Iran’s Bavar-373 Claims Ability to Track F-35 Stealth Jets: A Game-Changer in Middle East Air Power Dynamics

In a significant demonstration of capability, the fire-control radar integrated into the Bavar-373 system successfully identified and intercepted a domestically built ‘Karrar’ drone at an extended distance of 316 kilometres.

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By admin Last updated Apr 16, 2025

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Iran’s indigenously engineered Bavar-373 long-range air defence system may now stand among the world’s few platforms theoretically capable of detecting and tracking the United States’ fifth-generation stealth fighter, the F-35 Lightning II, according to recently surfaced performance data from Iranian military exercises.

In a significant demonstration of capability, the fire-control radar integrated into the Bavar-373 system successfully identified and intercepted a domestically built ‘Karrar’ drone at an extended distance of 316 kilometres.

This achievement, shared by the Middle East Spectator via Telegram, revealed that the drone presented a radar cross-section (RCS) of 2.14 square metres, equivalent to approximately 3.22 decibels, as confirmed by technical data and imagery published alongside the test.

Although the specific range at which the drone was initially detected has not been disclosed, operational estimates suggest the system’s fire-control radar can reliably detect aerial targets with a 0.01m² RCS at 82 kilometres, and those with a 0.05m² RCS at 123 kilometres.

If the Bavar-373 is upgraded with an L-band radar array—comparable to systems such as the American AN/TPY-4—and assuming analogous detection characteristics, it is theoretically feasible for the system to track a stealth aircraft like the F-35 at ranges reaching 218 kilometres.

This assessment is based on the known vulnerability of stealth aircraft in lower radar frequency bands, where the F-35’s radar-absorbent materials are less effective, and its radar cross-section expands to approximately 0.5 square metres in the L-band.

Visual simulations mapping the F-35’s radar visibility across both L-band and VHF frequency spectra were included in the report, offering comparative insight into how Iran may attempt to defeat advanced stealth technology.

To translate radar reflectivity measured in decibels on a full 360-degree radar chart into standard square metres—a critical calculation in air defence—analysts are advised to use the logarithmic conversion formula: 10^(decibels/10).

The ability of the Bavar-373 system to lock onto and intercept a target with an RCS significantly smaller than that of the F-35 strongly implies that stealth aircraft may no longer enjoy uncontested freedom of operation in Iranian airspace.

Given that the F-35 exhibits a larger radar cross-section than the intercepted drone, it stands to reason—at least in theory—that the Iranian system may find the American stealth fighter even easier to detect, track, and potentially neutralize.

Originally developed as an indigenous alternative to Russia’s S-300PMU2, the Bavar-373 represents Tehran’s strategic response to increasing aerial threats and its desire to assert autonomy in high-end air defence technology.

Designed for comprehensive aerial interdiction, the system is configured to counter a diverse spectrum of threats including fighter aircraft, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), cruise missiles, and short- to medium-range ballistic missiles.

Key Technical Specifications of the Bavar-373:

System Classification: Multi-target long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system
Primary Surveillance Radar: Active electronically scanned array (AESA) with full 360-degree coverage
Fire-Control Radar Configuration: High-power S-Band and L-Band radars optimised for detecting low-RCS stealth aircraft
Detection Envelope: Capable of tracking high-RCS targets at ranges up to 320 kilometres
Maximum Engagement Range: Up to 200 kilometres, contingent on missile variant deployed
Operational Altitude Range: Between 100 metres and 27 kilometres, covering low-flying cruise missiles to high-altitude bombers
Simultaneous Engagement Capability: Tracks up to 100 targets and engages 6 threats simultaneously
Missile Type: Sayyad-4B, a radar-guided missile with an estimated range exceeding 200 kilometres
Guidance Architecture: Inertial navigation system (INS) with mid-course update, followed by terminal active radar homing
Platform Mobility: Mounted on all-terrain wheeled launchers to ensure rapid deployment and battlefield adaptability
Counter-Electronic Warfare Features: Equipped with advanced radar processing algorithms to reduce false positives and enhance discrimination in contested electromagnetic environments

Given the breadth and depth of its design, the Bavar-373 now ranks among Iran’s most formidable air defence assets, capable of forming a vital component in its layered defence architecture against technologically advanced air platforms.

Geo-Strategic and Military Consequences of Tracking the F-35

Should the Bavar-373 system indeed prove capable of detecting and tracking the F-35 Lightning II, the strategic implications for Iran—and the broader Middle East—would be profound.

1. Elevated National Airspace Security

The capability to challenge stealth aircraft would dramatically enhance Iran’s aerial deterrent, enabling the establishment of more credible anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) zones over critical infrastructure, including nuclear facilities and key military assets.

2. Asymmetric Counter to Western Technological Superiority

Effectively neutralizing a fifth-generation stealth aircraft—long considered the pinnacle of Western airpower—would introduce a potent asymmetric threat, levelling the playing field between Iran and technologically superior adversaries like the United States and Israel.

3. Expanded Strategic Leverage in International Diplomacy

Iran’s ability to threaten even the most advanced Western air platforms could significantly bolster its negotiating leverage in ongoing geopolitical and security dialogues, particularly those surrounding its nuclear programme and missile development agenda.

4. Strengthening Iran’s Regional Military Posture

Successfully demonstrating the ability to counter stealth aircraft would solidify Iran’s position as a dominant military force in the Middle East, reshaping strategic calculations in the Persian Gulf and Levant, and potentially compelling U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE to reassess their defence dependencies.

5. Prestige and Growth of Iran’s Defence-Industrial Base

If validated, the Bavar-373’s success would serve as a landmark achievement for Iran’s domestic defence industry, enhancing its credibility and opening the door for export partnerships with nations seeking cost-effective alternatives to Western or Russian air defence systems.

DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA

Iran’s Bavar-373 Claims Ability to Track F-35 Stealth Jets: A Game-Changer in Middle East Air Power Dynamics

In a significant demonstration of capability, the fire-control radar integrated into the Bavar-373 system successfully identified and intercepted a domestically built ‘Karrar’ drone at an extended distance of 316 kilometres.

In a significant demonstration of capability, the fire-control radar integrated into the Bavar-373 system successfully identified and intercepted a domestically built ‘Karrar’ drone at an extended distance of 316 kilometres.

This achievement, shared by the Middle East Spectator via Telegram, revealed that the drone presented a radar cross-section (RCS) of 2.14 square metres, equivalent to approximately 3.22 decibels, as confirmed by technical data and imagery published alongside the test.

Although the specific range at which the drone was initially detected has not been disclosed, operational estimates suggest the system’s fire-control radar can reliably detect aerial targets with a 0.01m² RCS at 82 kilometres, and those with a 0.05m² RCS at 123 kilometres.

If the Bavar-373 is upgraded with an L-band radar array—comparable to systems such as the American AN/TPY-4—and assuming analogous detection characteristics, it is theoretically feasible for the system to track a stealth aircraft like the F-35 at ranges reaching 218 kilometres.

This assessment is based on the known vulnerability of stealth aircraft in lower radar frequency bands, where the F-35’s radar-absorbent materials are less effective, and its radar cross-section expands to approximately 0.5 square metres in the L-band.

Visual simulations mapping the F-35’s radar visibility across both L-band and VHF frequency spectra were included in the report, offering comparative insight into how Iran may attempt to defeat advanced stealth technology.

To translate radar reflectivity measured in decibels on a full 360-degree radar chart into standard square metres—a critical calculation in air defence—analysts are advised to use the logarithmic conversion formula: 10^(decibels/10).

The ability of the Bavar-373 system to lock onto and intercept a target with an RCS significantly smaller than that of the F-35 strongly implies that stealth aircraft may no longer enjoy uncontested freedom of operation in Iranian airspace.

Given that the F-35 exhibits a larger radar cross-section than the intercepted drone, it stands to reason—at least in theory—that the Iranian system may find the American stealth fighter even easier to detect, track, and potentially neutralize.

Originally developed as an indigenous alternative to Russia’s S-300PMU2, the Bavar-373 represents Tehran’s strategic response to increasing aerial threats and its desire to assert autonomy in high-end air defence technology.

Designed for comprehensive aerial interdiction, the system is configured to counter a diverse spectrum of threats including fighter aircraft, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), cruise missiles, and short- to medium-range ballistic missiles.

Key Technical Specifications of the Bavar-373:

System Classification: Multi-target long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system

Primary Surveillance Radar: Active electronically scanned array (AESA) with full 360-degree coverage

Fire-Control Radar Configuration: High-power S-Band and L-Band radars optimised for detecting low-RCS stealth aircraft

Detection Envelope: Capable of tracking high-RCS targets at ranges up to 320 kilometres

Maximum Engagement Range: Up to 200 kilometres, contingent on missile variant deployed

Operational Altitude Range: Between 100 metres and 27 kilometres, covering low-flying cruise missiles to high-altitude bombers

Simultaneous Engagement Capability: Tracks up to 100 targets and engages 6 threats simultaneously

Missile Type: Sayyad-4B, a radar-guided missile with an estimated range exceeding 200 kilometres

Guidance Architecture: Inertial navigation system (INS) with mid-course update, followed by terminal active radar homing

Platform Mobility: Mounted on all-terrain wheeled launchers to ensure rapid deployment and battlefield adaptability

Counter-Electronic Warfare Features: Equipped with advanced radar processing algorithms to reduce false positives and enhance discrimination in contested electromagnetic environments

Given the breadth and depth of its design, the Bavar-373 now ranks among Iran’s most formidable air defence assets, capable of forming a vital component in its layered defence architecture against technologically advanced air platforms.

Geo-Strategic and Military Consequences of Tracking the F-35

Should the Bavar-373 system indeed prove capable of detecting and tracking the F-35 Lightning II, the strategic implications for Iran—and the broader Middle East—would be profound.

1. Elevated National Airspace Security

The capability to challenge stealth aircraft would dramatically enhance Iran’s aerial deterrent, enabling the establishment of more credible anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) zones over critical infrastructure, including nuclear facilities and key military assets.

2. Asymmetric Counter to Western Technological Superiority

Effectively neutralizing a fifth-generation stealth aircraft—long considered the pinnacle of Western airpower—would introduce a potent asymmetric threat, levelling the playing field between Iran and technologically superior adversaries like the United States and Israel.

3. Expanded Strategic Leverage in International Diplomacy

Iran’s ability to threaten even the most advanced Western air platforms could significantly bolster its negotiating leverage in ongoing geopolitical and security dialogues, particularly those surrounding its nuclear programme and missile development agenda.

4. Strengthening Iran’s Regional Military Posture

5. Prestige and Growth of Iran’s Defence-Industrial Base

If validated, the Bavar-373’s success would serve as a landmark achievement for Iran’s domestic defence industry, enhancing its credibility and opening the door for export partnerships with nations seeking cost-effective alternatives to Western or Russian air defence systems.

DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA