Türkiye Targets 100 KAAN Stealth Fighters by 2035 to Overhaul Air Force
Ankara has contracted 20 Block 10 KAAN fighters through 2030, but reaching 100 by 2035 would test Türkiye’s ability to scale production while its first jets rely on US engines.
(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Türkiye wants 100 KAAN stealth fighters delivered to its air force by the end of 2035, setting a timetable that would put a domestically developed aircraft at the centre of a fleet transition still dependent on American engines and European fighters.
Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler announced the target during a parliamentary committee review of the 2027 defence budget, giving lawmakers two milestones against which to judge whether Türkiye can modernise its fighter force while sustaining operational readiness.
“In the project, it is envisaged that 20 aircraft will be delivered to our Air Force Command by the end of 2030, and that this number will reach 100 by the end of 2035,” Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler said.
The first milestone corresponds to a signed contract for 20 Block 10 jets scheduled for delivery from 2028 through 2030, while the second requires another 80 aircraft in five years, shifting the programme’s central challenge from initial production to sustained output.
Those additional deliveries would average 16 fighters a year from 2031 through 2035, a pace that would test final assembly, supplier capacity and military acceptance while the Turkish Air Force builds the personnel and support infrastructure required for a larger fleet.

The strategic significance of that timetable lies in the overlap between two transitions, as Türkiye introduces a low-observable multirole fighter while trying to replace the American turbofan powering its initial aircraft with a domestically developed engine for later production blocks.
The initial reliance on General Electric F110 engines gives KAAN a propulsion connection to Türkiye’s existing F-16 force, but it also means the first production batch will embody a narrower form of industrial autonomy than the later TF35000-powered aircraft could offer.
Güler described the transition as a “balanced approach that safeguards the continuity of our air power and our strategic relations,” a formulation that links the preservation of fighter readiness to continued engagement with the United States and the United Kingdom.
F-16 Block 70 procurement, a signed Eurofighter Typhoon acquisition and talks over six already-built F-35s occupy different places in that transition, with each carrying a distinct combination of political exposure, training requirements and potential to offset delays in the KAAN schedule.
Indonesia’s firm order for 48 KAAN fighters adds an Indo-Pacific dimension to Türkiye’s production plans, giving its aerospace industry a foreign customer while raising the question of how export deliveries will be sequenced alongside the Turkish Air Force’s domestic targets.
The immediate evidence for judging the 2030 deadline comes from the P1 prototype, whose progress through ground testing matters because the production schedule depends on demonstrating an aircraft closer to the configuration that the Turkish Air Force is due to receive.
The 2035 target sends a strategic signal today, but its effect on regional air power will depend on how many aircraft Türkiye can field with trained crews, cleared mission systems and sustained maintenance support once the deliveries begin to accumulate.
(READ) Türkiye’s KAAN P1 Nears Maiden Flight as TF35000 Engine Race Challenges F110 Dependence and the Global Fifth-Generation Fighter Balance
KAAN Block 10 Puts Türkiye’s Production Timetable to the Test
The contract between Türkiye’s Presidency of Defence Industries and Turkish Aerospace Industries sets a defined delivery window for the first 20 Block 10 fighters, making the initial batch the clearest benchmark for judging whether the 2035 target remains within reach.
The 2028–2030 window matters because a late start would compress acceptance and training into fewer years, leaving the air force less time to absorb its first KAANs before industry is expected to supply the much larger follow-on tranche after 2030.
The first 20 aircraft must serve both as an initial force and as the foundation for conversion training and maintenance experience, so the number available for routine frontline duties could initially be smaller than the headline delivery total might suggest.
Prototype P0 first flew on 21 February 2024 and flew again that May, establishing that the basic aircraft could fly and giving the programme an early flight-test foundation from which to evaluate a configuration closer to the intended production standard.
By late 2026, the more production-representative P1 had completed system checks and low-speed taxi tests, with high-speed taxi and first flight targeted before year-end, concentrating attention on whether the next flight-test phase can support the planned start of Block 10 deliveries.
P2 was still in assembly and testing, and the planned use of multiple test aircraft could allow evaluations to proceed in parallel once enough prototypes are available, though the pace will depend on when each aircraft is ready to fly.
For the air force, the consequences of discoveries during testing will depend on whether they can be addressed before production aircraft reach acceptance or require work on aircraft already in assembly, where changes could consume capacity intended for subsequent deliveries.
Scaling production after the first batch would require suppliers to deliver repeatable assemblies and mission systems while Turkish Aerospace Industries expands its throughput, because an increase in final assembly alone would leave the pace constrained by any component that arrives late.
