India Races to Buy 114 Rafales Amid Air Force Crisis — But France’s Source Code Refusal Threatens the Deal

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — India is accelerating its push to acquire 114 additional Rafale fighter jets under a government-to-government (G2G) framework, in what could be the single largest fighter aircraft deal in its history.

The move comes as the Indian Air Force (IAF) grapples with its lowest-ever squadron strength, a crisis worsened by the imminent retirement of the MiG-21 fleet that has long been the backbone of India’s aerial defence.

Pakistan’s reported acquisition of 40 J-35 stealth fighters from China could also have played a decisive role in New Delhi’s reported move to expand its Rafale fleet in order to preserve the regional balance of airpower.

The induction of the J-35, with its fifth-generation stealth features and long-range strike capabilities, would significantly strengthen Pakistan’s aerial combat potential and compel India to accelerate its efforts to safeguard its technological edge.”

Yet, New Delhi’s Rafale ambitions for the 4.5 generation French-made fighter jet face a potentially deal-breaking obstacle: France’s refusal to hand over the Rafale’s source code, the digital heart that governs mission systems, weapons integration, and avionics.

Despite persistent lobbying, Dassault Aviation has held the line, arguing that the software architecture represents decades of sensitive industrial know-how and cannot be surrendered to foreign operators.

India, however, insists that code access is critical for embedding indigenous weapons such as the Astra beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile, Rudram anti-radiation missile, and Smart Anti-Airfield Weapon (SAAW) into the Rafale’s ecosystem.

This demand is part of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (Self-Reliant India) initiative, which seeks to cut dependency on foreign suppliers and establish an independent defence industrial base.

According to Indian defence officials, “the Indian Air Force (IAF) plans to submit the case for Acceptance of Necessity (AoN), an early but essential step in India’s procurement process, to the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) by October 2025.”

The IAF currently operates only 31 squadrons, far below the sanctioned strength of 42.5 needed to sustain a two-front conflict with China and Pakistan.

With the last MiG-21s set to retire next month, India’s fighter strength will shrink further to 29 squadrons, the lowest in the nation’s history.

A senior IAF official noted, “Government will take the final decision when the MRFA case comes to DAC. But yes, IAF has projected an urgent need for additional Rafales to stem the depletion in the number of its fighter squadrons.”

The urgency was amplified after the short but intense border conflict with Pakistan in May, where New Delhi allegedly lost up to six frontline jets, including Su-30MKIs, Mirage 2000s, and even three Rafales.

Pakistan claimed these kills were executed by PLAAF-supplied J-10C fighters armed with the long-range PL-15 air-to-air missile, raising alarms in New Delhi about the credibility of its airpower edge.

The PL-15, with a reported range exceeding 200 kilometers, has already shifted South Asia’s BVR balance, forcing India to prioritize countermeasures and accelerate missile integration programs.

Against this backdrop, IAF commanders argue that a direct G2G Rafale purchase would be faster and more economical than a global tender, avoiding delays in negotiations and integration.

India already operates 36 Rafales, acquired under a €7.8 billion (RM37.5 billion) deal signed in 2016, with deliveries completed between 2020 and 2022.

These Rafales are forward-deployed at Ambala Airbase near Pakistan and Hasimara Airbase near the Chinese frontier, underscoring their role in India’s two-front war doctrine.

In April 2025, India also signed a US$7.4 billion (RM33.3 billion) deal for 26 Rafale-M naval fighters, to replace the MiG-29K fleet aboard INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya.

The naval Rafales will give India fourth-plus-generation carrier-based strike capability, essential as China expands its carrier fleet and increases presence in the Indian Ocean.

The Rafale, a twin-engine 4.5-generation multirole fighter, is powered by two Snecma M88-2 afterburning turbofan engines and is capable of supercruise at Mach 1.4 without afterburner, offering a high thrust-to-weight ratio and extended range.

Equipped with the Thales RBE2-AA Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, the Rafale can track up to 40 targets and engage 8 simultaneously at ranges exceeding 100 km, making it one of the most advanced radar systems in its class.

The aircraft also features the Spectra electronic warfare suite, which includes radar warning receivers, jammers, and infrared missile warning sensors capable of detecting and defeating modern threats through active and passive countermeasures.

India’s Rafale fleet is further equipped with Helmet Mounted Display Systems (HMDS), Thales Front Sector Optronics (FSO), IRST (Infrared Search and Track), and advanced data links for real-time network-centric operations.

The Rafale’s combat punch includes integration with the Meteor BVR missile with a no-escape zone of over 60 km, the SCALP-EG long-range cruise missile capable of precision strikes up to 500 km, and the Hammer (AASM) modular air-to-ground precision munitions.

Despite this growing cooperation between New Delhi and Paris, the source code dispute remains a critical stumbling block for India’s plan to expand its Rafale fleet.

The code controls mission-critical components such as the Modular Mission Computer (MMC) and the Rafale’s radar-electronic interface, both vital for seamless weapons integration.

Without access, India would remain dependent on French approval for upgrades, limiting its ability to adapt the Rafale for AI-driven warfare, EW countermeasures, and rapid mission reprogramming.

“The absence of source code access represents a significant obstacle to India’s broader defence modernization agenda,” said a senior IAF official.

The issue echoes past frustrations with the Mirage 2000 fleet, where India struggled to conduct local upgrades due to restrictions on software access.

France has offered limited collaboration through joint technical teams and restricted software kits, but this falls short of New Delhi’s demand for full autonomy.

Military planners argue that unrestricted access would allow India to rapidly integrate homegrown subsystems, enhance mission flexibility, and reduce logistic dependency.

French officials counter that source code access poses serious risks, including the possibility of reverse engineering, cyber intrusions, and export leaks to rival states.

They also fear that granting India such access could set a precedent for other Rafale operators like Egypt, Qatar, and Indonesia, undermining Dassault’s export leverage.

For Paris, the code represents a strategic industrial crown jewel, developed at massive financial cost and critical for sustaining France’s aerospace independence.

Furthermore, unauthorized modifications by third parties could jeopardize airframe integrity, safety certifications, and long-term support agreements, potentially damaging the entire Rafale export program.

While workarounds exist, such as integrating Indian weapons via external pods or fire-and-forget modes, these are suboptimal, reducing the Rafale’s full sensor-fusion and network-centric warfare potential.

This battle over digital sovereignty may ultimately decide whether India secures 114 more Rafales, or pivots toward alternative platforms like the Su-57E, F-35A, or indigenous AMCA stealth fighter under development.

At stake is not just India’s fighter fleet strength, but the future balance of airpower in South Asia, where China’s J-20 stealth fighters and Pakistan’s J-10C squadrons are already reshaping the regional skies.

India’s Rafale Gambit: How 114 New Fighters Could Reshape South Asia’s Airpower Balance

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is currently at its weakest operational strength in history, fielding only 29–31 squadrons, compared to the sanctioned 42.5 squadrons required to sustain credible deterrence against both China and Pakistan.

With the retirement of its ageing MiG-21 fleet and the slow pace of indigenous Tejas integration, the IAF faces a dangerous shortfall in combat aircraft that undermines its two-front war doctrine.

The proposed purchase of 114 Rafales under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) program is therefore not just a procurement choice, but a strategic necessity.

The deal, expected to be worth US$18–20 billion (RM85–95 billion), would give India six to seven additional squadrons of one of the world’s most advanced multi-role fighters.

The Rafale offers India a platform with unmatched versatility, from air dominance to deep strike, electronic warfare, and maritime interdiction.

Its Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile, with a no-escape zone exceeding 150 km, provides a decisive edge over Pakistan’s PL-15 missile and China’s current BVR inventory.

The Spectra electronic warfare suite allows the Rafale to jam, spoof, and degrade enemy radar and missile systems, giving Indian pilots greater survivability in contested airspace.

Armed with SCALP cruise missiles and AM39 Exocet anti-ship missiles, the Rafale is also a potent strike platform capable of projecting power deep into Pakistan or against Chinese naval assets in the Indian Ocean.

For Pakistan, the induction of 114 Rafales would represent a dramatic escalation in India’s combat capability.

Pakistan currently relies on its JF-17 Thunder (Block I–III) as the workhorse of its fleet, supported by a smaller contingent of F-16s and newly inducted J-10C fighters armed with the PL-15 BVR missile.

While the PL-15 temporarily gave Pakistan a qualitative advantage over India’s Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000 fleets, the arrival of Meteor-equipped Rafales has reversed that balance.

The Meteor’s ramjet propulsion and extended no-escape zone outclasses the PL-15, restoring India’s dominance in long-range engagements.

The Spectra suite further erodes the effectiveness of Chinese-origin radars and missile seekers, creating survivability challenges for Pakistan’s JF-17s and J-10Cs.

More troubling for Islamabad, the Rafale’s SCALP missile gives India the capability to conduct deep precision strikes against Pakistani command centres, airbases, and missile batteries, bypassing its surface-to-air defences.

To offset India’s Rafale expansion, Pakistan will almost certainly accelerate its acquisition of the J-35 stealth fighter from China, with reports suggesting an order of 40 aircraft has already been finalised.

The J-35, designed with stealth shaping and internal weapons bays, could provide Pakistan with a fifth-generation counterweight to the Rafale.

However, the J-35 is still in its early stages of development and lacks the operational maturity and combat record of the Rafale, raising questions about its reliability.

Pakistan may also expand its J-10C fleet, but financial constraints and economic fragility limit Islamabad’s ability to match India’s acquisition dollar-for-dollar.

Strategically, the Rafale deal would lock Pakistan even more tightly into China’s orbit, making the Sino-Pakistan defence partnership the bedrock of Islamabad’s military modernisation.

For China, the Rafale deal presents a two-theatre problem — the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean.

In the high-altitude Himalayan theatre, India’s Rafales deployed at Hasimara, Leh, and Tezpur airbases would directly contest Chinese fighters operating out of Tibet.

Chinese J-10C, J-11B, and even J-20 stealth fighters suffer from payload and endurance limitations when operating from high-altitude Tibetan bases.

The Rafale’s superior thrust-to-weight ratio, combat radius, and weapons integration would allow it to dominate in these contested environments.

The Meteor missile would extend India’s engagement envelope, giving IAF pilots the ability to strike Chinese aircraft before they can bring their weapons to bear.

This would force Beijing to allocate more J-20 stealth fighters and long-range support aircraft to the Western Theatre Command, tying down resources that might otherwise be deployed in Taiwan or the South China Sea.

The Rafale also complicates China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

With India already purchasing 26 Rafale-M carrier fighters for its carriers INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya, the 114 land-based Rafales would provide complementary maritime strike capability.

This would give India a layered capability to neutralise Chinese carrier groups, which are expected to increasingly patrol the Indian Ocean as Beijing expands its blue-water navy.

The combination of SCALP and Exocet missiles on Rafales and BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles on Indian warships creates a powerful deterrent against PLAN assets in the region.

The Rafale purchase risks altering the deterrence calculus in South Asia.

For Pakistan, the widening conventional gap may reinforce reliance on its nuclear arsenal to maintain parity, potentially lowering the nuclear threshold in a future crisis.

For China, it highlights India’s emergence as a credible two-front adversary, capable of threatening Chinese forces in Tibet and countering its naval expansion in the Indian Ocean.

This could accelerate an arms race in South Asia, with Pakistan and China seeking to outpace India’s gains through stealth fighters, hypersonic weapons, and advanced air defence systems.

Beyond the strategic calculus, the Rafale deal would also reshape India’s defence-industrial landscape.

India is pushing for source code access to integrate indigenous weapons like the Astra BVR missile, Rudram anti-radiation missile, and SAAW into the Rafale ecosystem.

If successful, this would reduce reliance on French weapons and advance India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) initiative, embedding domestic R&D into frontline combat systems.

It could also make India a regional hub for Rafale maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO), servicing not only its own fleet but potentially those of other operators such as Egypt, Qatar, and Indonesia.

India’s expected acquisition of 114 Rafales would be more than just a fleet expansion — it would be a strategic game-changer.

For Pakistan, it deepens dependence on China while eroding confidence in conventional parity, potentially increasing reliance on nuclear deterrence.

For China, it complicates both Himalayan and Indian Ocean strategies, forcing Beijing to divert advanced assets to contain India.

For India, it restores squadron strength, enhances strike reach, and reinforces its role as a primary airpower in Asia for the next two decades.

Ultimately, the Rafale deal would reshape the triangular airpower competition between India, Pakistan, and China — a contest that will define the strategic balance of South Asia well into the 2040s.

— DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA