Türkiye’s FNSS Unveils U-MAV, an Unmanned Amphibious Assault Vehicle Built for the First Wave
FNSS’ new U-MAV combines autonomous operations, modular mission systems, AI-assisted targeting and sea-to-shore mobility as Türkiye pushes unmanned vehicles into the dangerous first wave of amphibious warfare.
(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Turkish armoured vehicle manufacturer FNSS has unveiled its U-MAV Multi-Purpose Modular Unmanned Amphibious Vehicle, introducing a heavy unmanned platform designed to take over some of the most dangerous tasks during the opening phase of amphibious assaults.
The U-MAV was publicly unveiled at TEKNOFEST Mavi Vatan 2026, hosted by the Gölcük Naval Shipyard Command in Kocaeli, Türkiye, from August 20 to 23.

Designed as a next-generation unmanned amphibious manoeuvre platform, U-MAV is intended to operate ahead of crewed assault forces during the critical transition from sea to a defended shoreline.
Its central concept is straightforward: place an unmanned vehicle in the first wave, expose the machine rather than Marines to hostile coastal defences, and allow operators to remain at a safer distance.
The platform has been developed to operate alongside the Marine Assault Vehicle (MAV), also known as ZAHA, which is already in service with the Turkish Naval Forces Command.
Under the manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) concept, U-MAV can make initial contact with hostile coastal defences before crewed MAV/ZAHA vehicles begin their approach to the beach.
The vehicle can conduct missions ranging from mine and obstacle clearance to reconnaissance, fire support and electronic warfare, potentially reducing the exposure of personnel during the most dangerous phase of an amphibious landing.
With a combat weight of approximately eight tonnes, U-MAV can move continuously from sea to shore, reaching a swimming speed of seven knots before accelerating to as much as 70km/h on land.
A modular architecture allows its mission payload to be replaced in the field in approximately 40 minutes, giving commanders the ability to reconfigure the same basic vehicle for 10 different operational roles.
Speaking during the unveiling, FNSS CEO and Board Member Selim Baybaş said the programme combines the company’s engineering expertise, experience gained from the MAV programme and continuing investment in unmanned and autonomous vehicle technologies.
Baybaş said only a small number of companies worldwide possess the industrial and engineering capabilities required to develop an unmanned amphibious vehicle of U-MAV’s size and operational capability.
He added that FNSS’ more than 35 years of industry experience and ability to manufacture several different platforms concurrently place the company among a limited number of NATO suppliers capable of undertaking such a programme.
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UNMANNED VANGUARD FOR THE MOST DANGEROUS PHASE OF AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
Amphibious assaults remain among the most demanding military operations because attacking forces must cross the sea-land boundary while confronting prepared coastal defences, mines, obstacles and concentrated enemy fire.
Defending forces can reinforce beach approaches with layered minefields and fixed obstacle belts while positioning machine guns and anti-tank guided missiles to dominate likely landing zones.
Such obstacles are intended not merely to stop attacking vehicles but to slow and channel them into predetermined engagement areas where defensive fire can inflict maximum casualties.
Every delay imposed on the first assault wave therefore gives defenders additional time to identify targets, concentrate firepower and disrupt the momentum required to establish a viable beachhead.
U-MAV is designed specifically to enter this high-risk environment before crewed MAV/ZAHA vehicles and begin breaking down the defensive system confronting the amphibious force.
Depending on its mission configuration, the vehicle can engage coastal threats, neutralise mines, clear obstacles, mark navigation routes or conduct reconnaissance before Marines enter the most heavily contested area.
Once the initial landing phase has been completed, U-MAV can remain in action to support the seizure, expansion and securing of the beachhead rather than functioning solely as a disposable first-wave system.
The platform can operate autonomously, under remote control or through a hybrid control arrangement, allowing commanders to adapt its employment according to mission requirements and communications conditions.
This architecture enables operators to remain away from the immediate line of contact while retaining command over a vehicle operating inside areas exposed to direct fire and other battlefield threats.
The concept effectively shifts some of the physical risk associated with the amphibious vanguard from personnel to an unmanned platform capable of carrying specialised mission equipment.
TEN MISSION CONFIGURATIONS ON A SINGLE U-MAV PLATFORM
A defining feature of U-MAV is its modular mission architecture, which allows specialised payloads to be installed on a common amphibious vehicle rather than requiring separate platforms for every battlefield role.
FNSS says the mission module can be changed in approximately 40 minutes under field conditions, allowing the vehicle to be rapidly reconfigured as operational requirements evolve.
