Saudi Arabia Moves Toward Undersea Warfare as Talks with Fincantieri on Todaro-Class Submarines Intensify
Riyadh’s pursuit of Italian Type 212A AIP submarines marks a decisive shift toward stealth-centric maritime deterrence as threats intensify across the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz under Vision 2030.
(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Saudi Arabia’s sustained negotiations with Italy’s Fincantieri for the acquisition of Todaro-class (Type 212A) diesel-electric submarines represent a decisive inflection point in Riyadh’s maritime doctrine, signalling an intent to close a long-acknowledged undersea capability gap while recalibrating power balances across the Red Sea and Persian Gulf through stealth-centric deterrence aligned with Vision 2030’s defence-industrial transformation and localisation objectives.
Senior Saudi defence planners have privately framed the submarine pursuit as a strategic necessity rather than a prestige programme, with a senior Royal Saudi Naval Forces official stating that “undersea warfare is no longer optional for protecting our maritime lifelines,” while an Italian defence industry executive involved in the talks noted that “the Todaro-class offers an immediately deployable, low-signature capability suited to the Gulf’s constrained operating environment.”
The absence of submarines within the RSNF has long constrained Saudi Arabia’s ability to conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in contested chokepoints, forcing reliance on surface combatants vulnerable to mines, unmanned systems and saturation missile threats that have proliferated following Houthi attacks on commercial shipping since late 2023.

By entering the submarine domain, Riyadh would fundamentally alter its naval order of battle, integrating covert sea-denial and sea-control options that complement its surface fleet of Al Riyadh-class frigates and Avante 2200 corvettes while complicating adversary planning across the Bab el-Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz.
The negotiations underscore Saudi Arabia’s broader strategic recalibration, where naval modernisation is increasingly prioritised alongside air defence and long-range strike to protect energy exports that underpin the Kingdom’s economic stability, with more than 90 percent of crude shipments transiting vulnerable maritime corridors.
Fincantieri’s established presence in the Kingdom through Fincantieri Arabia for Naval Services provides Riyadh with a pathway to offsets, training and lifecycle support, aligning the submarine programme with domestic industrialisation goals under Saudi Arabian Military Industries while reducing long-term dependence on external sustainment chains.
Should an agreement materialise, Saudi Arabia would join a select group of Middle Eastern states operating advanced air-independent propulsion submarines, sending a powerful regional signal that undersea warfare is now central to Gulf security architectures rather than a niche capability reserved for traditional naval powers.
The prospective induction of AIP-equipped submarines would also recalibrate Saudi Arabia’s deterrence posture by introducing ambiguity and strategic depth into crisis scenarios, as the mere possibility of submerged assets operating undetected imposes disproportionate operational caution on adversaries planning maritime coercion or blockade strategies in narrow sea lanes.
At a macro-strategic level, the submarine negotiations reflect Riyadh’s recognition that future maritime dominance in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf will be defined less by visible fleet size and more by undersea persistence, sensor fusion and denial capabilities, positioning submarines as a force multiplier integral to safeguarding energy security, national sovereignty and regional influence.
The Todaro-Class and Its Relevance to Saudi Undersea Warfare Requirements
The Todaro-class Type 212A submarine, jointly developed by Italy and Germany, embodies a design philosophy optimised for stealth, endurance and manoeuvrability in shallow and acoustically complex waters, attributes directly applicable to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf where salinity gradients, dense traffic and constrained bathymetry challenge traditional anti-submarine warfare paradigms.
Displacing approximately 1,524 tonnes surfaced and 1,830 tonnes submerged, with a length of roughly 56 metres and a beam approaching seven metres, the Todaro-class combines compact dimensions with an advanced non-magnetic steel hull that significantly reduces magnetic and acoustic signatures, enhancing survivability against modern mine and sensor threats.
At the heart of the design lies Siemens proton-exchange membrane air-independent propulsion, enabling silent submerged operations for up to three weeks without snorkeling, a capability that allows submarines to remain covertly positioned near chokepoints during periods of heightened tension without revealing presence through mast exposure.
Endurance extending to approximately 12 weeks and a range exceeding 8,000 nautical miles at economical speeds allows sustained patrols from Saudi bases on either coast, supporting persistent deterrence missions while reducing operational tempo pressures on surface escorts tasked with convoy protection.
The class’s reported test depth of 250 metres, with structural margins far beyond that threshold, provides tactical flexibility in evading detection and prosecution, particularly relevant against regional adversaries operating older sonar suites optimised for predictable depth profiles rather than agile modern submarines.
Armament centred on six 533-millimetre torpedo tubes capable of deploying heavyweight torpedoes, mines and potentially tube-launched missiles offers Saudi planners a multi-mission toolkit spanning anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine operations and covert seabed denial, dramatically expanding response options during maritime crises.
Sensor integration through advanced combat management systems and flank, towed and mine-avoidance sonars ensures situational awareness in cluttered littoral environments, while automation reduces crew requirements, easing the human capital burden associated with establishing a nascent submarine force.
Italian Navy operational experience with extended deployments to the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden provides empirical validation of the platform’s reliability in warm-water theatres, reinforcing confidence that the Todaro-class can sustain high readiness levels under the climatic and operational stresses characteristic of Middle Eastern waters.

Strategic Drivers Behind Riyadh’s Submarine Ambitions
Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of submarines is driven by the convergence of economic vulnerability and evolving threat vectors, as the Kingdom’s energy-centric export model remains acutely exposed to disruptions in narrow maritime corridors where non-state actors and regional rivals have demonstrated an increasing willingness to challenge freedom of navigation.
The escalation of Houthi attacks using anti-ship ballistic missiles, drones and unmanned surface vessels has highlighted the limitations of surface-centric naval postures, compelling Riyadh to seek capabilities capable of operating below the threshold of detection while maintaining credible deterrence without immediate escalation.
Submarines provide an asymmetric counterbalance to Iran’s inventory of Kilo-class and midget submarines, enabling Saudi Arabia to contest undersea dominance in the Strait of Hormuz while denying adversaries uncontested access to critical sea lines of communication vital to global energy markets.
Persistent covert presence allows submarines to gather actionable intelligence, support special operations and deploy mines if required, complicating adversary planning cycles and forcing potential attackers to allocate disproportionate resources to anti-submarine warfare rather than offensive operations.
From a geopolitical perspective, undersea capability enhances Saudi Arabia’s leverage within coalition maritime security frameworks, reducing reliance on U.S. and allied naval forces while projecting an image of autonomous deterrence consistent with Vision 2030’s emphasis on strategic self-reliance.
The acquisition also aligns with regional naval modernisation trends, where Egypt, Israel and Iran have already integrated advanced submarines into their force structures, creating an implicit expectation that Saudi Arabia must follow suit to avoid strategic imbalance in adjacent theatres.
By embedding submarine capability within a broader naval modernisation agenda, Riyadh signals that maritime security is no longer a secondary consideration subordinate to land and air power, but a co-equal pillar of national defence policy shaped by economic imperatives and regional competition.
Ultimately, the submarine programme reflects Saudi Arabia’s recognition that undersea warfare offers disproportionate strategic returns relative to fleet size, providing deterrence effects that exceed the numerical scale of the force while remaining politically and operationally discreet.
Negotiation Dynamics, Cost Implications and Industrial Considerations
Ongoing negotiations between Riyadh and Fincantieri are understood to revolve around pricing, technology transfer depth and long-term sustainment frameworks, with estimates placing individual Todaro-class units between €280 million and €560 million, translating to approximately USD 305–610 million or RM1.43–2.86 billion per submarine depending on configuration.
When infrastructure, training, weapons and support packages are included, the total programme cost could reach several billion euros, underscoring the scale of Saudi Arabia’s commitment to establishing a credible undersea force rather than a symbolic capability.
German export approvals remain a critical variable given the intellectual property embedded within the Type 212A design, necessitating careful diplomatic alignment between Rome, Berlin and Riyadh to reconcile commercial interests with political sensitivities surrounding arms exports to the Middle East.
Fincantieri’s existing industrial footprint in the Kingdom strengthens its competitive position, offering pathways for local assembly, maintenance and workforce development that resonate with Saudi localisation mandates and reduce lifecycle costs over the submarines’ projected service life.
Alternative platforms, including French Scorpène variants and German Type 214 designs, have reportedly been evaluated, yet the Todaro-class’s proven shallow-water performance and AIP maturity position it as a tailored solution for Saudi operational requirements.
Training pipelines represent a substantial investment, as submarine crews require years of specialised preparation, potentially involving extended periods embedded with Italian or German navies before indigenous doctrine and training institutions achieve full operational autonomy.
Integration with existing Saudi command-and-control architectures will demand sophisticated systems engineering to ensure interoperability with surface combatants, maritime patrol aircraft and coalition networks without compromising the submarines’ low-observable characteristics.
The negotiations thus extend beyond platform acquisition into the realm of strategic partnership, where industrial cooperation, knowledge transfer and long-term sustainment are as consequential as hull numbers in determining the programme’s ultimate success.
Operational and Strategic Challenges of Introducing Submarines
Establishing a submarine force imposes demands that extend far beyond procurement, requiring dedicated basing infrastructure, secure weapons storage, specialised dry docks and simulation facilities that collectively represent a parallel naval ecosystem distinct from surface fleet requirements.
Saudi Arabia must also cultivate a safety and maintenance culture commensurate with the complexities of air-independent propulsion systems, where hydrogen handling and fuel-cell sustainment necessitate rigorous procedural discipline and technical expertise.
Doctrinal development poses another challenge, as undersea warfare demands fundamentally different command philosophies emphasising decentralised decision-making, patience and information dominance rather than visible presence and rapid response.
Budgetary competition within Vision 2030’s defence portfolio could constrain programme timelines, as investments in air defence, missile forces and unmanned systems vie for finite resources amid broader economic diversification priorities.
Regional perceptions must also be managed, as the introduction of Saudi submarines could prompt adversaries to accelerate countermeasures such as enhanced mine warfare or quieter platforms, potentially fuelling an undersea competition dynamic in already volatile waters.
Despite these hurdles, the strategic payoff of undersea capability remains compelling, offering Saudi Arabia a means to deter threats discreetly while preserving escalation control in crises where overt force projection could prove destabilising.
Successful integration will hinge on sustained political commitment, realistic timelines and the cultivation of indigenous expertise capable of operating, maintaining and evolving the submarine force over decades rather than years.
If these challenges are addressed systematically, the submarine programme could emerge as a cornerstone of Saudi maritime power, reshaping operational concepts and reinforcing national resilience against hybrid maritime threats.
Regional Security Implications and the Future of Saudi Naval Power
The acquisition of Todaro-class submarines would elevate Saudi Arabia into the ranks of advanced undersea operators, altering regional naval calculations and reinforcing deterrence across critical energy corridors that underpin both national prosperity and global economic stability.
Enhanced undersea patrols could deter mining and sabotage attempts in the Bab el-Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz, contributing to the security of international shipping while signalling Saudi Arabia’s willingness to assume greater responsibility for collective maritime security.
For regional rivals, Saudi submarine capability introduces uncertainty into operational planning, forcing adversaries to account for unseen threats and potentially moderating aggressive behaviour through the prospect of covert retaliation.
The programme also strengthens Riyadh’s hand within the Gulf Cooperation Council, positioning the Kingdom as a leader in maritime capability development and a hub for regional cooperation on undersea security.
Looking ahead, initial procurement of two to four submarines could lay the foundation for a scalable force, with future upgrades such as lithium-ion batteries or enhanced combat systems extending relevance as undersea warfare technologies evolve.
Delivery timelines of five to seven years following contract signature suggest that Saudi Arabia is planning for long-term strategic effect rather than immediate operational impact, integrating submarines into a generational vision of naval power.
By embracing undersea warfare, Saudi Arabia demonstrates an adaptive response to the changing character of maritime threats, recognising that stealth, persistence and information dominance are increasingly decisive in contested littoral environments.
Ultimately, the pursuit of Todaro-class submarines reflects Riyadh’s transformation from a predominantly surface-oriented navy into a multidimensional maritime force, leveraging advanced technology and international partnerships to safeguard national interests in an era of intensifying regional competition. — DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA
