Indonesia Moves Toward Aircraft Carrier Era With Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi Acquisition Talks

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Indonesia has formally acknowledged that discussions are underway with Italy to acquire the retired light aircraft carrier ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi, a move that, if realized, could dramatically alter the maritime balance of power in Southeast Asia.

The confirmation by Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Muhammad Ali represents Jakarta’s boldest signal yet that it is prepared to step into the exclusive club of carrier-operating nations.

“The matter of the aircraft carrier can be further clarified with the Italians, but we are seeking to acquire the Garibaldi, which previously served with the Italian Navy, and we hope this will reinforce our fleet,” Admiral Ali declared during the commissioning of the new KRI Brawijaya-320 at Tanjung Priok.

For the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL), the acquisition would mark the first time it has operated an aircraft carrier, instantly upgrading its status from a green-water defensive force into a blue-water player with power projection capability across the Indo-Pacific.

Ali explained that the ship would initially be employed for “Operations Other Than War” (OMSP), such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security patrols, but he also left open the possibility of full combat deployment if circumstances demanded.

This acknowledgment highlights a doctrinal evolution within TNI-AL, which until now has been structured around frigates, corvettes, and amphibious assault ships, rather than capital ships designed for sustained air operations at sea.

Garibaldi: A Compact Yet Combat-Proven Carrier

Launched in 1985, the 14,000-tonne Giuseppe Garibaldi was Italy’s first through-deck carrier, built specifically to operate AV-8B Harrier II jump jets and anti-submarine warfare helicopters.

Measuring 180 metres in length, equipped with a ski-jump deck, and powered by four LM2500 gas turbines capable of driving the vessel to 30 knots, the ship was designed as a fast, versatile flagship for NATO tasking.

Throughout its career, Garibaldi proved its combat credentials in multiple NATO operations, from the Kosovo air campaign in 1999 to supporting coalition strikes in Afghanistan and enforcing maritime control during the 2011 Libya intervention.

This operational pedigree makes the ship a compelling option for Indonesia, offering a tested platform that has demonstrated the ability to project sustained sea-based airpower.

Although compact by global carrier standards, Garibaldi was engineered to deliver maximum sortie rates within its size class, making it an ideal platform for smaller navies seeking credible but affordable aviation capability.

The ship’s ability to embark a mix of helicopters for anti-submarine warfare, amphibious assault support, and humanitarian operations underlines its versatility and relevance to archipelagic states like Indonesia.

For NATO, Garibaldi acted not only as a carrier but also as a command-and-control hub, integrating seamlessly with allied assets—a feature Indonesia could exploit in ASEAN or UN-led coalitions.

The vessel’s combat experience validates its design philosophy: that even a modestly sized carrier can influence operational outcomes in both high-intensity and stability operations.

From a cost-benefit perspective, acquiring a proven hull like Garibaldi offers Indonesia an accelerated path to carrier capability without the prohibitive expense of developing an indigenous platform from scratch.

Its relatively small displacement also means lower operating costs compared to supercarriers, while still delivering a visible deterrent and a credible flag-showing asset.

Most importantly, Garibaldi provides a stepping stone for TNI-AL to gain experience in carrier aviation doctrine, paving the way for future indigenous or joint-development projects in the decades ahead.

Strategic Implications for Southeast Asia

Indonesia’s pursuit of Giuseppe Garibaldi comes at a time when the Indo-Pacific has become the world’s most contested maritime theatre, defined by great-power rivalry, grey-zone operations, and escalating naval competition.

China has already fielded three aircraft carriers—the Liaoning, Shandong, and the conventionally powered Fujian—with additional hulls expected by the early 2030s, marking Beijing’s determination to achieve blue-water dominance.

Although Jakarta’s prospective Garibaldi would not match these Chinese supercarriers in scale, sortie generation, or modern aviation technology, the acquisition itself would represent a profound symbolic and operational shift in Southeast Asia’s naval balance.

It would signal that Indonesia, the largest maritime nation in ASEAN, intends to transition from a reactive coastal defence posture to one where it can shape outcomes in regional security through sustained air and sea presence.

Geographically, Indonesia’s leverage is unmatched—it straddles the Strait of Malacca, Sunda Strait, and Lombok Strait, maritime chokepoints through which more than one-third of global trade and much of East Asia’s energy imports flow.

A carrier-capable TNI-AL would allow Jakarta to maintain persistent surveillance and air cover across these waterways, effectively granting it a de facto veto over maritime access during times of crisis.

The platform would also give Indonesia the ability to lead regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions, a critical capability in an archipelago prone to earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions.

Equally important, the carrier could serve as a deterrent against non-traditional threats such as illegal fishing, piracy, and grey-zone tactics increasingly used by foreign maritime militias and coast guards in contested waters.

In multilateral terms, Indonesia could deploy Garibaldi as a flagship during joint naval exercises or UN peace-support missions, boosting its diplomatic influence and strengthening its position as a central ASEAN security provider.

