Hypersonic Arms Race: Is the United States Losing to Russia and China?

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Hypersonic weapons are rewriting the rules of deterrence, compressing the decision-making timeline of adversaries and rendering traditional missile defense networks increasingly obsolete.

These next-generation systems, capable of exceeding Mach 5 while maneuvering unpredictably, represent a seismic transformation in global warfare.

They can evade radar tracking, penetrate even the most sophisticated missile shields, and strike targets before national command authorities have time to react.

Russia and China have already fielded operational hypersonic arsenals, weaponizing speed and unpredictability to shift the balance of power in their favor.

By contrast, the United States—long regarded as the undisputed leader in aerospace and missile technology—finds itself fighting to close a gap that never should have opened.

This reversal of roles has triggered alarm across Washington, where questions are being raised about whether America has ceded the initiative in a domain critical to strategic stability.

For Russia, hypersonic deployment has become a way to neutralize NATO’s missile defenses and reinforce its nuclear deterrence against perceived Western encirclement.

For China, hypersonics are the centerpiece of its “anti-access/area denial” (A2/AD) doctrine, designed to push US naval power further from the First and Second Island Chains.

Both powers have operationalized their systems not only as military capabilities but also as strategic tools of intimidation, forcing adversaries to reconsider their defensive assumptions.

Hypersonics compress warning times from minutes to mere seconds, creating what military analysts describe as a “panic zone” for command authorities.

In this compressed decision window, the risk of miscalculation escalates dramatically, raising the specter of unintended escalation during crises.

For America’s allies in Europe and Asia, the specter of Russian and Chinese hypersonics raises difficult questions about the credibility of US extended deterrence.

If carriers, forward bases, and even homeland assets can be struck without warning, how resilient are the security guarantees that underpin alliances from NATO to the Indo-Pacific?

The Pentagon insists it is responding with urgency, unveiling a multi-branch portfolio of hypersonic programs across the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

These initiatives, from the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (Dark Eagle) to the air-launched ARRW and scramjet-powered HACM, are intended to restore balance by providing the United States with its own arsenal of precision hypersonic strike options.

Yet critics argue that every year of delay entrenches Moscow and Beijing’s advantage, making the US a reactive power in a domain it once dominated.

The stakes are not just military but geopolitical: whoever controls the hypersonic battlespace will command both deterrence credibility and escalation dominance in the twenty-first century.

Failure to catch up risks emboldening adversaries in Ukraine, Taiwan, and beyond—reshaping global power balances in ways unfavorable to Washington and its allies.

This is why the hypersonic arms race is no longer about speed alone, but about survival, credibility, and the ability of the United States to maintain its role as the guarantor of global security.

Russia’s Head Start: Nuclear-Capable Arsenal

Russia has made hypersonics the cornerstone of its nuclear deterrence strategy.

The Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, operational since 2019, can reportedly achieve speeds up to Mach 27 and conduct sharp evasive maneuvers that make interception virtually impossible.

Moscow has deployed Avangard on SS-19 ICBMs, with two regiments declared combat-ready, although construction delays raise doubts about full force availability.

The scramjet-powered 3M22 Zircon cruise missile, capable of Mach 8 and a range of 625 miles, is already deployed aboard frigates and submarines, with confirmed combat use in Ukraine in 2024.

The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, fired from MiG-31s and Tu-22M3s, is advertised at Mach 10 with a range of 1,200 miles, though US intelligence questions its true hypersonic maneuverability.

Moscow’s latest experiment—the Oreshnik IRBM tested in Ukraine in late 2024—is designed for Belarusian deployment by 2025 and could carry multiple nuclear re-entry vehicles.

While formidable, Russia’s arsenal has shown vulnerabilities, with Ukrainian forces intercepting Kinzhals using Patriot PAC-3 systems, exposing weaknesses in terminal-phase survivability.

China’s Rapid Hypersonic Expansion

China has emerged as the most aggressive expander of hypersonic capability in Asia.

The DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle has been operational since 2020, optimized for strikes against US bases and carrier groups within the First and Second Island Chains.

The DF-27, a longer-ranged system extending 5,000–8,000 km, can threaten Hawaii, Guam, and even parts of Alaska, providing Beijing with a conventional or nuclear strategic reach.

China also maintains the DF-21D “carrier killer” and DF-26 dual-capable intermediate-range ballistic missiles, both adapted for hypersonic trajectories.

The YJ-21 hypersonic missile, first launched from aircraft in 2022, enhances China’s anti-ship strike portfolio.

In 2021, Beijing tested a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) combined with an HGV, demonstrating the ability to circle the globe and strike targets from unexpected vectors.

By 2025, China has incorporated AI-enabled precision guidance, enhancing its goal of “intelligentized warfare” and expanding its nuclear arsenal toward a projected 1,000 warheads by 2030.

These capabilities directly target US carrier strike groups and forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific, cementing hypersonics as a central pillar of China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) doctrine.

US Hypersonic Programs: Racing Against Time

The United States has pivoted sharply to hypersonic development, pouring billions of dollars into advanced research and procurement in a bid to close the widening gap with Russia and China.

Unlike Moscow and Beijing, which prioritize nuclear payloads and regional deterrence, Washington has deliberately emphasized conventional precision strike capability, a strategy that demands higher accuracy, better guidance, and seamless integration with its global power-projection forces.

This approach reflects America’s belief that hypersonics will be central not only to deterrence but also to limited conflict scenarios, where conventional, rapid, and survivable strike options could neutralize threats without escalating to nuclear exchange.

Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW “Dark Eagle”)

The LRHW, nicknamed “Dark Eagle,” is the centerpiece of the US Army’s hypersonic arsenal.

This ground-launched boost-glide system boasts a range exceeding 1,725 miles (2,775 km), giving it the reach to target deep within adversary territory from European or Indo-Pacific forward bases.

The first operational battery was fielded in Q3 FY2025, a milestone that formally marked the US Army’s entry into the hypersonic era after years of developmental turbulence.

Its glide body is co-developed with the Navy’s CPS program, reflecting a “one body, many launchers” doctrine to streamline logistics, testing, and sustainment.

Critics, however, point to its staggering cost, with each missile estimated at USD41 million (RM191 million), raising questions about scalability in sustained conflicts.

Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS)

The CPS program is the Navy’s flagship hypersonic initiative, leveraging the same glide body as Dark Eagle but optimized for maritime deployment.

It will first be integrated into the Zumwalt-class destroyers by 2027, transforming these stealthy but underutilized ships into hypersonic strike platforms.

By the early 2030s, CPS will arm Virginia-class attack submarines, giving the US Navy a stealthy undersea hypersonic strike option capable of threatening targets far inland with minimal warning.

The undersea integration is seen as particularly destabilizing for adversaries, since CPS-equipped submarines could launch from virtually anywhere across the globe’s oceans.

Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW)

The ARRW has endured a turbulent history, having been cancelled in 2023 after multiple test failures only to be revived in mid-2025 under congressional and Pentagon pressure.

Designed as an air-launched boost-glide missile with a range of around 1,000 miles, it can be carried by B-52H Stratofortress bombers and potentially F-15E Strike Eagles, restoring an air-breathing hypersonic option to the Air Force.

Its resurrection underscores the urgency of fielding diverse hypersonic options, though concerns persist about its reliability and cost-effectiveness compared to HACM.

Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM)

The HACM is widely regarded as the Air Force’s most promising hypersonic effort.

Powered by a scramjet engine, it is capable of sustained speeds of Mach 8 with a range beyond 1,100 miles.

Unlike boost-glide systems, HACM can maintain powered flight throughout its trajectory, enabling more flexible targeting and evasive maneuvering.

It is intended for deployment across multiple platforms including the B-52, F-15EX, and even the F-35, offering cross-domain strike capability from both legacy and fifth-generation aircraft.

Testing is expected to continue through 2027, with initial operational capability projected before the end of the decade.

Supporting Initiatives and Experimental Efforts

DARPA remains at the forefront of experimental hypersonic development, pursuing projects such as the Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) and the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC).

These initiatives aim to refine propulsion technologies, materials resistant to extreme heat, and innovative guidance systems that could eventually flow into operational programs.

Meanwhile, private-sector ventures from firms like Anduril and Kratos are experimenting with affordable hypersonic propulsion, reflecting a push for cost-disruptive innovation that could democratize hypersonic access across the services.

Hypersonic Defenses: Catching the Threat

Recognizing that offense alone is not enough, the US is investing heavily in hypersonic defense.

The Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), scheduled for deployment by 2035, is being designed specifically to intercept hypersonic glide vehicles in their most vulnerable mid-course phase.

Complementing this effort is the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) constellation, a network of low-Earth orbit satellites that will provide continuous, real-time tracking of hypersonic threats from launch to impact.

Together, these initiatives reflect Washington’s dual-track strategy of not only catching up in hypersonic offense but also ensuring it retains a survivable defense umbrella against Russia and China.

Strategic and Fiscal Challenges

Despite momentum, America’s hypersonic push remains constrained by budgetary realities, industrial bottlenecks, and testing infrastructure shortfalls.

The cost per missile remains exorbitant compared to conventional systems, raising questions about whether the Pentagon can field hypersonics in sufficient numbers to credibly deter adversaries.

Yet, for Washington, the cost of inaction could be far greater—allowing Russia and China to cement hypersonics as instruments of coercion, intimidation, and first-strike capability in the world’s most volatile regions.

The Strategic Balance

Compared to Russia and China, the US remains behind in terms of deployed operational hypersonic arsenals.

Russia’s systems are nuclear-focused, leveraging speed and maneuverability for deterrence credibility.

China’s hypersonics concentrate on regional dominance, particularly Indo-Pacific denial strategies.

The US approach, by contrast, emphasizes conventional precision strike, requiring higher accuracy to offset the absence of nuclear warheads.

If fielded at scale, LRHW and CPS could threaten Russian anti-access bubbles in Europe, while HACM and ARRW would provide flexible air-launched vectors to penetrate Chinese maritime defenses.

Together, they could restore deterrence by introducing mutual vulnerability, ensuring that adversaries cannot assume sanctuary even in heavily defended zones.

Challenges and Prospects

US hypersonic programs face technical hurdles, testing delays, and budgetary contractions—from USD6.9 billion in FY2025 to USD3.9 billion in FY2026.

Russia and China enjoy faster iteration cycles, but the US benefits from industrial innovation, alliances, and global basing options that provide wider deployment flexibility.

Collaborations such as the AUKUS HyFliTE initiative signal that trilateral development between the US, UK, and Australia could accelerate Western hypersonic fielding by 2028.

By 2030, an integrated portfolio of offensive and defensive systems could tilt the balance back toward Washington, narrowing the gap with Moscow and Beijing.

Conclusion: The Future of Hypersonic Deterrence

The global hypersonic arms race is no longer theoretical, but a central reality shaping twenty-first century military competition.

Russia and China already brandish operational systems designed to undercut American missile defense networks and tilt escalation dynamics in their favor.

The United States, despite its unmatched technological ecosystem, is only now beginning to deploy its own arsenal after years of developmental turbulence and political hesitation.

This lag has not gone unnoticed, with adversaries exploiting the psychological and strategic leverage provided by their early operationalization of hypersonics.

The outcome of this race will define more than strike ranges and flight speeds—it will determine the credibility of nuclear deterrence, alliance cohesion, and the balance of power in contested theaters such as Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

For Washington, hypersonics are not merely another addition to its arsenal but a necessity to restore confidence in extended deterrence, particularly among allies exposed to Russian and Chinese missile umbrellas.

In Europe, the deployment of Avangard and Zircon threatens NATO command nodes and missile defenses, while in Asia, China’s DF-17 and DF-27 directly menace US carrier strike groups and bases from Okinawa to Guam.

Without a credible American response, allies may question the survivability of US commitments, triggering dangerous debates over independent nuclear options in capitals such as Tokyo, Seoul, and even Berlin.

If Washington can overcome cost overruns, testing delays, and industrial bottlenecks, its hypersonic strike force could evolve into a decisive counterweight to Moscow and Beijing’s coercive advantage.

The Pentagon’s strategy of prioritizing conventional precision strike offers a unique edge, as it allows the US to integrate hypersonics into its global power-projection toolkit without relying exclusively on nuclear escalation.

This precision-first philosophy, combined with America’s unmatched network of bases and alliances, could ultimately give Washington greater flexibility than either Russia or China in employing hypersonics across multiple theaters.

At the same time, the United States is the only power developing a comprehensive defense architecture—combining interceptors, space-based tracking, and layered air defenses—to neutralize adversary hypersonics.

If successful, this offense-defense integration could shift the balance back toward stability, ensuring that hypersonics do not remain one-sided instruments of intimidation.

Yet, the risk of an uncontrolled hypersonic arms race looms large, with each nation racing to shorten strike timelines and expand payload options, raising the danger of miscalculation during crises.

Strategic ambiguity surrounding whether a hypersonic launch is conventional or nuclear further compresses escalation ladders, magnifying the stakes of this competition.

In the words of one senior official, “The nation that wins the hypersonic race will hold the keys to twenty-first century deterrence.”

For the United States, the race is no longer optional—it is existential.

— DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA