Saudi TV Exposes Alleged UAE Construction of Israeli-Capable Runway on Yemen’s Mayun Island, Raising Stakes in Red Sea Power Struggle

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — The disclosure by Saudi state television that the United Arab Emirates has constructed a runway on Yemen’s Mayun Island capable of supporting Israeli military aircraft represents a profound escalation in the militarisation of one of the world’s most strategically sensitive maritime chokepoints, directly intersecting regional proxy warfare, Israel–Iran confrontation dynamics, and the global security of energy and commercial shipping lanes.

According to a source within Yemen’s internationally recognised, Aden-based government cited by Saudi News Channel, “The UAE has built a runway for Israeli aircraft to land on Mayon Island in the Bab al-Mandab Strait in the Yemeni governorate of Taiz,” a statement that, if validated, confirms a decisive shift from covert logistical presence to overt strategic basing with multinational implications.

This alleged development emerges against the backdrop of intensified Houthi missile and drone campaigns across the Red Sea theatre, Israeli kinetic operations tied to the Gaza war, and Iran’s expanding maritime denial posture, positioning Mayun Island as a potential fulcrum for airborne surveillance, interdiction, and strike coordination operations.

A geo-political analyst previously characterised the UAE’s runway construction on Mayun as part of a “longer-term strategic aim to establish a relatively permanent presence,” signalling that the island’s militarisation was never tactically limited to Yemen’s internal conflict but instead embedded within broader regional force-posture calculations.

A regional defence observer contextualised this trajectory by observing that “The Horn of Africa had become a dangerous place for Emiratis due to competitors and local war risks, but Mayun offered a site for monitoring the Red Sea,” reflecting Abu Dhabi’s doctrinal transition from outward power projection toward layered power protection against non-state and state-aligned threats.

The strategic significance of these remarks is amplified by the post-Abraham Accords security realignment, which transformed UAE–Israel relations from diplomatic normalisation into operational military coordination, intelligence sharing, and defence-industrial integration, particularly in counter-Iranian and counter-proxy frameworks.

Positioned astride the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—through which approximately nine percent of global oil trade transits daily—Mayun Island offers unparalleled control over aerial and maritime surveillance of shipping routes linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, elevating any permanent runway there into a high-value strategic asset.

As Houthi forces continue to frame their regional campaign as part of an “epic battle” against Israel and the United States, the alleged Israeli access to Mayun risks transforming Yemen’s fractured battlespace into a direct theatre of Israel–Iran confrontation, with cascading implications for Saudi Arabia, global commerce, and regional escalation thresholds.

Yemen’s Fragmented Warzone and the Enduring Strategic Centrality of Mayun Island

Yemen’s civil war, ignited in 2014 following the Houthi seizure of Sanaa, rapidly metastasised into a regional proxy conflict when the Saudi-led coalition, including the UAE, intervened in 2015 to restore the government of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, embedding the country within a multilayered contest between Gulf states and Iran.

Over nearly a decade of sustained conflict, Yemen has become a laboratory for missile proliferation, drone warfare, and maritime coercion, with the Houthis conducting increasingly sophisticated strikes against Saudi and Emirati infrastructure while leveraging geography to threaten international shipping routes.

Mayun Island, also known as Perim Island, occupies a uniquely advantageous position at the western mouth of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, granting its controller the ability to monitor, interdict, or potentially disrupt maritime traffic across one of the most economically vital sea lanes on the planet.

Historically, the island’s strategic value was recognised by successive empires, hosting Ottoman and British military installations that underscored its enduring relevance as a forward operating node for maritime dominance and aerial reconnaissance.

During the early phases of Yemen’s war, Mayun briefly fell under Houthi control before being recaptured by UAE-backed forces in 2015, after which it became effectively inaccessible to independent Yemeni governance structures.

Satellite imagery beginning in 2021 revealed rapid construction of a 1.85-kilometre runway accompanied by multiple hangars, fuel storage zones, and hardened infrastructure, developments that contradicted the UAE’s official narrative of having withdrawn military forces from Yemen in 2019.

Yemeni military officials attributed these activities to Emirati logistical shipments and engineering detachments arriving via UAE vessels, reinforcing assessments that Abu Dhabi retained a decisive operational footprint despite formal drawdown announcements.

Analysts assessment that the UAE’s posture had shifted from “power-projection” to “power-protection” is particularly salient in this context, as Mayun offers insulation from mainland insurgent seizure while preserving strategic visibility across Red Sea maritime corridors.

Saudi Television’s Disclosure and the Israeli Dimension of Mayun’s Runway

The Saudi News Channel’s 2026 broadcast marked the first time a state-aligned Arab media outlet explicitly linked the Mayun runway to Israeli military operations, elevating long-circulating allegations into a geopolitical flashpoint with significant diplomatic consequences.

The report asserted that the airstrip was constructed specifically to accommodate Israeli aircraft, a capability that would allow Israel to conduct long-range surveillance, refuelling, or precision strike missions against Houthi targets or Iranian supply networks without relying on distant bases.

Social media amplification by influential commentators rapidly disseminated the claim, including posts stating, “Saudi TV: The UAE has built a runway for Israeli aircraft to land on Mayun Island in Yemen,” reinforcing its penetration into global information ecosystems.

Pro-Houthi outlets such as Yemen Press Agency and Almasirah have long framed the installation as a “UAE-Israeli military base,” citing satellite imagery documenting runway extension, hangar expansion, and support facilities dating back to 2021.

A November 2025 Almasirah report alleged the runway was sufficient for military aircraft operations and accused both the UAE and Israel of employing the base for espionage and sabotage activities, language consistent with Houthi strategic messaging.

The Houthis’ SABA news agency condemned the installation as a “serious violation of Yemeni sovereignty,” warning that it endangered neighbouring states and legitimised retaliation under their self-declared maritime resistance doctrine.

Houthi spokespersons further linked the runway to their Red Sea campaign, framing it as justification for ongoing attacks against vessels they claim support Israel amid the Gaza conflict.

In contrast, UAE officials reiterated that “Any presence of the UAE is based on humanitarian grounds that is carried out in cooperation with the Yemen government and local authorities,” while avoiding direct engagement with claims of Israeli operational access.

UAE–Israel Military Convergence After the Abraham Accords

The 2020 Abraham Accords fundamentally restructured Middle Eastern security alignments by formalising UAE–Israel relations, unlocking rapid expansion in intelligence sharing, defence technology transfers, and joint threat-perception frameworks focused on Iran and its regional proxies.

Bilateral trade between the UAE and Israel has exceeded USD 2.5 billion annually, equivalent to approximately MYR 11.8 billion, with defence-related transactions encompassing surveillance technologies, cyber capabilities, and missile-defence cooperation.

In the Yemeni theatre, this partnership potentially translates into shared intelligence on Iranian arms smuggling routes, real-time maritime domain awareness, and forward basing options to compress response timelines against asymmetric threats.

Analysts have suggested that Mayun’s runway could enable Israeli aerial refuelling for long-range sorties or persistent ISR operations monitoring Iranian maritime logistics moving through the Red Sea corridor.

Analyst observed that “The Houthis, like any insurgent group, win by not losing,” underscoring why coalition forces increasingly seek structural advantages rather than decisive battlefield victories.

Another prominent analyst noted that “The Houthis feed off war—war is good for them,” explaining why symbolic escalation narratives resonate within Houthi mobilisation strategies.

Satellite imagery from Planet Labs corroborates ongoing UAE-linked infrastructure expansion across nearby islands such as Zuqar and Abd al-Kuri, where runways approaching 2,000 metres have been documented.

Ardemagni assessed that “A likely Emirati airstrip in Zuqar could serve to improve surveillance and monitoring off the Hodeida coast to better support Yemeni forces in tackling smuggling,” indicating an integrated network rather than an isolated installation.

Escalation Risks, Regional Reactions, and Maritime Security Fallout

The alleged Israeli-capable runway on Mayun materially elevates escalation risks across the Red Sea, particularly as Houthi forces intensify missile and drone attacks against shipping they associate with Israel or its allies.

Since October 2023, the Bab el-Mandeb has witnessed a surge in attacks against Israeli-linked vessels, U.S. naval assets, and regional commercial shipping, destabilising global trade flows and insurance markets.

An Israeli forward operating capability on Yemeni soil could provoke direct Houthi retaliation, potentially triggering Israeli counterstrikes and widening the conflict envelope beyond proxy engagement.

For Saudi Arabia, the disclosure exposes underlying fissures within the coalition, as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi pursue divergent end-states in Yemen, particularly regarding southern separatism and port control.

The Saudi television report itself may signal institutional discomfort with Emirati unilateralism, reflecting earlier tensions over airport management, arms interdiction, and influence competition.

Iran is likely to interpret the development as a strategic encirclement measure, incentivising accelerated weapons transfers to the Houthis and heightening maritime shadow warfare risks.

Mohammed al-Basha warned, “I don’t see a way in 2025 that we have a de-escalation with the Houthis,” highlighting the structural improbability of conflict resolution under current dynamics.

Broader implications extend into the Horn of Africa, where UAE bases in Eritrea and Somaliland complement Mayun’s positioning, reinforcing Abu Dhabi’s Red Sea security architecture.

Strategic Trajectories and the Future of Red Sea Militarisation

Defence analysts caution that while Mayun Island offers immediate tactical advantages for counter-smuggling operations, maritime domain awareness, and forward ISR coverage, Yemen’s deeply fragmented alliance architecture structurally inhibits the formation of a unified, sustained offensive against the Houthis, thereby transforming the runway’s value from a decisive operational enabler into a long-term positional asset whose effectiveness depends on external coalition coherence rather than local force integration.

The Southern Transitional Council, Tariq Saleh’s coastal forces, and residual Hadi-aligned military elements operate according to mutually incompatible political end-states—ranging from southern secession to regime restoration—which erodes command-and-control unity, fragments targeting coordination, and prevents the consolidation of a singular operational doctrine capable of exploiting forward basing at Mayun for decisive battlefield outcomes.

International aviation and maritime regulatory bodies have expressed concern that the absence of formal civil or military aviation declarations for newly constructed runways introduces significant legal, sovereignty, and airspace governance ambiguities, creating a permissive grey zone that can be exploited for deniable military operations while simultaneously increasing the risk of miscalculation, contested jurisdiction, and escalation involving third-party commercial traffic.

Humanitarian organisations warn that the accelerating militarisation of Yemen’s peripheral islands exacerbates an already catastrophic humanitarian environment—where more than 20 million civilians face acute food insecurity—by diverting political attention, financial resources, and diplomatic leverage away from stabilisation mechanisms and toward force-posture competition embedded within external geopolitical rivalries.

A geopolitical analyst criticised the UAE’s expanding footprint by stating, “UAE has even annexed a Yemeni Island (Socotra) together with Israel to establish a spying base,” a claim that reflects widening regional anxiety over the erosion of Yemeni sovereignty through incremental militarisation justified under the rubric of counter-threat deterrence and maritime security.

Although Abu Dhabi consistently frames its posture across Yemen’s islands as defensive and stabilisation-oriented, the cumulative effect of dispersed, hardened airstrips across Mayun, Zuqar, Abd al-Kuri, and Socotra constitutes a de facto forward basing network with latent offensive utility, enabling rapid force projection, cross-theatre ISR fusion, and escalation dominance well beyond Yemen’s internal conflict parameters.

The Saudi television disclosure therefore exposes a broader transformation in the Middle Eastern security order, wherein non-traditional alliances, post-normalisation military convergence, and expeditionary infrastructure replace conventional coalition warfare as the primary mechanisms for controlling strategic chokepoints and shaping regional power balances.

Another analyst cautioned, “An outbreak in the war could be a reality in the next few months,” underscoring that Mayun Island is no longer a peripheral outpost but a strategic bellwether whose militarisation may serve as both a trigger and an amplifier for wider Red Sea and Middle Eastern escalation dynamics. — DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA