India and Pakistan on the Brink: Overlapping NOTAMs and Live-Fire Drills Turn Sir Creek into a Potential Flashpoint in South Asia

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — The shallow, mud-laden waters of Sir Creek have once again become the centre of renewed strategic tension between India and Pakistan.

Stretching approximately 96 kilometres through the Rann of Kutch, this narrow estuarine channel has evolved from a historical boundary dispute into a modern theatre of military signalling and maritime deterrence.

In early November 2025, both New Delhi and Islamabad issued overlapping Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) covering areas near the Sir Creek sector.

These NOTAMs — restricting airspace and maritime zones — coincide with simultaneous live-fire exercises by both militaries, conducted only a few dozen kilometres apart.

The convergence of these activities underscores the persistent fragility of the India–Pakistan relationship, where even routine exercises can carry escalatory overtones.

India’s NOTAM, effective from 2 to 5 November, applied to the western seaboard near Gujarat, while Pakistan’s corresponding NOTAM covered its Sindh coastline during the same period.

Both announcements reflected deliberate signalling: the projection of readiness and deterrence in one of South Asia’s most volatile border zones.

Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif, spokesperson for Pakistan’s armed forces, accused India of planning a provocation, stating:
“India is preparing another false-flag operation in the deep seas, to malign Pakistan. India can do whatever it wants on land, at sea and in the air. Pakistan’s response will be more severe this time. Our forces are fully prepared to respond decisively to any aggression from India.”

His statement, broadcast by ISPR, was aimed at both domestic and international audiences, portraying Pakistan as reactive but resolute in its defensive posture.

Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh countered with a strong warning of his own, asserting that any “misadventure” in Sir Creek would be met with decisive action, declaring, “the way to Karachi goes through Sir Creek.”

“This time we will not maintain the restraint that we did in Operation Sindoor 1.0… this time we will do something that Pakistan will have to think whether it wants to be in geography or not,” Indian Army Chief Jeneral Upendra Dwivedi.

Such exchanges have raised the rhetorical temperature, transforming a historically bureaucratic boundary issue into a stage for national prestige and strategic assertion.

Summary

1. Overlapping NOTAMs and Military Escalation:
   India and Pakistan have heightened tensions in the Sir Creek sector after issuing overlapping Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) and conducting simultaneous live-fire exercises in early November 2025, signalling a new phase of maritime confrontation.

2. Historic Dispute with Modern Implications:
   The 96-kilometre Sir Creek, situated in the Rann of Kutch, has remained a contested boundary since 1947, with competing claims that directly affect both nations’ maritime jurisdiction, resource rights, and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

3. Verified Exercises and Operational Readiness:
   India’s tri-service Exercise Trishul and Pakistan’s naval drills off Sindh were confirmed through official announcements and OSINT verification, demonstrating heightened operational alertness and mutual deterrence in a sensitive border area.

4. Strategic and Geopolitical Dimensions:
   The standoff reflects a broader Indo-Pak maritime competition shaped by India’s western naval strategy and Pakistan’s partnership with China under CPEC, adding complexity to Indo-Pacific maritime security dynamics.

5. Humanitarian and Environmental Impact:
   Beyond military manoeuvres, the escalation has deepened humanitarian and ecological risks, disrupting fishing livelihoods and endangering the Rann of Kutch’s mangrove ecosystems — underscoring the urgent need for restraint, dialogue, and maritime confidence-building measures.

 A Historical Dispute Shaped by Geography and Law

The Sir Creek issue originates from a colonial-era boundary drawn in 1914 under the Bombay Presidency.

That agreement delineated the boundary between Sindh and Kutch but left the precise interpretation of the creek’s channel ambiguous.

India maintains that the international border follows the eastern bank of the creek, while Pakistan argues for the mid-channel or “thalweg” line, consistent with international riverine principles.

The dispute gained legal complexity after the 1968 Western Boundary Tribunal settled parts of the Rann of Kutch but left the Sir Creek segment unresolved due to tidal shifts and the creek’s unstable course.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the demarcation carries strategic weight, as it determines where each country can claim its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

If Pakistan’s claim is accepted, its EEZ could extend further south, potentially affecting maritime resource entitlements in the Arabian Sea.

India’s claim along the eastern bank preserves its maritime control and coastal integrity along Gujarat’s energy-rich shoreline.

Thus, what began as a question of administrative jurisdiction has evolved into a maritime sovereignty issue with direct economic and security consequences.

The 1999 downing of a Pakistani Breguet Atlantic aircraft by an Indian MiG-21 near Sir Creek was a stark reminder of how narrow margins of error can ignite diplomatic crises.

That event, followed by decades of stalled negotiations, demonstrated how Sir Creek represents both a geographic and psychological frontier in Indo-Pakistani rivalry.

Escalation by Exercise: Military Posture and Strategic Context

India’s tri-service exercise “Trishul”, officially launched in late October 2025, represents the country’s continuing emphasis on integrated operations under its emerging theatre command structure.

The exercise brings together the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force in coordinated scenarios across the western theatre, covering land, air, and maritime dimensions.

According to verified defence ministry briefings and domestic reporting, Trishul aims to test interoperability in littoral and desert environments, mirroring the complexity of modern hybrid warfare.

The Indian Navy’s Western Command plays a pivotal role, supported by formations from the Army’s Southern Command and the Air Force’s South-Western Air Command.

The deployment of the indigenously built aircraft carrier INS Vikrant for these operations marks a major demonstration of India’s expanding blue-water capability and indigenous defence production.

Carrier-based MiG-29K fighters have been observed operating in the Arabian Sea, confirmed by OSINT flight tracking and satellite imagery.

The use of P-8I Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft underscores India’s focus on anti-submarine and maritime domain awareness, integrating real-time data links between surface and air assets.

These verified elements reflect India’s operational doctrine of jointness — the capacity to deliver rapid, coordinated effects across multiple domains using networked command systems.

Pakistan, in parallel, has announced its own live-fire naval exercises in the northern Arabian Sea during the same timeframe.

The Pakistan Navy confirmed participation of Zulfiquar-class frigates in missile and gunnery drills, forming part of its scheduled annual readiness cycle.

Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Naveed Ashraf was publicly reported visiting forward coastal positions, including areas near the creek, to review training activities and operational readiness.

During this inspection, the Navy inducted new hovercraft units optimised for mobility in shallow-water and tidal environments — assets particularly suitable for operations in the Sir Creek sector.

Pakistan’s naval aviation wing, equipped with ATR-72 and Sea King aircraft, conducted reconnaissance and coastal surveillance flights from Karachi.

Open-source satellite and flight-tracking data corroborate increased maritime activity by both nations, indicating simultaneous readiness drills on each side of the border.

The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has also maintained higher-than-usual patrol activity over Sindh’s coastline using JF-17 Thunder fighters, suggesting coordinated air-sea integration.

Analytically, this operational symmetry between Indian and Pakistani exercises reveals mutual deterrence posturing — each side demonstrating readiness without direct engagement.

Such exercises serve dual objectives: validating command responsiveness and communicating political resolve.

Both militaries appear to have managed their drills within respective territorial and maritime limits, yet the geographic proximity inherently elevates the risk of misinterpretation.

Strategic Balance and Maritime Deterrence in the Northern Arabian Sea

Sir Creek’s significance lies not only in its history but in its location at the intersection of national security, maritime economics, and nuclear deterrence.

For India, maintaining a credible presence along its western seaboard secures access to offshore energy infrastructure, protects trade routes, and supports broader regional initiatives such as Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR).

For Pakistan, the area links directly to its coastal defence network, supporting maritime traffic connected to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the port of Gwadar.

The Pakistan Navy’s modernisation programme, including Hangor-class submarines and Type-054A/P frigates from China, enhances its sea-denial capability and complements China’s growing maritime footprint in the region.

India’s own naval modernisation — represented by the INS Vikrant, Scorpène-class submarines, and forthcoming indigenous destroyers — reflects its determination to sustain maritime dominance and secure critical sea lanes.

The parallel buildup of capabilities points to a regional naval competition centred not only on deterrence but also on influence and access in the northern Arabian Sea.

Unlike previous decades, where deterrence rested on land forces, both countries now see the maritime domain as essential to projecting credibility and safeguarding economic interests.

