(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Singaporean pilots joined United States and South Korean crews for F-35 simulator training in Guam on 15 October 2026, bringing the Republic of Singapore Air Force into a multinational fifth-generation exercise before its first stealth fighters are scheduled to arrive.

The Cope Lightning 26-3 exercise put Singaporean personnel through simulated cruise missile defence and suppression of enemy air defences, two mission areas that require a shared understanding of command responsibilities when aircraft and controllers belong to different national forces.

Singapore is preparing to become Southeast Asia’s first F-35 operator, but the immediate milestone is institutional, with pilots learning how to work alongside experienced operators while the country builds the training, maintenance and basing arrangements needed to sustain its fleet.

The US$4.059 billion programme covers 20 aircraft, engines, training, logistics and support, making the headline figure a measure of the investment in operating a fifth-generation force as well as the scale of Singapore’s planned purchases of F-35A and F-35B fighters.

The first four F-35Bs are scheduled for delivery in the United States by the end of 2026, a sequence that puts conversion training ahead of a home-based F-35 presence and makes Arkansas central to the RSAF’s transition from the outset.

Singapore plans to base all 12 short take-off and vertical landing F-35Bs at Ebbing Air National Guard Base in Arkansas, while its eight conventional F-35As are earmarked for Tengah Air Base, giving the two variants distinct roles in the basing plan.

At Guam, RSAF Major Julian Low, head of the next-generation fighter project office, emphasised the opportunity to share best practices and repeat training scenarios, a priority for an air force building familiarity with the aircraft before its first jets arrive.

Colonel William Yoakley, commander of the Pacific Air Warfare Center, said joint briefing, execution and debriefing at that level “just cannot be done in the real world during peacetime operations,” underscoring why repeatable simulation has a place in conversion training.

The exercise used the F-35 Emulated Non-Operational Flight Program Integrated Experience, or FENIX, which links simulated cockpits and command functions so personnel can practise working across a multinational formation and review how information and decisions moved through the group.

Australia and Japan joined the United States for a separate iteration on 8 October, placing Singapore’s training one week later in a broader Pacific Air Forces effort to develop common procedures among Indo-Pacific air forces acquiring or already flying the F-35.

The reported development has implications for regional force posture, although the exercise disclosed no measured outcomes and the Arkansas delivery schedule leaves a gap between the first transfer of aircraft and the establishment of routine F-35 operations from Singapore.

Singapore’s programme will therefore be judged against several milestones, from pilot conversion and maintenance training to the readiness of Tengah and the eventual transition from upgraded F-16s, with each stage determining how much operational capacity the acquisition adds at home.

(READ) Singapore’s 20 F-35 Stealth Fighters Confront an Indo-Pacific Runway Threat

Inside Cope Lightning

Pacific Air Forces hosted the two Cope Lightning events at Andersen Air Force Base, using successive sessions to bring in four partner air arms while retaining the United States Air Force as the common participant across both training groups.

The Royal Australian Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force took part on 8 October, while the Republic of Korea Air Force and RSAF joined the 15 October session, an important distinction when assessing the scope of the multinational exercise.

The simulator combines linked cockpits with radio and data-link communications, allowing pilots to work with geographically separated controllers and examine how effectively a multinational group shares information when the participants have to make decisions under the same conditions.

Cruise missile defence provides a test of whether controllers and aircrews can interpret a common picture and coordinate responsibilities, a coordination requirement that persists even when each participating national contingent uses the same aircraft systems.

Suppression of enemy air defences introduces a different coordination problem, requiring crews to interpret the same exercise picture and understand how their decisions fit into a combined mission whose execution depends on cooperation between the cockpit and command centre.

For pilots accustomed to national procedures, joint briefings create an opportunity to identify differences in terminology and expectations before a scenario begins, while shared debriefings give instructors a way to trace confusion back to the decision or exchange that produced it.

Simulation reduces the logistics footprint of each rehearsal because crews can reset scenarios without consuming flying hours, fuel or weapons, freeing time to revisit decisions that would be difficult for participating crews to reproduce consistently during a live multinational exercise.

The available exercise details leave the number of participating pilots, the specific scenarios and their measured results open, limiting any assessment of how broadly the training reached within the RSAF or how far individual crews progressed during the Guam event.

The public account describes shared formation procedures as an objective, and Yoakley’s emphasis on trusting flight leads across nationalities points to the human dimension of interoperability that a common cockpit and shared aircraft systems can help develop over time.

Singapore’s involvement establishes that its crews trained alongside American and South Korean counterparts before delivery, a meaningful step in conversion whose operational significance will become clearer as the RSAF gains experience operating and sustaining aircraft in Arkansas.

(READ) Singapore’s $4.059 Billion F-35 Power Shift Reshapes Indo-Pacific Airpower

Why Singapore Ordered Two F-35 Variants

Singapore selected the F-35 in 2019 to succeed its F-16s, initially committing to four F-35Bs with options for eight more, a phased acquisition that gave the RSAF time to assess the short take-off and vertical landing variant before expanding the order.

The initial agreement was signed in March 2020 and the option for eight additional F-35Bs was exercised in 2023, bringing the variant to 12 aircraft before Singapore announced plans for eight conventional F-35As the following year.

Then Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen described the 2024 purchase as a “window of opportunity” amid competitive pricing, placing procurement timing alongside the operational rationale for buying a second variant before the amendment covering the eight F-35As was signed in February 2025.

The F-35B’s short take-off and vertical landing capability reduces reliance on conventional runway length, a consideration for a land-scarce country facing the planned closure of Paya Lebar Air Base and weighing how its future fighter force can retain basing flexibility.

The lift fan that enables the F-35B’s vertical landing also takes up space within the aircraft, reducing internal fuel and weapons capacity and explaining why Singapore can gain endurance and payload by buying the conventional F-35A alongside the shorter-runway variant.

Published specifications list 8,278 kilograms of internal fuel for the F-35A and 6,125 kilograms for the F-35B, a difference that helps explain the variants’ complementary roles while leaving actual endurance dependent on the mission and aircraft configuration.

Listed ranges exceed 2,200 kilometres for the F-35A and 1,667 kilometres for the F-35B, figures that illustrate the difference between the variants while leaving combat radius and operational reach dependent on mission demands outside the scope of the comparison.

The F-35A’s larger internal weapons bay gives it more flexibility over the stores it can carry internally, while the higher published overall payload figure describes capacity more broadly and cannot by itself establish what can be carried in a low-observable configuration.

Both variants combine an active electronically scanned array radar, distributed aperture and electro-optical targeting systems, an electronic warfare suite and sensor fusion, giving Singapore a common foundation for training even where flight handling, maintenance requirements and basing arrangements differ by model.

The decision to buy both variants distributes capability across two airframes with different strengths, while the resulting training and support obligations make fleet availability as important to Singapore’s eventual force posture as the performance advantages set out in published specifications.

F-35 Basing Across Arkansas and Tengah

The delivery schedule places the first four F-35Bs at a US training base by the end of 2026, with another eight scheduled for 2028, creating a staged expansion in which training and support capacity must grow alongside the number of aircraft.

Ebbing Air National Guard Base in Fort Smith, Arkansas, is the planned permanent base for all 12 Singaporean F-35Bs, concentrating the variant’s training and maintenance footprint at a US facility that also supports other Foreign Military Sales customers acquiring the aircraft.

The arrangement gives RSAF pilots access to qualified United States Air Force instructors and other F-35 operators, allowing Singapore to build instructor and aircrew experience while using a training establishment shared with partner nations facing some of the same conversion demands.

Singapore also plans to move its F-16 training detachment to Ebbing, bringing two generations of RSAF fighters into the same overseas training location as the service develops its F-35 workforce while continuing to train personnel for aircraft already in use.

The projected Ebbing community of roughly 300 to 400 people includes pilots, maintainers and family members, so that figure captures the scale of the overseas commitment while leaving the size of the detachment’s operational and maintenance workforce unspecified in public details.

Planned facilities for Singapore’s own campus and work on academic infrastructure show that the basing agreement extends beyond access to flying activity, because conversion also depends on classrooms, technical instruction and the personnel who will support the fleet between sorties.

Tengah Air Base is slated to receive the eight F-35As, and its specialised hangars and secure infrastructure are part of the effort to support fifth-generation aircraft in Singapore as the RSAF prepares for the broader relocation from Paya Lebar.

The targeted readiness of Tengah’s main operating base in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2029 and the projected F-35A deliveries around 2030 describe distinct milestones, with the timing of local arrivals also subject to project progress and training requirements.

The US$4.059 billion value covers equipment and support beyond the aircraft, which limits what can be inferred about an individual jet’s price and makes comparisons with the earlier US$2.75 billion F-35B package dependent on the scope of each figure.

For Singapore, the split between Arkansas and Tengah makes the location of instructors, maintenance personnel and support infrastructure consequential for force posture, since aircraft ordered under the same programme will enter different operating arrangements and become available on different schedules.

Singapore’s F-16 Transition

Singapore’s future fighter force is planned around the F-35A, F-35B and existing F-15SG, with upgraded F-16s expected to remain into the mid-2030s, giving the RSAF a transition period in which it must sustain established aircraft while introducing two new variants.

The F-15SG’s place in that plan makes Singapore’s F-35 acquisition part of a mixed fighter force, where common training and command procedures will matter to the contribution of fifth-generation sensors alongside aircraft already used by the Republic of Singapore Air Force.

During the overlap with upgraded F-16s, the ability to produce qualified crews and maintainers for the F-35 will shape how quickly the new fleet contributes, while continued F-16 training preserves an established source of capacity as the transition proceeds.

The planned retirement of the F-16s from the mid-2030s gives Singapore a time horizon for the transition, but the pace at which the F-35 takes on a larger share of flying activity will also depend on aircraft availability and local infrastructure.

The F-35B’s ability to land vertically broadens the basing options available to Singapore in principle, although sustained operations still depend on suitable facilities and support, and the public plan places the entire variant fleet at Ebbing for its permanent basing.

The F-35A’s higher internal fuel capacity gives the future Tengah fleet a different operating profile, but the programme information leaves open how Singapore will allocate missions among that aircraft, the F-35B and the F-15SG once all three are in service.

Sensor fusion can help aircrews make sense of information from multiple onboard systems, while the command-and-control training at Guam addresses a separate question about how pilots and controllers reach shared decisions when each national contingent brings its own procedures.

The public programme figures describe a 20-aircraft acquisition, with eight earmarked for Tengah, but leave the number likely to be available for routine activity in Singapore uncertain because delivery, conversion and maintenance schedules will determine the strength of the force.

The reported basing structure makes the arrival of the first jet in Arkansas and the start of a sustained home-based presence different benchmarks, with the latter depending on Tengah’s readiness and on personnel being qualified to operate and support the F-35A.

The most consequential force-structure change will come when Singapore can sustain fifth-generation operations through the F-16 transition, which will require progress across aircraft delivery, training and base development before the full inventory can translate into sustained air defence capacity.

The Indo-Pacific Signal

Singapore’s expected status as Southeast Asia’s first F-35 operator gives the acquisition regional significance, while its early reliance on US-based training illustrates how the introduction of a national stealth fighter fleet can deepen institutional links beyond the immediate region.

The presence of American, South Korean and Singaporean crews at Cope Lightning 26-3 shows where part of that integration is already occurring, in a training setting where air forces can compare procedures before Singapore fields the aircraft under its own arrangements.

The separate Australian and Japanese iteration shows that the United States is using a common simulation environment across different partner groupings, an approach that can familiarise crews with shared procedures without requiring every participating air force to train together simultaneously.

Guam’s role as the host and Arkansas’s role as the conversion base link two parts of the US training enterprise to Singapore’s programme, one oriented towards multinational rehearsal and the other towards the sustained instruction and support needed to introduce the aircraft.

The South Korean connection gives Singaporean pilots a chance to compare practice with an Asian F-35 operator and the US Air Force, broadening the experience available to the RSAF as it develops its own procedures.

Singapore has long trained crews in the United States because of limited domestic airspace, so the move to Ebbing extends an established relationship while adding the specialised support, secure facilities and multinational training associated with the F-35’s introduction.

The scheduled introduction has implications for Southeast Asian assessments of air power, but the immediate military effect remains conditioned by where aircraft are based, how many crews complete conversion and when Singapore can sustain regular flying from its own territory.

The exercise demonstrates cooperation in training, while decisions about participation in any future combined operation would depend on national policy and circumstances beyond the simulator, a distinction that matters when interpreting the political signal sent by the Guam event.

The Guam exercise also provides a more concrete measure of progress than aircraft specifications alone because it shows Singaporean pilots taking part in shared training before delivery, while the absence of published performance results leaves the depth of that integration uncertain.

The next milestone is the scheduled transfer of the first four F-35Bs in the United States, after which conversion progress at Ebbing and infrastructure readiness at Tengah will show when Singapore’s acquisition can produce a sustained fifth-generation presence in Southeast Asia.