(VIDEO) Pakistan Eyes China’s HQ-19 in Game-Changing Move to Neutralise Indian Missile Threat

The HQ-19, developed by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), is designed to intercept medium- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their terminal descent phase, and mirrors in function and purpose the U.S.-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system fielded by Washington and its key allies.

EnglishETCInternational

By admin Last updated May 29, 2025

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — In a bold shift toward strengthening its strategic defences against evolving regional missile threats, Pakistan is reportedly in advanced discussions to acquire China’s HQ-19 anti-ballistic missile system—often dubbed the “Chinese THAAD”—to counter high-end threats posed by Indian cruise and ballistic missile capabilities.

The HQ-19, developed by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), is designed to intercept medium- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their terminal descent phase, and mirrors in function and purpose the U.S.-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system fielded by Washington and its key allies.

THAAD, developed by Lockheed Martin, is a highly mobile, hit-to-kill missile defence platform that neutralises incoming threats through kinetic impact, eliminating the need for explosive warheads—a concept China has seemingly replicated in its HQ-19 platform.

According to defence sources in Islamabad, the government is planning to procure the HQ-19 alongside the next-generation J-35A stealth fighter, a Chinese-developed fifth-generation platform expected to enter Pakistani service in the first quarter of next year.

The two-pronged acquisition—if confirmed—would mark a quantum leap in Pakistan’s airpower and missile defence posture, signalling its intent to integrate cutting-edge Chinese systems into its command architecture.

Reports indicate that Pakistani Air Force pilots are currently undergoing advanced training in China to prepare for the J-35A’s operational induction, marking the first known foreign deployment of the stealth fighter beyond Chinese forces.

Beyond conventional air threats, the HQ-19 would be a critical asset in neutralising supersonic and potentially hypersonic cruise missiles, such as India’s Indo-Russian BrahMos, Agni and French-origin SCALP-EG, both of which are in operational service with the Indian Air Force’s Rafale squadrons.

During the most recent high-altitude skirmishes and cross-border tensions, India’s use of precision-guided cruise missiles against Pakistani military installations drew global attention to the growing risk of escalation between two nuclear-armed neighbours.

Although most of these attacks were reportedly intercepted by Pakistan’s existing short- and medium-range air defence systems, analysts believe Islamabad is now seeking a strategic tier capable of defeating saturation strikes or advanced missile systems launched from stand-off distances.

If finalised, the HQ-19 acquisition would further diversify Pakistan’s integrated air and missile defence network, which already includes several layers of Chinese-supplied platforms such as the HQ-9B, LY-80, HQ-16FE, and infantry-deployed FN-series MANPADS.

The HQ-9/HQ-9B (FD-2000), for instance, provides Pakistan with long-range air defence coverage, capable of engaging airborne threats at distances up to 300 km and altitudes of 50 km, including aircraft, cruise missiles, and even tactical ballistic missiles.

The LY-80, an export version of the HQ-16A, forms the medium-range backbone of Pakistan’s air defence architecture, protecting critical infrastructure with a range of 40 km and altitude coverage up to 50,000 feet since its induction in 2017.

To augment that layer, Pakistan has deployed the HQ-16FE, a newer and more agile variant that offers enhanced resilience against electronic warfare and jamming, bolstering the country’s ability to operate in contested environments.

At the tactical level, the FN-6 and FN-16 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) have provided Pakistani infantry with mobile, point-defence capability against low-flying threats like helicopters and strike aircraft since 2010 and 2018 respectively.

With the HQ-19, Pakistan would for the first time acquire a system capable of exo-atmospheric interception.

Estimated Range and Interception Altitude:

Interception Range: Estimated to be 1,000–3,000 km, targeting incoming ballistic missiles within this envelope (not to be confused with the missile’s own flight range, but rather the range of the threats it is designed to counter).
Interception Altitude: Approximately 70 to 150 km, placing it in the exo-atmospheric layer—above most conventional air defence systems, similar to U.S. THAAD.
Radar Detection Range (with X-band AESA radar): Likely exceeds 1,000 km depending on the size and profile of the target missile.

The HQ-19’s capabilities include tracking and interception of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), using AESA-based X-band radar technology.

Equipped with dual-mode guidance (semi-active and active) and potentially infrared seekers in newer iterations, the HQ-19 offers a lethal hit-to-kill intercept profile comparable to THAAD, allowing it to strike inbound warheads at extreme velocities.

The system is road-mobile and mounted on wheeled transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), enabling flexible deployment in both peacetime deterrence roles and crisis mobility scenarios, especially along Pakistan’s eastern front with India.