This shift illustrates how maritime strategy has become integral to broader national security architecture in both capitals.

Economic and Human Dimensions of a Strategic Waterway

While military manoeuvres dominate headlines, Sir Creek’s disputes have tangible human and economic consequences.

The estuary’s surrounding seabed holds potential for oil and gas exploration, with both India and Pakistan having conducted surveys in adjoining maritime zones.

The unresolved boundary, however, restricts commercial development and complicates potential bilateral investment in offshore resources.

Fishing remains the most immediate and emotional issue for local populations.

Hundreds of fishermen from both sides are arrested each year for inadvertently crossing the undefined maritime line — a humanitarian challenge that frequently strains diplomatic goodwill.

These arrests are compounded by harsh detention conditions and slow repatriation processes, though both governments periodically exchange prisoners through humanitarian initiatives.

Environmental experts have raised alarms that repeated live-fire exercises and naval movements threaten the fragile mangrove ecosystems of the Rann of Kutch.

These mangroves, vital to coastal stability and marine biodiversity, also support thousands of families dependent on fishing and salt production.

Increased militarisation thus risks collateral economic damage to communities already living on the margins of a changing coastline.

Diplomatic Stalemate and the Nuclear Backdrop

Bilateral diplomatic mechanisms between India and Pakistan remain operational but under strain.

The hotline between their Directors General of Military Operations (DGMO) remains functional, yet the absence of new maritime confidence-building measures (CBMs) signals declining trust.

Agreements like the 1991 accord on prior notification of military exercises and the 2005 maritime dialogue have not produced tangible progress in recent years.

India continues to insist that border disputes, including Sir Creek, be resolved bilaterally under the framework of the 1972 Simla Agreement.

Pakistan maintains that international maritime law, particularly UNCLOS, provides a legitimate avenue for third-party arbitration on technical boundary issues.

This divergence in approach has effectively stalled negotiations since 2012, when the last technical-level discussions were held.

From a deterrence perspective, both sides’ development of sea-based nuclear platforms — India’s Arihant-class SSBNs and Pakistan’s Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile — adds a new layer of strategic complexity.

While no evidence indicates active nuclear deployment in the Sir Creek region, the very existence of these capabilities underscores how misinterpretation in a maritime encounter could escalate rapidly.

The challenge lies in ensuring tactical restraint within a deterrence framework that leaves little room for error.

A Narrow Corridor of Risk and Resolve

Sir Creek has transformed from an obscure colonial demarcation into a focal point of Indo-Pakistani maritime strategy.

Both nations’ recent exercises are verifiable displays of readiness rather than direct provocations, yet their proximity raises the spectre of accidental confrontation.

For India, sustained control over its western maritime approaches forms part of a broader strategy to safeguard national interests from the Arabian Sea to the Persian Gulf.

For Pakistan, asserting a visible naval presence reinforces its sovereignty claims and demonstrates strategic endurance in a contested zone.

The unresolved nature of Sir Creek, however, means that each act of readiness carries with it the shadow of escalation.

Diplomatic caution, disciplined communication, and professional restraint remain the only barriers preventing this narrow estuary from becoming a spark in South Asia’s enduring rivalry.

As November’s drills conclude, Sir Creek stands once more as a microcosm of the Indo-Pakistani equation — where geography, nationalism, and deterrence converge in a delicate balance that the region can ill afford to disturb.

Sir Creek also reflects the broader structural instability of South Asian security, where tactical events in confined geographies can rapidly assume strategic significance.

The convergence of high-technology weapon systems, automated command networks, and compressed decision timelines makes the region increasingly vulnerable to escalation through misperception.

Both militaries now operate in an information-saturated battlespace where electronic warfare, surveillance, and cyber interference could distort situational awareness and trigger unintended responses.

In this environment, the absence of robust crisis-management frameworks or maritime confidence-building measures heightens the probability that even a routine patrol could be misread as a hostile act.

Ultimately, Sir Creek exemplifies how unresolved maritime boundaries in the nuclear age demand not only deterrence but diplomacy informed by restraint, transparency, and technical dialogue to prevent the next crisis from beginning with a radar echo over a tidal swamp. — DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA