ a “hit-to-kill” kinetic kill vehicle—destroying enemy missiles by colliding with them at ultra-high speeds, with no warhead required.

How Does THAAD Work?

A standard THAAD battery includes four major components:

1. Interceptor Missiles – These high-speed projectiles travel at over Mach 8 (approx. 9,800 km/h), physically crashing into enemy missiles to destroy them mid-air.
2. AN/TPY-2 Radar – A long-range, X-band radar system capable of detecting and tracking multiple targets from hundreds of kilometres away. It provides real-time target acquisition and classification.
3. Mobile Launchers – Mounted on trucks, THAAD launchers are highly mobile and can be rapidly relocated to operational theatres or forward-deployed areas.
4. Fire Control and Communication Units (TFCC) – The brain of the system, managing radar data, threat discrimination, and interceptor firing decisions within seconds.

Once an enemy missile is launched, the radar detects its trajectory, relays data to the TFCC, and the interceptor is launched—often engaging the threat outside the atmosphere or in high-altitude airspace.

THAAD operates within a layered missile defence architecture, complementing other U.S. and allied systems such as:

• Patriot PAC-3 – Effective against lower-altitude threats.
• Aegis/SM-3 – Deployed on US Navy vessels to intercept missiles during their midcourse phase.
• Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) – Focused on intercontinental threats.

By covering the upper-tier of terminal interception, THAAD enhances both homeland and forward-deployed force protection against missile barrages, including potential nuclear or WMD payloads.

Where Has THAAD Been Deployed?

As of 2025, the United States has deployed THAAD batteries to several strategic locations:

• South Korea (Seongju) – Positioned to counter threats from North Korea’s growing ballistic missile arsenal.
• Guam – Protecting US Indo-Pacific assets from Chinese intermediate-range missile systems like the DF-26.
• United Arab Emirates (UAE) – First export customer, enhancing Arabian Gulf defence posture.
• Saudi Arabia – Fielding THAAD to defend against Iranian ballistic missiles and drone swarms.
• Israel (Temporary Deployment) – Notably during the 12-day war with Iran in June 2025, where US forces launched over 150 THAAD interceptors to shield Israeli cities from missile saturation attacks.
• Continental United States – THAAD batteries are also used to protect critical homeland assets and military infrastructure.