The reported procurement contract gives the 2030 figure a firmer basis than the ministerial target for 2035, which leaves the ordering schedule and production mix of the additional 80 fighters open even as the air force plans for their eventual arrival.
A shortfall in Block 10 deliveries would have consequences beyond aircraft totals, since fewer jets would be available to train pilots and maintainers who will have to bring the larger follow-on fleet into service while sustaining existing fighter operations.
(READ) Trump Approves US$700 Million GE F110 Engine Deal for Türkiye’s KAAN Fighter, Reshaping NATO Airpower Before Ankara Summit

From F110 to TF35000, KAAN Faces a Second Transition
Block 10 KAANs are set to use General Electric F110-GE-129 engines, a type already used on Turkish F-16s, giving the programme an established propulsion starting point while Türkiye develops the engine intended to reduce its dependence on foreign supply.
The twin-engine configuration makes propulsion supply a fleet planning issue because 20 Block 10 fighters require 40 installed engines, with additional support needs arising as the air force accumulates flying hours and establishes maintenance arrangements for a new aircraft type.
United States approval for additional F110 engines supports the early programme, although the quantity and timing specified in the reported development leave open how far those approvals can sustain production if the indigenous engine takes longer than planned to enter service.
Experience supporting F110-powered F-16s may help Türkiye prepare for KAAN, although the new fighter will have its own installation and maintenance requirements, making the practical benefit of engine familiarity dependent on which skills and support arrangements can carry over.
TEI and TRMotor are developing the TF35000 for later KAAN variants, with integration targeted around Block 30 in the early 2030s, placing the intended propulsion change in the same period when Türkiye needs to raise aircraft deliveries toward its 2035 goal.
A domestically produced turbofan could strengthen Türkiye’s control over engine supply and support, but its strategic value will depend on demonstrating reliable performance in the aircraft and producing enough engines to sustain deliveries as well as the fleet already in service.
Supercruise is a potential performance benefit associated with the TF35000, and whether KAAN can sustain supersonic flight without afterburner in a useful service configuration will depend on the integrated aircraft’s demonstrated performance, beyond the expectations attached to the engine programme.
A fleet split between F110-powered and TF35000-powered blocks would give Türkiye a path to introduce the indigenous engine in stages, while creating parallel requirements for spares, technician training and engineering support until the air force settles how each fleet will be sustained.
The engine transition also has export implications, since prospective customers will need to assess the propulsion configuration available for delivery and the long-term support associated with it before treating the later domestic engine as a feature of their own fleet plans.
For Ankara, the most consequential gain from TF35000 would be greater control over when fighters can be produced and supported, an advantage that would become tangible only when the engine progresses from its integration target to dependable service at fleet scale.
F-16s, Typhoons and F-35 Talks Shape Türkiye’s Interim Air Power
The F-16 Block 70 process gives Türkiye a route to modernise a familiar fighter family while KAAN develops, making its progress relevant to near-term readiness if the domestic jet’s flight-test or production schedule leaves the air force waiting for replacements.
Familiarity with the F-16 may ease part of the training and support burden compared with introducing a new fighter family, although the timeline for the Block 70 process still governs when that option can contribute materially to the available force.
The United Kingdom agreement covers 20 Eurofighter Typhoons alongside equipment and munitions, with a technical and logistical support agreement in place, giving Türkiye a contracted route to add a second fighter family during the years before KAAN deliveries are due.
Turkish pilots began flight training in the United Kingdom in August 2026, moving the Typhoon acquisition into personnel preparation and allowing conversion experience to build ahead of the air force’s eventual task of sustaining regular operations with the new type.
The Typhoon adds another source of fighter capacity, but converting pilots and establishing technical support will draw on the same air force that must continue operating F-16s and prepare to receive its first domestically developed fifth-generation aircraft later this decade.
Contacts over six F-35s already produced for Türkiye represent a separate proposition, because existing airframes can only contribute to Turkish air power after the political and regulatory questions surrounding their delivery yield an agreement that allows the aircraft to transfer.
Ankara is seeking the removal of CAATSA sanctions linked to its S-400 acquisition and related defence industry restrictions, leaving the F-35 track exposed to a bilateral dispute that an improvement in KAAN’s technical maturity would do little to resolve directly.
Typhoon training and discussions over F-35 delivery therefore represent different degrees of readiness for force planning, with one already absorbing pilot time through a contracted programme and the other still dependent on decisions outside the Turkish Air Force’s control.
Operating several fighter families through the transition could cushion a late delivery on any one programme, while increasing the maintenance and training workload at precisely the point when Türkiye needs to build a new cadre of KAAN pilots and technicians.
The mix preserves room for Ankara to pursue its domestic fighter and maintain defence ties with Washington and London, but the extent of that flexibility will depend on how quickly each procurement track produces aircraft that Türkiye can routinely operate.
Stealth Capability Depends on Integration and the Logistics to Sustain It
KAAN combines low-observable shaping and internal weapons bays with plans for indigenous sensors, including the ASELSAN MURAD active electronically scanned array radar, placing systems integration alongside propulsion and production among the principal tests of the fighter’s eventual operational value.
Internal weapons carriage is intended to preserve the aircraft’s external profile, but its practical value depends on completing the integration and clearance work that allows the Turkish Air Force to employ the weapons it needs in the configurations it receives.
The planned MURAD AESA radar gives Türkiye a domestic role in a mission system central to the fighter’s utility, while the sensor’s actual contribution will depend on its integration with the aircraft and the maturity of the software delivered to operators.
The emerging force posture should therefore be judged by the capabilities cleared on each production block, since aircraft delivered under the same programme can offer different operational options depending on the maturity of their sensors, weapons integration and supporting mission systems.
For Türkiye’s neighbours and partners, the distinction is consequential because 100 delivered aircraft create a different military planning problem from a fleet of comparable size that can consistently generate sorties with the intended low-observable configuration, mission systems and trained crews.
Türkiye’s separate acquisition of 12 C-130J transports from the United Kingdom addresses another element of force readiness, expanding the planned transport fleet while the introduction of multiple combat and support aircraft increases demands on the personnel responsible for sustaining it.
Training for C-130J pilots, crews, maintainers and engineers is planned for completion by the end of 2026, with the first two transports expected in December and Türkiye intending to handle subsequent operations and maintenance through its own national capabilities.
The transports could improve Türkiye’s flexibility to move people and equipment as the force modernises, although the reported acquisition establishes a broader airlift programme and leaves any specific role in sustaining KAAN deployments to be determined by the air force.
Güler’s call for special budget allocations during 2026–2028 places KAAN within a wider investment requirement that also covers Steel Dome air defence, unmanned systems and infrastructure protection, all competing for the industrial expansion needed to move priority programmes into serial production.
The resulting force posture will depend on how well Türkiye synchronises aircraft deliveries with investment in crews, maintenance and mission systems, because an imbalance between those elements could limit the usable capacity gained from an otherwise successful production ramp-up.
Indonesia’s 48-Jet Order Gives KAAN Global Stakes
Indonesia’s firm order for 48 KAAN fighters gives the programme an Indo-Pacific customer with a substantial stake in its industrial performance, making Turkish progress through prototype testing and initial production relevant to forces beyond Ankara’s own air force modernisation.
The commercial advantage of a sizeable export order is the prospect of a longer production run, but that benefit depends on expanding supplier and assembly capacity sufficiently to meet foreign commitments alongside the planned growth in Turkish Air Force deliveries.
The reported development leaves Indonesia’s delivery sequence relative to Türkiye’s domestic batches open, an uncertainty that matters because the industrial implications differ depending on whether both customers require aircraft during the same production ramp or at different stages of it.
The engine configuration available to Indonesia will also shape the long-term relationship, since an export fighter fleet ties the buyer to arrangements for propulsion support and maintenance over many years, extending the consequences of the purchase beyond the airframes themselves.
Interest or partnerships involving Pakistan and Azerbaijan indicate that other governments are watching the programme, although Indonesia’s firm order provides the clearer basis for assessing demand and the potential scale of Türkiye’s role as a fighter supplier beyond its borders.
For potential buyers, the availability of a Turkish alternative could widen procurement choices, with the credibility of that option resting on delivery schedules, operational capability and dependable support that customers can assess as the first aircraft approach service with Türkiye.
Meeting the 2030 milestone would strengthen Ankara’s position in export discussions by showing that its industry can deliver a fighter to its own air force, while the configuration accepted for service would clarify which capabilities prospective customers could reasonably expect.
The 2035 target carries a wider geopolitical implication because a sizeable Turkish-operated KAAN fleet, backed by an export customer, could give Ankara more influence over fighter procurement relationships while it continues to rely on partners for parts of its transition.
The near-term measures of that ambition are concrete, from P1’s first flight and the start of Block 10 deliveries to the emergence of a TF35000 integration schedule that can coexist with the production commitments Türkiye has announced at home and abroad.
If Türkiye can deliver the first 20 fighters, absorb them into service and raise output without slowing the engine transition or weakening fleet readiness, the 100-aircraft goal could become the basis of a durable shift in Turkish air power.