The psychological impact of a Southeast Asian nation operating an aircraft carrier should not be underestimated—it would force neighbours like Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines to recalibrate their maritime strategies.

For Washington, an Indonesian carrier would present a valuable partner asset in promoting “collective maritime security” without binding Jakarta too closely to U.S.-led alliances, preserving Indonesia’s cherished policy of strategic autonomy.

For Beijing, however, Jakarta’s acquisition would be viewed as a direct assertion of maritime independence at a time when China seeks to expand its influence across the South China Sea and into the Indian Ocean.

The move would therefore position Indonesia as a balancing power in the Indo-Pacific, one that can engage both Washington and Beijing on its own terms while securing its archipelagic lifelines from external coercion.

Ultimately, the Garibaldi acquisition is less about the ship’s inherent capabilities than about the message it sends: Indonesia is prepared to redefine its naval identity and assume a decisive role in shaping Southeast Asia’s maritime future.

Strengthening Ties With Italy

Indonesia’s interest in Garibaldi reflects deepening defence ties with Italy, which recently delivered the KRI Brawijaya-320 and has been actively pursuing further naval cooperation.

Admiral Ali had already inspected Garibaldi during Italian naval exercises in May 2024, while in September 2024 three Italian warships made a reciprocal visit to Jakarta, reinforcing the growing bilateral relationship.

For Rome, the transfer of Garibaldi would extend Italy’s defence industry footprint into Southeast Asia, complementing its export of advanced frigates and potentially opening pathways for technology transfer in naval aviation and shipbuilding.

Challenges of Integration

For Indonesia, integrating Garibaldi into TNI-AL will not be without difficulty.

The absence of STOVL fighters such as the Harrier or F-35B means the ship would most likely be employed as a helicopter and UAV carrier, requiring doctrinal adjustments and investments in unmanned aviation.

Upgrades to sensors, electronic warfare systems, and point-defense weapons will be essential to ensure survivability in modern high-threat environments.

Training flight deck crews, aviation handlers, and commanders for carrier operations will represent a steep learning curve, demanding international partnerships and significant resource allocation.

Yet these challenges are counterbalanced by the strategic advantages of possessing a carrier, even one configured primarily for rotary-wing and unmanned operations.

A Rare Second Life for a European Carrier

Should Jakarta proceed, Garibaldi would become one of the few European carriers to find a second life in another navy, reinforcing Indonesia’s stature as an emerging maritime power.

For TNI-AL, the ship would provide a crucial testbed for developing carrier aviation doctrine and a symbol of prestige that elevates Indonesia’s position in the regional security architecture.

For Southeast Asia, it would mark the arrival of a new naval force projection capability at a time of fragile balance between regional powers and major external actors.

Jakarta’s Maritime Gamble

Indonesia’s negotiations with Italy for the Giuseppe Garibaldi are more than a ship acquisition—they represent Jakarta’s boldest declaration of intent in modern naval history.

By moving to secure a light aircraft carrier, Indonesia is signalling that it no longer accepts the role of a reactive, archipelagic navy limited to coastal defence and narrow strait patrols.

Instead, Jakarta is setting its sights on transforming TNI-AL into a force with genuine blue-water credentials, capable of shaping events far beyond its immediate territorial waters.

This ambition is rooted in Indonesia’s strategic geography, which places it astride the world’s busiest maritime chokepoints—the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits—that together carry a third of global trade and much of East Asia’s energy supply.

With a carrier at its disposal, Jakarta would gain the ability to maintain air cover for task groups, extend surveillance horizons, and command maritime operations across the Indo-Pacific, from the South China Sea to the eastern Indian Ocean.

The move would also enhance Indonesia’s deterrence posture, not just against grey-zone incursions and piracy, but against the possibility of high-end conflict spilling into Southeast Asian waters.

In strategic terms, the acquisition positions Indonesia as a counterweight to China’s rapidly expanding carrier fleet, which already includes the Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian, and serves notice that Jakarta intends to secure strategic autonomy between Washington and Beijing.

Domestically, it elevates Indonesia’s defence industry aspirations by creating the need for new logistics chains, deck operations training, naval aviation infrastructure, and a cadre of carrier-qualified officers who could one day form the backbone of an indigenous carrier programme.

For ASEAN and Southeast Asia as a whole, the arrival of an Indonesian carrier would force regional states to reassess their naval postures, catalyse new partnerships, and potentially alter the calculus of both defence cooperation and competition.

Yet the gamble is immense, with challenges ranging from funding and refits to operational integration and training, and any misstep could saddle Jakarta with a prestige asset that consumes resources without delivering strategic returns.

If successful, however, Indonesia’s carrier leap will not only redefine its navy but also recast the strategic geometry of Southeast Asia, ensuring that Jakarta emerges as a decisive maritime player in the Indo-Pacific balance of power for decades to come. — DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA