US Blocks Engine Exports for Turkey’s KAAN Fighter Jet: NATO Rift Deepens
US Congress blocks the export of F110 engines for Turkey’s KAAN stealth fighter jet, triggering delays, straining NATO ties, and opening the door for Russia and China to exploit Ankara’s strategic vulnerability.
(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — In a dramatic escalation of defence-industrial tensions between Washington and Ankara, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has confirmed that the United States Congress has blocked the export of crucial engines intended for Turkey’s indigenous KAAN fifth-generation fighter jet program.
This unprecedented move underscores the deep fractures within NATO and highlights the growing mistrust that continues to plague US-Turkey defence relations in the aftermath of Ankara’s acquisition of Russia’s S-400 air defence system.

The decision threatens to delay the KAAN program at a critical stage, undermining Turkey’s ambition to become one of the few nations capable of producing a stealth fighter jet and complicating its aspirations for both domestic deployment and international export success.
Beyond the technical disruption, the blockage carries profound implications for regional power balances in the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, and South Asia, where Ankara has sought to project influence through defence exports and indigenous military technology.
Turkey now faces an acute dilemma—either accelerate the development of its domestic engine technology, seek alternative suppliers from Russia or China, or risk strategic vulnerability by extending reliance on its ageing fleet of F-16s.
The KAAN program, long heralded as the jewel of Turkey’s indigenous defence sector, suddenly finds itself entangled in the geopolitics of sanctions, alliance politics, and competing great power strategies.
New intelligence assessments from European think tanks warn that any major delay in the KAAN’s entry into service could give Greece and Israel a decisive generational advantage with their growing F-35 fleets.
Meanwhile, Turkish defence industry insiders reveal that TRMotor’s indigenous engine program has been accelerated with emergency funding injections, though most analysts agree it remains at least seven years away from maturity.
There are also indications that Ankara is lobbying sympathetic NATO partners, such as Hungary and Italy, to mediate with Washington in hopes of reversing the congressional embargo on engines.
At the same time, Chinese defence commentators have speculated that Beijing may view Turkey’s predicament as a golden opportunity to market its WS-15 engine or propose joint development, a move that would further strain Ankara’s already fragile relationship with the United States.

Background on the KAAN Fighter Jet Program
The KAAN, formerly designated the TF-X, represents Turkey’s boldest defence-industrial project to date, an attempt to catapult Ankara into the exclusive club of nations capable of building fifth-generation stealth combat aircraft.
The program, launched in 2010 under Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), aims to replace the Turkish Air Force’s legacy F-16 fleet while simultaneously providing Ankara with an exportable product to rival platforms like the US F-35, China’s J-31/J-35, and South Korea’s KF-21 Boramae.
The prototype of the KAAN was rolled out in 2023, making its maiden flight in February 2024, a symbolic moment that Ankara celebrated as proof of Turkey’s rising aerospace ambitions despite years of sanctions and technology denials from its Western allies.
Designed with advanced stealth shaping, integrated avionics, and the ability to achieve supercruise without afterburners, the KAAN is marketed as a platform capable of competing directly with fifth-generation Western and Chinese designs.
Ankara has promoted the KAAN not only as a national defence asset but also as a prospective export product to friendly nations, particularly those excluded from the F-35 program or reluctant to rely on Washington’s political strings.
The aircraft’s early prototypes rely on US-manufactured General Electric F110-GE-129 turbofan engines, the same engines powering upgraded F-16s, with Turkey planning to build 20 KAANs using this configuration before switching to an indigenous powerplant.
This transition hinges on TRMotor, a joint venture involving Turkish engine manufacturers such as Kale Group, tasked with developing a domestic turbofan capable of matching fifth-generation requirements by 2032.
Indonesia became the first international partner in July 2025, investing in the program as part of Jakarta’s strategic effort to diversify away from Western suppliers, while Pakistan has been in exploratory talks to join as a partner and eventual customer.
The KAAN also integrates Turkish-made AESA radar, mission software, and electronic warfare suites, distinguishing it from South Korea’s KF-21, which still relies heavily on US subsystems.
Turkey envisions the KAAN as both a strategic deterrent and a lucrative export vehicle, potentially reshaping its defence export profile in parallel with UAV successes such as the Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı.
The US Congress’s Decision and Fidan’s Statement
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed in his address that Washington had blocked the export licenses for GE’s F110 engines, calling the move “a deliberate obstruction against Turkey’s rightful ambition to secure its national defence independence.”
He linked the congressional decision directly to wider disputes within the alliance, accusing the US of leveraging military technology as a political weapon against Ankara’s strategic autonomy.
The blocked engines are vital for Turkey’s planned Block 0 and Block 1 production runs of the KAAN, expected to provide the Turkish Air Force with initial operational capability before the integration of a domestic engine.
The timing of the congressional obstruction coincides with Ankara’s attempts to restructure a $7 billion arms deal with the United States, previously centred on new F-16s and missile packages, to instead prioritise engine supply and local co-production rights.
Turkey had requested permission not only to import the F110 engines but also to assemble both F110 and F404 engines locally to reduce dependency, create industrial spillover, and accelerate its indigenous propulsion ambitions.
US lawmakers, however, have resisted these requests, citing national security concerns, intellectual property sensitivities, and mistrust over Ankara’s willingness to align with NATO policies.
For Ankara, the denial represents more than a technical hurdle—it is a symbolic message that Washington remains unwilling to trust Turkey with advanced aerospace technologies unless Ankara reverses its geopolitical choices.
Reasons Behind the Blockage
The roots of the congressional decision lie in the geopolitical earthquake of 2019, when Turkey defied repeated US warnings and acquired Russia’s S-400 Triumf long-range surface-to-air missile system.
This decision prompted Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program and triggered sanctions under Washington’s Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
US officials argue that the S-400, when deployed in close proximity to NATO aircraft, risks exposing sensitive radar signatures and potentially compromising the stealth profile of advanced Western jets.
Despite Turkey’s proposals to store the S-400 under supervision, operate it independently of NATO systems, or create technical safeguards, Washington has remained firm that only complete divestment would restore trust.
The dispute has since metastasized into broader disagreements—ranging from US military support for Kurdish YPG forces in Syria, which Ankara designates as terrorists, to Turkey’s refusal to fully enforce Western sanctions against Russia.
Turkey’s continued imports of Russian oil and natural gas, combined with its mediation in high-profile initiatives such as the Black Sea Grain Deal, have fuelled bipartisan suspicion in Washington.
Congressional hawks have pushed to extend restrictions beyond the F-35 to include all high-end aerospace technology, fearing that Turkey’s policies risk undermining NATO cohesion while indirectly empowering Moscow.
Thus, the engine blockage reflects not just a technical dispute but a political stand—punishing Ankara for policies deemed incompatible with Western strategic unity.
Implications for Turkey’s Defence and Beyond
The immediate impact of the blockage is a potential delay to the KAAN’s production schedule, with serial deliveries originally targeted for 2028 now at risk of slipping well into the 2030s.
Without US-supplied F110 engines, Turkey may struggle to field even its limited batch of Block 0 and Block 1 fighters, creating an operational gap that forces continued reliance on its ageing F-16s.
This gap comes at a time when regional airpower competition is intensifying, with Greece pursuing the F-35A Lightning II, Israel upgrading its F-35I Adir fleet, and Egypt exploring options for advanced Russian or French fighters.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, where tensions over maritime boundaries and energy exploration persist, delays in KAAN deployment could tilt the balance in favour of adversaries with more modern air fleets.
Turkey may be compelled to seek interim solutions, such as additional F-16 upgrades, or even pivot toward Russian or Chinese engine suppliers to keep the KAAN project alive.
Such a pivot, however, would deepen Ankara’s estrangement from NATO and expose it to further US sanctions, while also raising risks of technology compromise and intellectual property disputes.
For prospective customers like Pakistan, which viewed KAAN as a counterbalance to India’s Rafale and potential Su-57 acquisitions, delays could derail procurement timelines and complicate strategic planning.
Economically, the setback undermines Ankara’s ambition to turn the KAAN into a multi-billion-dollar export programme capable of rivaling the success of Turkish UAVs in markets from Azerbaijan to Africa.
Yet the crisis may also serve as a catalyst for Turkey’s defence industry to double down on domestic propulsion research, accelerating TRMotor’s development despite the formidable technical challenges of producing a fifth-generation-class engine.
To sustain momentum, Turkey may need to expand its defence budget well beyond the current $45–47 billion range, prioritising aerospace independence at the expense of other procurement projects.
Reactions and Broader Context
Reactions within Turkey have been defiant, with officials stressing that the KAAN is already 80 percent indigenous and will not be derailed by congressional obstruction.
Defence analysts on Turkish media platforms and social networks have urged Ankara to explore engine options from Russia’s Saturn AL-41 or China’s WS-15 programs, though such moves would carry enormous political consequences.
In Washington, the blockage aligns with long-standing congressional scepticism toward Turkey’s role in NATO, with lawmakers frequently citing Ankara’s “transactional” approach to alliances.
This development mirrors past disputes, from the F-35 expulsion in 2019 to the protracted debates over approving F-16 sales in 2024, demonstrating the persistence of distrust despite areas of cooperation.
Notably, the US continues to cooperate with Turkey on F-16 upgrades and limited arms sales, reflecting a pragmatic recognition of Ankara’s strategic importance while limiting access to cutting-edge technologies.
The engine blockage, therefore, highlights the dual nature of US-Turkey ties—indispensable in some areas yet bitterly contested in others, shaped by diverging geopolitical priorities.
READ: Jakarta Becomes First Foreign Operator of Türkiye’s KAAN Fifth-Gen Fighter in Landmark Aerospace Pact
Conclusion
The US Congress’s decision to block the export of F110 engines for the KAAN program represents a watershed moment in the trajectory of Turkey’s defence-industrial ambitions.
It exposes the vulnerabilities of Ankara’s reliance on foreign suppliers for critical technologies while simultaneously reinforcing its determination to pursue technological sovereignty at all costs.
In the short term, the decision delays Turkey’s entry into the fifth-generation fighter club and complicates its regional airpower calculus, particularly against rivals armed with F-35s.
In the longer term, it may accelerate Ankara’s pivot toward non-Western suppliers or galvanise its domestic engine development efforts, reshaping Turkey’s defence trajectory for decades to come.
At stake is more than just an aircraft—it is the future of Turkey’s role in NATO, the resilience of the transatlantic alliance, and the evolving balance of power across one of the world’s most volatile geostrategic regions.
The KAAN’s fate will thus serve as both a barometer and a battleground for the intersection of technology, geopolitics, and national ambition in the 21st century.
Already, reports from Ankara suggest that Turkish defence planners are intensifying dialogue with Pakistan and Azerbaijan to establish a broader KAAN consortium that could share the costs and risks of engine development.
At the same time, Turkish officials have quietly expanded exploratory contacts with Ukraine’s Motor Sich and even South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace, seeking potential interim solutions until the TRMotor engine is ready.
Analysts caution that any reliance on Russian or Chinese engines would not only invite further US sanctions but also compromise Turkey’s leverage within NATO, deepening suspicions about Ankara’s long-term strategic alignment.
Ultimately, the coming years will determine whether Turkey transforms this crisis into a springboard for genuine aerospace independence or whether the KAAN project becomes another victim of the great-power rivalries that increasingly define the Indo-Pacific and European security landscapes. — DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA

No one should be buying military equipment from the US if it is at all possible to avoid it. The US will strangle a country with legal maneuvering and sanctions even for allies. US technology should be avoided unless you get an irrevocable license to manufacture in your own country and have full right to repair and modify.
well done Norm dill, usa is exact same like china and russia.