India to Build Rafale Fighter Fuselages in Hyderabad in Landmark Dassault-Tata Defence Deal

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — In a landmark move aimed at revitalizing India’s defence-industrial base in the wake of recent battlefield setbacks—including the reported shootdown of three Rafale fighter jets by Pakistan during the latest cross-border conflict—France’s Dassault Aviation has announced a strategic agreement with Tata Advanced Systems to manufacture Rafale fuselages on Indian soil, marking a bold step to reinforce both capability and self-reliance.

This marks the first time the structural core of the Rafale multirole fighter will be produced outside France, underscoring growing defence-industrial ties between Paris and New Delhi.

The fuselage is the central body of an aircraft that houses the cockpit, avionics, fuel, and payload systems, connects major components like the wings and tail, and in military jets like the Rafale, supports weapons, sensors, and electronic warfare equipment.

Tata Advanced Systems will establish a dedicated facility in Hyderabad to produce major fuselage assemblies of the 4.5-generation fighter jet, an aircraft that has already gained operational credibility in Indian service.

The companies stated that the facility is expected to begin production by the 2028 financial year, with capacity planned for the rollout of two complete fuselage sets per month.

Although neither Dassault nor Tata disclosed the value of the agreement, the announcement carries major strategic implications for India’s ambition to become a global aerospace manufacturing hub under its “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (self-reliant India) initiative.

“Atmanirbhar Bharat” is a Hindi phrase that translates to “Self-Reliant India” in English.

It is a national initiative launched by the Indian government—particularly emphasized by Prime Minister Narendra Modi—aimed at reducing dependency on foreign imports by boosting domestic manufacturing, innovation, and investment across key sectors, including defence, technology, healthcare, energy, and infrastructure.

In the defence context, Atmanirbhar Bharat focuses on:

• Encouraging indigenous design and production of military hardware

• Reducing reliance on foreign arms suppliers

• Promoting public-private partnerships and foreign direct investment (FDI) in Indian defence industries

• Enhancing defence exports

It reflects a broader strategic shift toward economic resilience, national security, and industrial autonomy.

In a post on social media platform X, Tata Advanced Systems confirmed that the fuselages produced in Hyderabad will serve both the Indian Air Force (IAF) and “other global markets,” hinting at a broader export vision aligned with India’s growing defence exports, which rose 12 percent to $2.76 billion in the last fiscal year.

Currently, the Indian Air Force operates 36 Rafale fighter jets, all acquired under a $8.7 billion intergovernmental agreement signed in 2016 for two squadrons based in Ambala and Hashimara.

In April 2025, India further deepened its procurement ties with France by signing a $7 billion contract for 26 Rafale-M naval variants, intended for deployment on its upcoming aircraft carrier INS Vikrant by 2030.

This expansion of Rafale variants signals New Delhi’s intent to build a common multirole platform across both its air and naval forces, simplifying logistics while reinforcing airpower standardization.

India’s decision to localize Rafale production follows heightened military activity in South Asia, including four days of intense aerial skirmishes with Pakistan last month triggered by a deadly militant assault in Indian-administered Kashmir that left 26 soldiers dead.

Pakistan’s Defence Minister made headlines when he claimed that three Indian Rafales were shot down during those engagements, although no physical evidence has been presented to support the assertion.

One U.S. defence official, however, told an international media organisation on condition of anonymity that at least one Indian Rafale was downed during the conflict, lending partial credence to Islamabad’s claim.

Dassault Aviation has declined to publicly comment on the alleged loss, while India’s Chief of Defence Staff acknowledged in a recent interview that Indian forces suffered aerial losses but withheld specifics “due to operational sensitivity.”

The decision to manufacture Rafale fuselages in India will likely bolster both India’s aerospace sovereignty and its long-term maintenance capability, enabling faster turnaround for spares, overhauls, and future upgrades.

