(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Pakistan Air Force pilot Shaheen Bilal has delivered an unusually direct operational verdict, declaring the Chinese-built J-10CE superior to Pakistan’s F-16s across radar, avionics, electronic warfare and weapons, while identifying the newer fighter as his preferred combat platform.

Bilal’s assessment matters because he is reportedly dual-qualified, having accumulated more than 1,200 hours on the F-16 Block 52+ before converting to the J-10CE and subsequently logging hundreds of hours aboard Pakistan’s newest multirole fighter.

His comparison does not establish that every J-10 variant surpasses every F-16 configuration, but it exposes a decisive capability gap between the aircraft, missiles, software permissions and mission architectures that Pakistan can actually employ during a high-intensity regional confrontation.

The distinction is strategically important because Pakistan operates older Block 15 Mid-Life Upgrade aircraft and a smaller Block 52+ fleet, rather than F-16V or Block 70 fighters equipped with modern active electronically scanned array radar.

Within that force structure, the J-10CE combines an AESA radar, infrared search-and-track sensor, modern electronic warfare suite and PL-15E beyond-visual-range missile, creating an engagement architecture designed to detect, classify and attack contested targets substantially earlier.

The F-16 remains a proven and reliable fourth-generation fighter, yet Pakistan’s mechanically scanned AN/APG-68-family radars and AIM-120C-5 missiles impose substantially different detection, tracking and engagement boundaries from those available aboard the newer Chinese combat platform.

Bilal reportedly described the J-10CE as “a generation ahead” in the capabilities governing modern beyond-visual-range combat, making his preference less about aerodynamic reputation than the kill chain connecting sensors, electronic protection, datalinks and long-range weapons.

That operational judgment carries added weight after the four-day India–Pakistan crisis of May 2025, when Pakistani J-10CEs and PL-15 missiles were credited with the opening night’s most consequential long-range engagements while F-16s received no confirmed shootdown attribution.

India acknowledged aircraft losses and tactical mistakes during the opening phase, although it rejected Pakistan’s highest claims, leaving the precise scoreboard disputed while reinforcing that range estimation, networked targeting and electronic warfare shaped the encounter more than dogfighting.

Pakistan’s narrative portrays the engagement as combat validation of Chinese airpower technology, whereas the defensible conclusion is narrower: J-10CEs launched the prominent long-range attacks, PL-15 debris reached Indian territory, and at least some Indian losses occurred.

The episode therefore changes the regional battlespace by demonstrating how an export fighter, integrated with airborne early warning and national command networks, can credibly threaten premium aircraft without crossing the border or seeking visual contact.

For military planners, Bilal’s remarks illuminate a broader shift in Pakistani force posture: combat value increasingly rests on sovereign employment freedom, missile reach, electronic survivability and sensor fusion rather than the prestige historically attached to the F-16.

(CLICK HERE): How China’s KLJ-7A Radar Let Pakistan’s J-10CE Silently Down India’s Rafale, MiG-29 and Su-30MKI — And Why It Shatters the Beyond-Visual-Range Air War

The Capability Gap Inside Pakistan’s Fighter Fleet

Pakistan still operates roughly 70 or more F-16s, principally upgraded Block 15 aircraft alongside approximately 18 Block 52+ jets originally delivered around 2010, comprising 12 single-seat F-16Cs and six two-seat F-16Ds in total active service.

These aircraft remain important for air defence, precision attack and force availability, but their principal mechanically scanned radars cannot replicate an AESA’s rapid beam steering, simultaneous functions, multi-target capacity and stronger resistance against sophisticated electronic jamming.

The better Block 52+ aircraft employ the AN/APG-68(V)9 radar and carry AIM-120C-5 missiles, a combination that once underpinned Pakistan’s qualitative advantage but now competes against a longer-reaching weapon and more modern sensor aboard the J-10CE.

Public estimates place the AIM-120C-5 near the 100–105-kilometre class under relevant conditions, while the PL-15E is commonly presented around 145 kilometres, although every practical engagement envelope changes with altitude, speed, geometry, manoeuvre and electronic interference.

Pakistan received its first six J-10CEs in March 2022, fielded approximately 20 by mid-2025, and expects the remaining aircraft from an initial 36-fighter order through phased deliveries, giving No. 15 Squadron “Cobras” a growing operational nucleus.

The force’s transition is consequently qualitative before it becomes numerical, because a smaller J-10CE contingent can hold disproportionate responsibility for long-range counter-air missions while the larger F-16 inventory sustains broader readiness, defensive patrol and strike requirements.

For a pilot moving between both cockpits, the operational contrast links AESA surveillance and PL-15E reach with infrared search-and-track and modern electronic warfare, allowing passive detection options, stronger situational awareness and earlier weapon employment against supported targets.

Pakistan’s F-16s can still exploit mature procedures, established maintenance knowledge and proven flight characteristics, but those institutional advantages cannot independently compensate for shorter missile reach, older sensor architecture and constrained access to newer American weapons or software.

Bilal’s comparison therefore concerns integrated systems rather than isolated airframes, because combat effectiveness emerges from the combined radar, missile seeker, electronic warfare suite, datalink, mission computer and rules governing when those capabilities may be released operationally.

This internal capability hierarchy has major force-planning consequences, pushing Pakistan to reserve J-10CEs for the most demanding India-focused counter-air missions while using F-16s as valuable but increasingly complementary assets across a diversified combat fleet structure.

PL-15E, AESA Radar and the Long-Range Kill Chain

The PL-15E sits at the centre of Bilal’s preference because missile reach reshapes pilot decision time, forces adversaries to defend earlier and enables Pakistani fighters to launch while remaining behind their own border and integrated air-defence umbrella.

Pakistani accounts claimed firing distances between roughly 170 and 200 kilometres during the May 2025 fighting, exceeding the frequently published 145-kilometre export figure, but those claims remain publicly unaudited and should not be treated as confirmed performance specifications.

Even the conservative published envelope potentially exceeds that of Pakistan’s AIM-120C-5, giving the J-10CE a substantially earlier engagement opportunity when supported by suitable altitude, speed, target geometry, track quality and effective mid-course targeting information flows.

An AESA radar strengthens that advantage by scanning rapidly, managing multiple targets and complicating hostile jamming, although detection range alone never guarantees a kill because identification, weapons-quality tracking and seeker transition must remain coherent throughout the engagement.

Pakistan’s Saab 2000 Erieye airborne early warning and control aircraft extend the battlespace further, generating a long-range air picture and distributing tracks that can cue fighters before their onboard radars would independently establish an optimal firing solution.

Public uncertainty remains over whether Erieye directly provides detailed mid-course guidance to the PL-15 or principally cues J-10CE sensors, yet either arrangement reduces search burden and helps pilots approach an engagement with superior positional awareness.

The F-16 can also receive networked situational information, but a shorter-ranged missile and older seeker narrow its prosecution window, potentially forcing the aircraft closer to hostile weapons and increasing exposure to opposing fighters, surface-to-air missiles and electronic attack.

This range asymmetry imposes logistical effects beyond the launch aircraft, because longer standoff distances can reduce fuel consumed in aggressive positioning, preserve tanker independence, shorten exposure time and allow defensive counter-air patrols to remain nearer protected operating bases.

However, claimed maximum ranges cannot be equated with reliable no-escape zones, since manoeuvring targets at lower altitude may defeat energy-depleted missiles, while jamming, decoys, terrain, warning systems and defensive tactics can disrupt the entire kill chain.

The strategic lesson is nevertheless clear: J-10CE and PL-15E force India to account for deeper threat rings, protect airborne early-warning and tanker assets more cautiously, and reassess assumptions concerning safe launch distances for standoff strike formations.

May 2025: Combat Claims, Confirmed Losses and Uncertainty

The operational backdrop began after 26 civilians were killed at Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir on April 22, 2025, an attack India attributed to Pakistan and Islamabad denied, triggering an escalation that culminated in reciprocal military operations.

India opened Operation Sindoor shortly after midnight on May 7, using Rafale, Mirage 2000 and Su-30MKI aircraft to launch SCALP, Hammer and some BrahMos weapons against militant-linked sites without apparently sending manned fighters deep across Pakistani territory.

Pakistan responded under Operation Bunyan al-Marsus, scrambling J-10CEs as a large night-time air confrontation developed, with estimates placing approximately 70 to 110 aircraft aloft during one of the largest reported beyond-visual-range engagements in recent decades.

Pakistani officers subsequently said Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Sidhu directed crews to target Rafales specifically, indicating that the engagement’s strategic purpose extended beyond interception toward demonstrating that Pakistan could threaten India’s most prestigious combat aircraft.

India’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan, later acknowledged aircraft losses and “tactical mistakes” during the first day while rejecting Pakistan’s claim of six destroyed jets, leaving aircraft types and the official Indian loss total undisclosed.

American officials reportedly assessed with high confidence that Pakistani J-10s destroyed at least two Indian fighters using air-to-air missiles, including at least one Rafale, while explicitly stating that F-16s were not responsible for those shootdowns.

Wreckage evidence was assessed as consistent with a Rafale and Mirage 2000 at separate Indian crash sites, while PL-15 debris recovered inside India established missile employment but did not independently prove every Pakistani attribution or claimed firing distance.

France’s air chief later referenced evidence of three Indian losses involving a Rafale, Mirage 2000 and Sukhoi, a more restrained account than Pakistan’s public tally but one that reinforced the material consequences of the opening engagement.

Pakistan ultimately claimed five fighters and one unmanned aircraft, usually listing three Rafales, one MiG-29 and one Su-30MKI, yet independent assessments generally placed Indian fighter losses between two and four, with one Rafale most widely accepted.

These evidentiary gaps demand equal scepticism, because verified losses do not validate every Pakistani claim, while India’s limited disclosure prevents complete reconstruction and leaves missile ranges, targeting support, engagement geometry and individual kill attribution unresolved.

Why American Restrictions Change Combat Utility

Bilal’s preference also reflects sovereignty over combat employment, because every Pakistani F-16 sale carries American end-use monitoring, while spare parts, software modifications and approved missile configurations remain subject to United States export controls and political oversight.

A United States Technical Security Team has monitored Pakistani F-16 usage, and Washington historically presented the fleet’s purpose around counterterrorism and internal security, creating political sensitivity whenever Islamabad considers employing those aircraft directly against India.

Reports surrounding the 2025 fighting suggested F-16s were constrained or withheld from the most prominent long-range counter-air role, although Pakistani briefings listed them among scrambled aircraft and publicly available evidence does not establish every mission assignment.

The J-10CE carries no equivalent American veto, enabling Pakistan to integrate Chinese weapons, connect the fighter with its national Link-17 and Sky Guard architecture, and plan India-focused missions without requesting Washington’s approval for each capability change.

That freedom is operationally significant because a technically capable aircraft becomes strategically unreliable when political restrictions might limit weapon access, software modification, mission-data updates or combat employment during the precise crisis for which the force is maintained.

For a frontline pilot, platform preference therefore includes confidence that weapons, electronic warfare libraries and datalinks will remain available throughout escalation, rather than judging manoeuvrability or cockpit ergonomics independently from alliance politics and supply-chain permissions.

A reported December 2025 American sustainment package valued near $686 million would support Pakistan’s F-16s into the 2030s through Link-16, identification and communications improvements, preserving operational readiness and interoperability across a still-substantial national combat fleet.

However, sustainment and networking upgrades do not equal a fleet-wide transformation to F-16V standard, because they neither install AESA radars throughout the entire force nor automatically provide AIM-120D missiles and unrestricted national systems integration authority.

Pakistan’s logistics posture consequently depends on parallel ecosystems: American-controlled sustainment for F-16 availability, Chinese supply and weapons integration for J-10CE expansion, and domestic command-network adaptation to coordinate both fleets without assuming identical data or mission permissions.

This diversification reduces reliance on one supplier but increases training, maintenance and inventory complexity, requiring separate technical expertise, test equipment, spares pipelines and weapons stocks while commanders assign each fighter according to capability and political availability.

(CLICK HERE): Pakistan’s J-10CE Kill Marks Reignite Rafale, PL-15E Air War Debate

Regional Airpower Consequences Beyond the Pilot’s Verdict

Bilal’s statement should not be interpreted as evidence that the J-10CE universally defeats the F-16, particularly because Pakistan does not operate the F-16V or Block 70 configuration with APG-83 SABR AESA radar and newer compatible weapons.

His verdict instead captures a specific operational comparison between Pakistan’s Block 52+ and upgraded Block 15 aircraft carrying AIM-120C-5 missiles, and J-10CEs equipped with significantly newer sensors, electronic warfare capabilities and PL-15E beyond-visual-range combat weapons.

For India, the May 2025 episode increases pressure to improve threat-library accuracy, electronic intelligence, missile-warning procedures and distributed airborne surveillance, because underestimating an adversary’s engagement envelope can expose expensive fighters before their crews recognise immediate danger.

The encounter also raises protection requirements for high-value enablers, including airborne early-warning aircraft and tankers, whose destruction could fracture India’s long-range air picture, shorten fighter endurance and reduce coordination across dispersed strike and defensive formations.

For China, Pakistan’s account provides valuable strategic signalling that an export AESA fighter and Chinese long-range missile can challenge Western-origin combat aircraft, although disputed kill totals and incomplete telemetry prevent definitive judgments about relative platform quality.

For the United States, the comparison illustrates how restrictive access and delayed capability upgrades can reduce an established fighter’s influence, encouraging partners to acquire alternative systems that offer wider weapons integration and greater freedom during politically sensitive operations.

Pakistan must still confront force-generation realities, because approximately 20 J-10CEs cannot replace more than 70 F-16s across every alert, training, maintenance and combat requirement, making availability rates and phased deliveries central to any sustainable posture.

No. 15 Squadron’s reported deployment of 18 aircraft during the opening night, if accurate, would represent intensive concentration of its available J-10CE force, delivering combat mass but potentially leaving limited depth for attrition, maintenance disruption or simultaneous contingencies.

The air war’s durable lesson concerns integrated systems rather than national branding: sensors establish awareness, datalinks distribute tracks, electronic warfare protects access, missiles translate information into reach, and political authority determines whether the complete architecture can actually be employed.

Bilal’s candid preference therefore marks a strategic transition inside Pakistan’s air force, where the F-16 remains indispensable but no longer defines the highest-end counter-air mission, while J-10CE, PL-15E and networked targeting increasingly shape deterrence against India.