Reports from Chinese state media and U.S. defence monitoring agencies indicate that HQ-19 underwent its first successful flight tests in the early 2010s, with confirmation in 2021 of a live intercept against a simulated ballistic missile target in China’s interior.

While the system has not yet been officially exported, a sale to Pakistan would reflect a deepening of Beijing-Islamabad strategic trust, marking one of the few known transfers of a high-tier missile defence system outside China’s immediate military alliance network.

Strategically, such an acquisition would dramatically enhance Pakistan’s ability to counter threats such as India’s Agni-series ballistic missiles—particularly the MIRV-capable Agni-V and Agni-P—which form the backbone of New Delhi’s nuclear triad.

More importantly, it would provide Islamabad with a shield over its nuclear command-and-control nodes, ballistic missile launchers, and critical military infrastructure, improving its survivability in the event of a first strike and reinforcing its doctrinal emphasis on “Minimum Credible Deterrence.”

By enabling Pakistan to potentially intercept incoming nuclear-capable missiles in flight, the HQ-19 could reduce the necessity for immediate retaliatory nuclear launches, thereby lowering the risk of miscalculation and enhancing strategic stability.

Yet, such a transformative capability would likely trigger a robust response from India, possibly accelerating its efforts to field hypersonic glide vehicles, expand submarine-launched ballistic missile inventories, and deploy additional countermeasure technologies such as MIRVs.

South Asia could thus see a renewed phase in the missile arms race, one defined not only by offensive capacity but also by layered defence and the increasing role of exo-atmospheric systems in regional doctrines.

The integration of HQ-19 would also require significant upgrades to Pakistan’s C4ISR infrastructure, including dedicated radar stations, secure datalink networks, and high-fidelity command systems capable of managing real-time interception across multiple domains.

Training, maintenance, and operational integration would be a massive undertaking, demanding sustained investment and doctrinal shifts within Pakistan’s air and missile defence command.

Internationally, such a development could reignite non-proliferation concerns, especially among signatories of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) and adherents of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Although HCOC is a non-binding framework, the operational deployment of a system like HQ-19—designed to target nuclear-capable delivery systems—could increase scrutiny of Pakistan’s strategic intentions and transparency in missile doctrine.

First adopted in 2002, the HCOC seeks to curb the global spread of ballistic missile technology capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and now includes over 140 subscribing states, though neither Pakistan nor India are current participants.

Ultimately, if acquired and integrated, the HQ-19 would thrust Pakistan into the exclusive club of nations possessing exo-atmospheric missile interception capability—a domain traditionally dominated by the United States, Russia, and China.

Such a move would not only redefine the regional military balance but also project Pakistan’s ascent into the upper tier of technologically sophisticated missile powers in an era increasingly defined by space-based threats and cross-domain deterrence.

— DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA

(VIDEO) Pakistan Eyes China’s HQ-19 in Game-Changing Move to Neutralise Indian Missile Threat

THAAD, developed by Lockheed Martin, is a highly mobile, hit-to-kill missile defence platform that neutralises incoming threats through kinetic impact, eliminating the need for explosive warheads—a concept China has seemingly replicated in its HQ-19 platform.

According to defence sources in Islamabad, the government is planning to procure the HQ-19 alongside the next-generation J-35A stealth fighter, a Chinese-developed fifth-generation platform expected to enter Pakistani service in the first quarter of next year.

The two-pronged acquisition—if confirmed—would mark a quantum leap in Pakistan’s airpower and missile defence posture, signalling its intent to integrate cutting-edge Chinese systems into its command architecture.

Reports indicate that Pakistani Air Force pilots are currently undergoing advanced training in China to prepare for the J-35A’s operational induction, marking the first known foreign deployment of the stealth fighter beyond Chinese forces.

During the most recent high-altitude skirmishes and cross-border tensions, India’s use of precision-guided cruise missiles against Pakistani military installations drew global attention to the growing risk of escalation between two nuclear-armed neighbours.

Although most of these attacks were reportedly intercepted by Pakistan’s existing short- and medium-range air defence systems, analysts believe Islamabad is now seeking a strategic tier capable of defeating saturation strikes or advanced missile systems launched from stand-off distances.

If finalised, the HQ-19 acquisition would further diversify Pakistan’s integrated air and missile defence network, which already includes several layers of Chinese-supplied platforms such as the HQ-9B, LY-80, HQ-16FE, and infantry-deployed FN-series MANPADS.

The HQ-9/HQ-9B (FD-2000), for instance, provides Pakistan with long-range air defence coverage, capable of engaging airborne threats at distances up to 300 km and altitudes of 50 km, including aircraft, cruise missiles, and even tactical ballistic missiles.

The LY-80, an export version of the HQ-16A, forms the medium-range backbone of Pakistan’s air defence architecture, protecting critical infrastructure with a range of 40 km and altitude coverage up to 50,000 feet since its induction in 2017.

To augment that layer, Pakistan has deployed the HQ-16FE, a newer and more agile variant that offers enhanced resilience against electronic warfare and jamming, bolstering the country’s ability to operate in contested environments.

At the tactical level, the FN-6 and FN-16 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) have provided Pakistani infantry with mobile, point-defence capability against low-flying threats like helicopters and strike aircraft since 2010 and 2018 respectively.

With the HQ-19, Pakistan would for the first time acquire a system capable of exo-atmospheric interception.

Estimated Range and Interception Altitude:

Interception Range: Estimated to be 1,000–3,000 km, targeting incoming ballistic missiles within this envelope (not to be confused with the missile’s own flight range, but rather the range of the threats it is designed to counter).

Interception Altitude: Approximately 70 to 150 km, placing it in the exo-atmospheric layer—above most conventional air defence systems, similar to U.S. THAAD.

Radar Detection Range (with X-band AESA radar): Likely exceeds 1,000 km depending on the size and profile of the target missile.

The HQ-19’s capabilities include tracking and interception of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), using AESA-based X-band radar technology.

Equipped with dual-mode guidance (semi-active and active) and potentially infrared seekers in newer iterations, the HQ-19 offers a lethal hit-to-kill intercept profile comparable to THAAD, allowing it to strike inbound warheads at extreme velocities.

The system is road-mobile and mounted on wheeled transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), enabling flexible deployment in both peacetime deterrence roles and crisis mobility scenarios, especially along Pakistan’s eastern front with India.

Reports from Chinese state media and U.S. defence monitoring agencies indicate that HQ-19 underwent its first successful flight tests in the early 2010s, with confirmation in 2021 of a live intercept against a simulated ballistic missile target in China’s interior.

While the system has not yet been officially exported, a sale to Pakistan would reflect a deepening of Beijing-Islamabad strategic trust, marking one of the few known transfers of a high-tier missile defence system outside China’s immediate military alliance network.

Strategically, such an acquisition would dramatically enhance Pakistan’s ability to counter threats such as India’s Agni-series ballistic missiles—particularly the MIRV-capable Agni-V and Agni-P—which form the backbone of New Delhi’s nuclear triad.

By enabling Pakistan to potentially intercept incoming nuclear-capable missiles in flight, the HQ-19 could reduce the necessity for immediate retaliatory nuclear launches, thereby lowering the risk of miscalculation and enhancing strategic stability.

Yet, such a transformative capability would likely trigger a robust response from India, possibly accelerating its efforts to field hypersonic glide vehicles, expand submarine-launched ballistic missile inventories, and deploy additional countermeasure technologies such as MIRVs.

South Asia could thus see a renewed phase in the missile arms race, one defined not only by offensive capacity but also by layered defence and the increasing role of exo-atmospheric systems in regional doctrines.

The integration of HQ-19 would also require significant upgrades to Pakistan’s C4ISR infrastructure, including dedicated radar stations, secure datalink networks, and high-fidelity command systems capable of managing real-time interception across multiple domains.

Training, maintenance, and operational integration would be a massive undertaking, demanding sustained investment and doctrinal shifts within Pakistan’s air and missile defence command.

Internationally, such a development could reignite non-proliferation concerns, especially among signatories of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) and adherents of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Although HCOC is a non-binding framework, the operational deployment of a system like HQ-19—designed to target nuclear-capable delivery systems—could increase scrutiny of Pakistan’s strategic intentions and transparency in missile doctrine.

First adopted in 2002, the HCOC seeks to curb the global spread of ballistic missile technology capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and now includes over 140 subscribing states, though neither Pakistan nor India are current participants.

Ultimately, if acquired and integrated, the HQ-19 would thrust Pakistan into the exclusive club of nations possessing exo-atmospheric missile interception capability—a domain traditionally dominated by the United States, Russia, and China.

Such a move would not only redefine the regional military balance but also project Pakistan’s ascent into the upper tier of technologically sophisticated missile powers in an era increasingly defined by space-based threats and cross-domain deterrence.

— DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA