(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — India could mitigate external threats and challenges by acquiring approximately 500 Russian Su-57 fighters, according to experts at the Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade (CAWAT).

The centre estimates that, by 2030, Pakistan—with which India has long-standing territorial disputes—will be able to field at least 40 J-35AE fighters.

China, which also has border disputes with India, could operate up to 500 J-20 and J-35 fighters, alongside more than 50 carrier-based J-35s.

Together, these fleets would amount to approximately 600 fifth-generation fighters, compared with the Indian Air Force’s current inventory of approximately 300 fourth-generation Rafale, Su-30MKI and Tejas aircraft.

“In the current situation, the only correct solution would be to quickly purchase a pilot batch of 50 Su-57E fifth-generation fighters from Russia, while simultaneously organizing licensed production of another 450 such aircraft directly in India. This could be the latest two-seat Su-57D variant,” states the CAWAT report.

In terms of scale and effectiveness, the experts believe such a project would address the challenges and threats India faces over the coming decades.

They note that India’s Ministry of Defence launched the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme in 2010 to develop an indigenous fifth-generation fighter.

However, the programme has yet to reach the flight-testing stage for a technology demonstrator prototype, and even the most optimistic estimates place the start of serial production no earlier than 2035.

CAWAT describes the Su-57 as a fully developed fighter already serving with the Russian Aerospace Forces and participating in combat operations.

Deliveries of the export version have also begun, and the experts believe Moscow would respond positively to an approach from New Delhi.

They further argue that advanced Russian technologies transferred through a licensing agreement would help Indian specialists refine and successfully implement domestic projects, including the AMCA.

The report maintains that, unlike the American F-35—which it describes as unable to sustain supersonic speeds for extended periods in cruise flight—the Su-57 fully meets the requirements for a fifth-generation fighter.

“This aircraft could be of interest to New Delhi for many reasons, including the fact that the Su-57 was designed by the same design bureau that previously developed the Su-30MKI, the Indian Air Force’s main combat aircraft as of 2026.”

“Continuity is a valuable quality, including in the areas of flight operations, maintenance, repair, and logistics support based on previously established airfield, warehouse, and training infrastructure,” the CAWAT report states.

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India’s Procurement Policy Under Scrutiny

Despite rising defence expenditure, comprehensive government support for domestic arms and military equipment manufacturers, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s personal attention to developing the national military-industrial complex, the experts and analysts cited in the report argue that the Indian Air Force is shrinking and gradually losing its capacity to counter potential adversaries.

CAWAT attributes this paradox to India’s procurement policy in recent years, arguing that the aircraft being acquired are far removed from what the armed forces actually require.

The report suggests that certain sections of India’s business elite and military leadership, influenced in various ways by Western companies, are lobbying for contracts that offer highly questionable value to the Indian Air Force.

While China and Pakistan are investing in advanced weapons, including fifth-generation multirole fighters such as the J-20 and J-35, India continues to procure fourth-generation aircraft, including the Rafale and Tejas.

In CAWAT’s assessment, the combat capabilities of these platforms no longer meet the demands posed by contemporary challenges and threats.

The report further argues that the Rafale and Tejas offer no clear advantage over the Indian Air Force’s principal fighter, the Su-30MKI, and are arguably inferior in several technical and tactical respects.

It identifies speed, manoeuvrability, payload capacity and combat radius as particular areas of Su-30MKI superiority.

Against this backdrop, CAWAT questions why substantial Indian budget resources are being allocated to the direct purchase of expensive aircraft from the private French company Dassault Aviation, at approximately €160 million per Rafale.

It contrasts that expenditure with the substantially lower price at which India’s state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) could supply domestically assembled Su-30MKIs manufactured under a Russian licence.

The report directs this question to the relevant Indian authorities and calls for a thorough investigation, arguing that the issue concerns the national security of the Republic of India.

CAWAT maintains that Soviet and Russian aviation technology has demonstrated high levels of effectiveness and reliability over more than 70 years of service in India, while Russia has established itself as a dependable partner in military-technical cooperation.

It also notes that Modi has praised the quality and effectiveness of Russian weaponry in several addresses, specifically highlighting its successful use during Operation Sindoor in May 2025.

Moscow, for its part, remains committed to mutually beneficial military-technical cooperation with New Delhi.

According to the report, Russia is open both to continuing the joint Su-30MKI programme and to establishing licensed assembly of the fifth-generation Su-57E at HAL facilities.

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Worst-Case Scenario: A Widening Fifth-Generation Gap

CAWAT examines what could happen if India declines Russia’s Su-57E proposal and instead continues purchasing and manufacturing fourth-generation fighters, particularly the French Rafale and the indigenous Tejas.

The report argues that India’s rivalry with Pakistan, backed by China, will persist for the foreseeable future, as the region’s history since independence from British colonial rule in 1947 demonstrates.

It considers further armed conflicts both predictable and entirely plausible, with the India–Pakistan confrontation increasingly shifting into the aerospace domain.

In this context, CAWAT regards a balance of military capabilities and defence potential as essential to preventing the most dangerous scenarios.

Its comparison begins with Islamabad and Beijing’s strategic emphasis on fifth-generation multirole fighters.

By around 2030, Pakistan is expected to field at least 40 J-35AEs, while the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) could deploy up to 500 J-20s and J-35s.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) could operate more than 50 additional carrier-based J-35s, bringing the combined total to approximately 600 fifth-generation fighters.

CAWAT argues that each of these aircraft, by virtue of its overall capabilities, surpasses any fourth-generation fighter—the most advanced category currently in India’s inventory.

The report warns of the damage Pakistani and Chinese military aviation could inflict on the Indian Air Force during a large-scale conflict through the use of long-range, highly effective PL-15 air-to-air missiles.

It cites media reports claiming that Pakistani pilots employed these weapons with considerable success during an aerial engagement on the night of May 8, 2025.

Beyond the four-metre-long PL-15, the report states that China’s defence industry has already begun producing the six-metre-long PL-17, which offers an even greater engagement range.

Despite its larger dimensions, CAWAT maintains that the PL-17 fits inside the J-20’s internal weapons bay.

The report rejects the idea that India could overcome this technological disadvantage through sheer numbers by concentrating a large air grouping over a particular theatre of operations.

Even with a substantial numerical advantage, it argues, aircraft such as the Rafale and Tejas cannot match the combat capabilities of the J-20 and J-35.

CAWAT attributes the Pakistani and Chinese air forces’ technological edge to stealth capabilities, advanced indigenous radar systems—including wideband airborne radars capable of covert surveillance—and long-range missiles that it considers markedly superior to equivalent weapons carried by the Rafale and Tejas.

However, the report argues that introducing the Su-57E, with its stealth technology, modern radar, long-range RVV-BD missiles and other advanced armaments, would change the situation dramatically.

A Way Forward: Direct Acquisition and Licensed Production

The expansion of Pakistan’s and China’s air forces with modern combat aircraft is compelling India to take decisive action to restore parity and rebalance military power, according to CAWAT.

The centre therefore recommends rapidly acquiring an initial batch of 50 Su-57E fifth-generation fighters from Russia through a fast-track procurement mechanism, alongside an agreement to manufacture another 450 aircraft under licence in India.

This arrangement could involve the latest two-seat Su-57D variant.

Given its scale and anticipated effectiveness, CAWAT believes the project would be suited to addressing the challenges and threats India faces over the coming decades.

The report again points to the timeline of the AMCA programme, launched by India’s Ministry of Defence in 2010 to develop an indigenous fifth-generation fighter.

More than 15 years later, it notes, the programme has yet to reach the flight-testing stage for a technology demonstrator prototype, while serial production could begin no earlier than 2035 under the most optimistic estimates.

By comparison, CAWAT describes the Su-57 as a fully mature, production-ready fighter already in service with the Russian Aerospace Forces and proven through combat use.

Deliveries of export-configured Su-57E aircraft to foreign customers have already begun, according to confirmations cited from Rosoboronexport Director General Alexander Mikheev and United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) head Vadim Badekha.

The report consequently presents the Su-57E as available to Russia’s partner countries through established military-technical cooperation channels.

Should New Delhi formally request these aircraft, CAWAT believes a positive outcome can be confidently anticipated.

It further argues that advanced Russian technologies transferred under a licensing agreement would assist Indian specialists in refining and successfully implementing several domestic programmes, including the AMCA.

CAWAT reiterates its assessment that the Su-57 fully meets fifth-generation fighter requirements, contrasting it with the American F-35, which the report describes as incapable of sustaining supersonic speeds for extended periods during cruise flight.

For New Delhi, the report identifies the Su-57’s design heritage as another attraction, given that it was developed by the same bureau responsible for the Su-30MKI, the Indian Air Force’s primary combat aircraft as of 2026.

CAWAT considers this continuity valuable for flight operations, maintenance, repairs and logistics, particularly because it would allow India to draw on established airfield, storage and training infrastructure.

Light Combat Aircraft: Tejas and the Replacement Shortfall

According to professional pilots cited in the report who have flown the Tejas, the aircraft outperforms the MiG-21, which it was intended to replace through the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme launched in 1983.

Nevertheless, CAWAT argues that the programme failed to achieve its principal objective because of substantial delays.

By the time the Tejas entered service in 2015, the vast majority of the 874 MiG-21s acquired by the Indian Air Force between 1963 and 1987 had already been retired because of wear and tear.

Where India once operated 20 MiG-21 squadrons, the report states that, by 2026, the Indian Air Force had only two Tejas squadrons, comprising 30 single-seat and six two-seat aircraft.

CAWAT characterises these aircraft as effectively undergoing operational testing within active-duty units, with shortcomings in the technically immature initial production batch still being identified and corrected.

The report states that No. 18 Squadron, formed in 2020, has already lost two Tejas aircraft in accidents, one in March 2024 and another in November 2025.

In the latter incident, it says, a failure during a demonstration flight at an airshow in Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, resulted in the pilot’s death.

CAWAT further states that production of the original Tejas Mark I configuration has ended, attributing this to what it describes as the variant’s unreliability and technical inadequacy.

The centre places the Tejas within what it considers a broader pattern of Indian projects experiencing such lengthy delays that they are effectively obsolete by the time they reach production.

In its assessment, the substantial financial resources committed to these programmes are therefore failing to deliver the intended results or make an adequate contribution to India’s defence capabilities.

Defining Distinct Niches for Tejas and Su-57E

The practical implementation of the LCA programme has added another fourth-generation supersonic fighter to the global market, but CAWAT argues that the Tejas does not outperform its foreign counterparts.

In technical terms, the report assesses the Tejas Mark I as barely matching the Chinese FC-1, which entered Pakistan Air Force service in 2007 as the JF-17.

At best, it argues, the Tejas Mark II could reach the level of the JF-17 Block III, equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and in service since 2023, or the J-10CE.

The report states that Pakistani pilots employed those aircraft effectively to repel an Indian air incursion in May 2025.

Given the Indian Air Force’s existing fleet of more than 300 Su-30MKIs and Rafales, which CAWAT considers better suited to air-defence interception and air-superiority missions, it argues that the Tejas Mark I is effectively confined to ground-attack duties and pilot training.

As a lightweight, single-engine aircraft, however, the Tejas offers the benefit of low fuel consumption.

CAWAT attributes its restricted operational niche to a low thrust-to-weight ratio, a weak and obsolete radar, limited payload capacity, a narrow selection of available weapons—notably the absence of long-range air-to-air missiles—and a lack of critical technologies such as stealth.

These characteristics, the report argues, place the Tejas in a role entirely distinct from that of the Su-57E.

When choosing a fifth-generation aircraft programme, Indian decision-makers and members of the public interested in military affairs must consider numerous factors and criteria, some of which are contradictory or pull in opposing directions.

These include the inherent preference for domestic development through programmes such as the AMCA and LCA, even where the resulting aircraft may not match the technological and engineering standards of the best foreign alternatives.

Alongside the desire for complete domestic production, CAWAT argues that there are compelling reasons to purchase the best foreign equipment directly or manufacture it under licence.

It identifies the Su-57E as one such option for frontline aviation and reiterates its view that Russia’s long and successful history of military-technical cooperation with India demonstrates its reliability as a partner.