The 10 planned configurations cover Fire Support, Mine Clearance, Combat Engineering, Electronic Warfare, Reconnaissance, Deception, Counter-Drone, Navigation and Obstacle Marking, Logistics Support and Casualty Evacuation.
This means several U-MAV variants could potentially enter an amphibious landing simultaneously, with individual vehicles performing complementary tasks as part of a coordinated unmanned formation.
Mine-clearance and combat-engineering variants could open routes through defended beaches while reconnaissance platforms identify threats and navigation variants mark safer approaches for the crewed assault force.
Fire-support and counter-drone configurations could provide protection to the advancing formation, while electronic-warfare variants could disrupt hostile sensors, communications or other electronic systems.
Logistics-configured U-MAVs could subsequently transport supplies across the beachhead, reducing the requirement to expose personnel and crewed vehicles during sustainment missions in contested areas.
A CASEVAC configuration could also evacuate casualties from exposed positions, potentially allowing wounded personnel to be moved without sending another crewed vehicle into the same threat environment.
Using a common base platform across these roles could reduce the amphibious force’s logistics burden by simplifying maintenance, spare parts, training and sustainment requirements.
The modular approach consequently transforms U-MAV from a specialised unmanned assault vehicle into a broader battlefield system capable of supporting multiple phases of littoral combat operations.
SEAMLESS SEA-TO-SHORE MOBILITY
U-MAV is designed to maintain mobility throughout the transition between water and land, one of the central technical challenges facing vehicles intended for amphibious assault operations.
The eight-tonne vehicle can reach approximately seven knots while swimming and a maximum road speed of 70km/h after reaching land.
Its propulsion system is built around a combined 300-horsepower powerpack, producing a power-to-weight ratio of approximately 37.5hp per tonne.
This power reserve is intended to maintain vehicle performance as U-MAV transitions from water through soft beach terrain and onto harder surfaces beyond the shoreline.
An independent suspension system provides additional manoeuvrability, while selectable tyre configurations allow the vehicle to be adapted for different terrain and operational conditions.
FNSS has also sought to reduce the vehicle’s visual, thermal and acoustic signatures, characteristics that could become particularly important when unmanned platforms are operating ahead of the main assault formation.
Reducing those signatures could make U-MAV more difficult to detect and classify while it conducts reconnaissance, electronic-warfare or deception missions close to defended coastal positions.
The platform also provides internal payload volume that can be allocated to mission systems, logistics equipment or casualty evacuation depending on the installed module.
Its amphibious mobility means the vehicle does not require a separate transfer platform at the shoreline, enabling it to move directly from the maritime environment onto land.
That uninterrupted movement is critical during amphibious operations because congestion or delays around the waterline can leave an assault force exposed to concentrated defensive fire.
AUTONOMOUS OPERATIONS WHEN SATELLITE NAVIGATION IS DENIED
U-MAV incorporates autonomous, remote-controlled and hybrid operating modes supported by an encrypted mesh communications network and an integrated navigation architecture.
Its command-and-control system combines GNSS and inertial navigation with an Identification Friend or Foe module to maintain situational awareness and coordination during operations.
The inertial navigation unit is particularly important in contested environments because it allows the vehicle to maintain an estimate of its position when satellite-navigation signals are degraded, jammed or unavailable.
FNSS states that the standard line-of-sight communications range is approximately three kilometres, although the operational reach can be extended through an unmanned aerial vehicle acting as a communications relay.
Such an arrangement could allow operators to control U-MAVs from ships or other protected locations while the vehicles operate significantly closer to hostile coastal positions.
Removing personnel from the vehicle also eliminates the immediate crew exposure associated with sending conventional vanguard vehicles into mines, obstacles and direct-fire engagement zones.
If the datalink is interrupted, U-MAV initially enters a safe-hold condition rather than immediately continuing uncontrolled movement.
Depending on its configuration, the vehicle can subsequently return to base automatically along a pre-programmed route or continue its assigned navigation task.
These safeguards are particularly significant for unmanned systems operating in electronic-warfare environments where communications disruption must be expected rather than treated as an exceptional event.
The combination of inertial navigation, encrypted networking and configurable lost-link behaviour is therefore intended to preserve mission continuity even when the electromagnetic environment becomes contested.
AI SHORTENS THE SENSOR-TO-SHOOTER CYCLE
U-MAV also incorporates an artificial intelligence-enabled image-processing architecture designed to reduce both operator workload and the amount of data that must be transmitted across battlefield networks.
Instead of continuously sending bandwidth-intensive video streams, the onboard mission computer can analyse camera imagery locally and transmit detection information through the radio network.
This edge-processing approach is intended to preserve target awareness when communications bandwidth is limited, degraded or under electronic attack.
Detected objects can be classified according to their type, status and assessed threat level before being displayed to operators through colour-coded overlays and detailed intelligence cards.
Automatic target detection allows the system to prioritise potential threats rather than requiring operators to manually scan every part of the vehicle’s sensor imagery.
Integration with the fire-control architecture can further shorten the engagement cycle by presenting prioritised targets for operator consideration.
The system also tracks detected targets and records them with timestamps, potentially creating a continuously updated tactical picture of activity around the landing area.
New target categories or engagement rules can be introduced into the live imagery-processing system in the field as the threat environment changes.
This capability could prove particularly valuable during amphibious operations where defenders may employ a rapidly changing mixture of personnel, vehicles, anti-tank teams, unmanned systems and concealed firing positions.
AI assistance does not remove the operator from the command chain, but it is intended to accelerate detection and decision-making when several U-MAVs are simultaneously operating across a complex beachhead.
‘ARMOR INTEGRITY’ GIVES AN UNCREWED VEHICLE ITS OWN DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
U-MAV is also described as the first unmanned vehicle to integrate Nurol Teknoloji’s Armor Integrity structural monitoring technology directly into its digital architecture.
Damage assessment presents a unique challenge for unmanned combat vehicles because there is no crew inside the platform to physically identify penetration, deformation or structural deterioration after an impact.
Armor Integrity addresses that problem through sensors capable of detecting the location, direction and severity of impacts affecting the vehicle.
The system can calculate the remaining structural capacity of the affected area and monitor latent damage that accumulates as the vehicle continues operating.
This information is transmitted to the operator and command network, providing commanders with a digital assessment of the vehicle’s condition without requiring personnel to inspect it on the battlefield.
Commanders can then decide whether the U-MAV should manoeuvre to shield a weakened area, seek cover, continue its mission or transition into a less exposed supporting role.
The capability could be especially significant during amphibious operations because damaged unmanned vehicles may still retain sufficient mobility or mission capability to continue supporting the assault.
If communications are lost, structural-damage information is stored locally aboard the vehicle and transmitted once connectivity is restored.
That information can subsequently feed tactical decision-making, maintenance planning and logistics support, providing a record of damage accumulated during combat operations.
By combining unmanned amphibious mobility, modular payloads, autonomous navigation, AI-assisted sensing and digital damage monitoring, U-MAV represents FNSS’ attempt to move the most dangerous opening phase of an amphibious assault away from crewed vehicles and toward networked unmanned systems.
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RAPID DEPLOYMENT FOR EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS
FNSS has designed U-MAV to be transportable by road, rail and sea using standard military logistics systems, allowing the platform to accompany amphibious and expeditionary formations.
For long-distance deployments requiring rapid air movement, the vehicle is also designed for compatibility with a broad range of heavy-lift helicopters and military transport aircraft.
The stated transport options include the CH-47F Chinook and Mil Mi-26 helicopters as well as the C-130 Hercules, A400M, C-17 Globemaster III, C-5 Galaxy, An-124 and Il-76 transport aircraft.
This transportability could allow U-MAV units to be rapidly repositioned between theatres without relying exclusively on amphibious ships or strategic sealift.
More importantly, U-MAV reflects a wider shift in amphibious warfare in which unmanned systems could increasingly be used to penetrate defended littorals before Marines and crewed combat vehicles are committed.
Rather than replacing the MAV/ZAHA, the platform is designed to operate ahead of and alongside it, creating a combined manned-unmanned assault formation in which the highest-risk tasks can increasingly be assigned to machines.
For the Turkish Naval Forces, such a capability could expand the tactical options available to Marine formations confronting mined, obstructed and heavily defended shorelines.
For FNSS, the unveiling also demonstrates an effort to extend Türkiye’s growing unmanned-systems ecosystem beyond aerial and maritime platforms into the specialised domain of heavy unmanned amphibious combat vehicles.
If the concept proves operationally mature, the traditional image of Marines and crewed armoured vehicles forming the first wave onto a hostile beach could begin to change fundamentally.
The first vehicles approaching a defended shoreline may increasingly carry sensors, weapons, engineering equipment and artificial intelligence—but no crew.