Strategically, the move aligns with India’s long-term efforts to counterbalance Chinese and Pakistani aerial capabilities, especially as the region sees an uptick in stealth fighter acquisitions and long-range missile deployments.

With China advancing its J-20 and J-35 stealth fighters and Pakistan expected to receive J-35A-based platforms “in the coming months”, India’s deepening industrial partnership with Dassault is a signal to adversaries and allies alike: New Delhi intends to not only buy cutting-edge combat platforms—but also build them.

Despite agreeing to transfer fuselage production of the Rafale fighter jet to India, France has drawn a clear red line on digital sovereignty by refusing to provide New Delhi with access to the platform’s highly classified source code.

This refusal has reignited strategic tensions between the two long-standing defence partners, highlighting the often-overlooked limitations of high-end arms procurement in the absence of true software control.

India has made repeated diplomatic overtures to Dassault Aviation, pressing for access to the mission system’s core software to allow full control over integration, upgrades, and mission customization.

However, Dassault remains steadfast in its stance, declining to share the critical software backbone that governs the Rafale’s avionics, fire-control systems, data buses, and weapons integration modules.

This digital lockout directly undercuts India’s ambitions under its flagship “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (Self-Reliant India) initiative, which seeks to embed indigenous weapons and sensors into imported platforms to enhance combat autonomy.

India’s primary aim is to integrate homegrown munitions—including the Astra beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile, the Rudram series of anti-radiation missiles, and the SAAW smart air-to-ground glide bomb—into the Rafale’s weapons ecosystem.

While some limited progress has been made in integrating Indian-developed stores like Astra Mk1, full integration remains stalled without access to the Rafale’s Modular Mission Computer (MMC) and radar interface source code.

This barrier forces India to rely on French technical teams for even minor software updates or new weapons configurations, slowing down response time in dynamic combat scenarios.

The Rafale itself remains a formidable 4.5-generation twin-engine multirole fighter powered by two Snecma M88-2 afterburning turbofans, capable of sustained supercruise at Mach 1.4 without afterburners.

It features the Thales RBE2-AA Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, capable of simultaneously tracking 40 airborne targets and engaging up to eight, with detection ranges exceeding 100 km.

Complementing the radar is the SPECTRA electronic warfare suite, one of the most advanced in its class, offering jamming, radar warning, and infrared missile threat detection with both passive and active countermeasures.

India’s Rafale fleet is also outfitted with advanced avionics including the Thales TopSight Helmet Mounted Display System (HMDS), Front Sector Optronics (FSO), Infrared Search and Track (IRST), and high-speed data links for network-centric operations.

The jet’s primary strike arsenal includes the MBDA Meteor BVR missile, which offers a no-escape zone of over 60 km; the SCALP-EG stealth cruise missile with a strike range of 500 km; and the Hammer (AASM) modular precision-guided bombs for ground targets.

Despite its firepower and multi-domain capability, the lack of access to Rafale’s digital source code critically restricts India’s ability to tailor the jet to its unique regional requirements.

The mission software defines how onboard sensors, weapons, and targeting systems interact in combat—meaning that any modification, be it Indian or otherwise, must pass through French engineering oversight.

This creates a bottleneck in adapting the aircraft to emerging battlefield threats, especially in a region where China is deploying fifth-generation stealth fighters like the J-20 and Pakistan is fielding long-range PL-15 missiles with its J-10C fleet.

In an era of software-defined warfare, India’s inability to independently modify Rafale mission systems without French cooperation risks compromising operational flexibility and response speed in high-intensity scenarios.

Without sovereign access to the aircraft’s source code, India remains locked out of deeper software-defined upgrades, AI-based enhancements, and even seamless multi-platform interoperability.

As the strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific accelerates, India’s dependence on foreign digital architecture—despite localised manufacturing—exposes a fault line in its self-reliance doctrine and underscores the necessity of full-spectrum defence indigenization.

— DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA