(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) – China and Thailand will conduct their annual “Falcon Strike 2025” joint air force training exercise in mid-to-late September, underscoring the expanding defence partnership between the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF).

The exercise, now in its eighth edition and fourth consecutive year on Thai soil, will once again feature a significant deployment of Chinese aircraft and ground-based air defence units, although Beijing has deliberately withheld confirmation of the exact platforms it intends to dispatch.

In a formal statement, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China declared that the exercise “is conducive to enhancing the technical and tactical capabilities of the participating troops and deepening mutual trust and practical cooperation between the two militaries.”

The deliberate ambiguity surrounding which aircraft will participate has fuelled speculation among regional observers, with many analysts anticipating the presence of advanced PLAAF fighters such as the J-10C, a platform that has become increasingly visible in China’s military diplomacy.

According to reports, the PLAAF has deployed a diverse mix of combat and support aircraft to Thailand for Falcon Strike 2025.

The Chinese contingent includes six J-10 fighter jets, two J-11 fighters, and two JH-7 fighter-bombers, representing a formidable mix of air superiority and strike capabilities.

Supporting this combat fleet are a KJ-500 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, a YLG-9 electronic warfare and electronic intelligence (EW/ELINT) platform, and a Y-6 aerial refueling tanker, each with one unit assigned to the drills.

On the Thai side, the RTAF has committed five Saab JAS 39 Gripen multirole fighters and four Alpha Jet light attack aircraft, providing a balanced though smaller force to partner with their Chinese counterparts.

The PLAAF delegation is led by Major General Lu Hongzhou, Commander of the Kunming Air Base, who is serving as Director of the PLAAF’s Joint Command for Falcon Strike 2025.

The joint training, held from 15–25 September 2025 at Wing 23 in Udon Thani Province, was formally inaugurated with RTAF Deputy Wing Commander Group Captain Pisit Thepsuwan welcoming the Chinese forces upon their arrival.

Both sides stressed that Falcon Strike has become a valuable platform for enhancing mutual operational capabilities, allowing the two air forces to strengthen cooperation and improve interoperability through years of joint training.

According to a Chinese defence expert quoted by state-owned Global Times, the exercise illustrates “mutual trust and pragmatic cooperation that boost technical and tactical capabilities of both countries’ militaries.”

“China and Thailand have different geographic environments and have some different military equipment. Through the joint training, the two countries’ air forces can learn from each other and boost their technical and tactical capabilities,” the analyst explained, highlighting the training’s emphasis on adaptability and cross-learning.

The participation of J-10C this year carries added weight, particularly given the platform’s recent real-world combat record in foreign service, which has elevated its export appeal across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

As the J-10C once again features prominently in “Falcon Strike 2025,” Thai interest could be reignited in exploring procurement options, a development that would have profound implications for Bangkok’s long-term air power trajectory.

Thailand currently operates a fleet of Swedish Gripens, American F-16s, and a legacy inventory of Alpha Jets, but has struggled to finalise its next-generation fighter procurement programme amid political debates, budgetary constraints, and U.S. restrictions on F-35 sales.

For Beijing, the exercise also represents a strategic opportunity to showcase Chinese combat aircraft to one of Washington’s oldest allies in Southeast Asia, subtly challenging the U.S. position as the primary supplier of advanced military aviation to the region.

The deployment of PLAAF assets to Thailand must also be viewed through the lens of China’s broader “military diplomacy” strategy, which has increasingly leveraged joint exercises to expand influence, promote weapons sales, and counterbalance U.S. and Western security initiatives in the Indo-Pacific.

The Falcon Strike series, launched in 2015, has steadily grown in sophistication, evolving from basic joint manoeuvres into highly technical engagements that include beyond-visual-range (BVR) combat simulations, complex electronic warfare scenarios, and joint command-and-control integration.

Previous iterations held in August 2022, July 2023, and August 2024 saw intensive engagements between J-10Cs and Gripens, giving Thai pilots critical exposure to Chinese aircraft performance and tactics in both dogfighting and BVR combat environments.

Regional analysts note that the exercise serves dual purposes: building confidence and tactical knowledge between the two air forces, while simultaneously sending a message to neighbouring states about the tightening China-Thailand defence alignment.

For Thailand, a U.S. treaty ally, the deepening air force cooperation with Beijing underscores Bangkok’s pragmatic approach to balancing its security relationships in an era of intensifying great power rivalry.

For China, every edition of “Falcon Strike” provides a platform to strengthen its military footprint in mainland Southeast Asia, promote advanced fighter exports such as the J-10C, and cultivate long-term operational trust with one of ASEAN’s most strategically located nations.

As the countdown to “Falcon Strike 2025” begins, attention will be fixed on whether Beijing chooses to field its most advanced export-ready fighters, and whether Thailand uses the opportunity to reconsider its next-generation air power roadmap.

In an era defined by escalating competition in the South China Sea and intensifying Indo-Pacific security rivalries, the significance of these joint drills transcends bilateral cooperation—“Falcon Strike 2025” is a message to the region that China’s military influence is not only expanding but also embedding itself deeply into the air power dynamics of Southeast Asia.

READ: China’s J-10C Fighter Jets and Thailand’s JAS39 Gripen “Face Off” in Falcon Strike 2024 Exercise

Aircraft Platforms and Capabilities

The J-10C and the Gripen C/D represent two very different design philosophies in modern air combat, and their face-off during Falcon Strike is closely watched by regional defence analysts.

China’s J-10C is equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, advanced data links, and a robust electronic warfare suite, while the Swedish-made Gripen employs the mechanically scanned PS-05/A radar, Western avionics, and NATO-standard networked warfare capabilities.

The Gripen’s smaller radar cross-section, high agility, and efficient datalink integration with AEW&C assets make it a formidable opponent in contested airspace.

In contrast, the J-10C’s strength lies in its range, payload, and access to indigenous Chinese air-to-air missiles such as the PL-15, which provides a long-range punch that rivals Western equivalents.

For Thai pilots, these engagements provide rare firsthand insights into Chinese aircraft performance, an opportunity that few ASEAN air forces enjoy.

Such experience is invaluable for future procurement debates, with Bangkok quietly weighing the possibility of diversifying its fleet to include platforms such as the J-10C—or even China’s emerging fifth-generation J-35A stealth fighter.

Weapons Systems in Focus

Beyond Visual Range (BVR) combat remains the most critical element of Falcon Strike, where the Gripen’s access to the MBDA Meteor missile directly pits it against the J-10C’s PL-15.

The Meteor, with its ramjet propulsion and “no-escape zone” advantages, gives the Gripen a long-range engagement edge, but the PL-15’s range—estimated at over 200 kilometres—ensures China’s fighters are never outmatched.

In close-quarters dogfights, Thailand’s IRIS-T short-range missile is designed for high off-boresight engagements, providing Gripen pilots with deadly manoeuvrability in visual-range combat.

China’s PL-10, meanwhile, has been tested extensively in high-G manoeuvres and is regarded as one of the most capable short-range air-to-air missiles in Asia.

Supporting assets further complicate the equation, with China fielding its KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft to extend radar coverage and Thailand relying on the Saab 340 Erieye to provide situational awareness and command-and-control integration.

The result is a complex simulation of modern multi-domain warfare, far beyond simple dogfighting scenarios.

READ: China Deploys Long-Range Jammer Aircraft, Y-9LG (High 13) EW/ELINT to Thailand

Geopolitical and Strategic Context

Beyond the technical exchanges, Falcon Strike reflects Beijing’s wider “military diplomacy” push across mainland Southeast Asia.

China leverages such exercises to strengthen influence, promote arms sales, and counterbalance the security architecture dominated by the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.

For Thailand, a treaty ally of Washington, these exercises highlight Bangkok’s pragmatic balancing act between East and West at a time of great power rivalry.

Thailand’s ambition to procure the F-35A has been blocked by U.S. export restrictions, forcing Bangkok to explore alternatives, including upgraded Gripens, South Korea’s KF-21 Boramae, and potentially Chinese solutions such as the J-10C or J-35A.

For the United States, China’s deepening military cooperation with Thailand raises concerns over the erosion of one of Washington’s oldest defence relationships in Asia.

Regional neighbours are also watching closely.

Vietnam views the exercise with suspicion, given its own territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea.

Malaysia, which is modernising its air force with light combat aircraft and considering future fighter acquisitions, sees Falcon Strike as a benchmark for measuring China’s ability to integrate with ASEAN militaries.

Singapore, operating advanced F-15SGs and awaiting F-35B deliveries, interprets the exercise as part of the shifting balance of air power in Southeast Asia, reinforcing its decision to stay ahead technologically.

The Falcon Strike series, launched in 2015, has steadily grown in sophistication, evolving from basic joint manoeuvres into highly technical engagements that include BVR combat simulations, electronic warfare contests, and joint command-and-control integration.

Previous iterations in August 2022, July 2023, and August 2024 saw intensive engagements between J-10Cs and Gripens, giving Thai pilots critical exposure to Chinese aircraft performance in both dogfighting and BVR scenarios.

As the countdown to “Falcon Strike 2025” begins, attention will be fixed on whether Beijing deploys its most advanced export-ready fighters and whether Thailand uses the opportunity to reshape its next-generation air power roadmap.

In an era defined by escalating competition in the South China Sea and intensifying Indo-Pacific security rivalries, the significance of these joint drills transcends bilateral cooperation—Falcon Strike 2025 is a signal that China’s military influence is embedding itself deeply into the air power dynamics of Southeast Asia. — DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA