(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) – China has emerged as the world’s second-largest operator of nuclear-powered submarines, as the People’s Liberation Army Navy now fields an estimated 32 active nuclear boats—surpassing Russia’s diminished force of 25 to 28 submarines and narrowing the long-standing numerical gap with the United States’ fleet of 71—thereby marking a decisive inflection point in global naval power and fundamentally reshaping undersea deterrence dynamics across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.”

This structural shift is underpinned by Beijing’s industrial-scale naval modernisation drive, which contrasts starkly with Russia’s constrained submarine readiness amid economic pressure, prolonged conflict in Ukraine, and persistent maintenance backlogs that have degraded Moscow’s ability to sustain numerical parity or qualitative momentum beneath the world’s oceans.

Former U.S. Navy officer Christopher Carlson, analysing the trajectory of China’s next-generation attack submarines, warned that “The Type 095 will be a very quiet submarine, which will complicate the situation,” a statement that underscores how acoustic stealth rather than sheer tonnage is increasingly shaping the balance of undersea power.

Echoing these concerns, Brent Sadler, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, assessed that “Chinese submarine technologies are making significant strides, making the ships more difficult to track,” reinforcing the growing consensus among Western naval planners that China’s submarine force is closing long-standing detection and survivability gaps.

A senior U.S. Navy official candidly highlighted industrial vulnerabilities within the American shipbuilding base, stating “Our 2024 annual production rate [for ships] … together to address those challenges,” a remark that implicitly contrasts Washington’s constrained output with Beijing’s rapidly accelerating submarine construction tempo.

Defence analysts assessing the strategic inflection point concluded that “China’s nuclear submarine inventory has reached a level that places it firmly ahead of Russia for the first time,” signalling a historic redistribution of undersea power that elevates China from a regional maritime challenger to a global nuclear-naval heavyweight.

The quantitative leap also translates into profound strategic consequences, as China’s expanding submarine force enhances its second-strike nuclear survivability, reinforces anti-access/area-denial architectures around Taiwan and the South China Sea, and complicates U.S. and allied freedom of manoeuvre in contested maritime chokepoints.

As this submarine surge unfolds against a backdrop of intensifying U.S.–China strategic rivalry, the undersea domain is rapidly becoming the decisive arena where industrial capacity, acoustic superiority, and nuclear deterrence credibility converge to define the future maritime order.

The Industrial and Strategic Foundations of China’s Nuclear Submarine Expansion

China’s ascent to second place in global nuclear submarine numbers is the cumulative result of a decades-long, state-directed industrial strategy that prioritised sustained hull production, incremental technological iteration, and the deliberate scaling of shipyard capacity to levels unmatched by any contemporary naval power outside the United States.

The PLAN’s nuclear submarine lineage began modestly with the Type 091 Han-class in the 1970s, platforms that were acoustically crude by Western standards yet strategically transformative in signalling Beijing’s entry into nuclear propulsion and undersea deterrence despite technological immaturity.

By the 1990s, the introduction of the Type 093 Shang-class SSN marked a pivotal transition toward improved hydrodynamics, enhanced reactor safety, and Russian-influenced design features that reduced noise signatures and expanded mission versatility beyond coastal defence.

China’s true submarine acceleration emerged in the 2010s, when political leadership elevated undersea warfare as a core pillar of maritime power projection, aligning submarine force development with broader objectives in the South China Sea, Western Pacific, and potential Taiwan contingencies.

As of early 2026, the PLAN fields nine Type 093 and 093A Shang-class attack submarines, each displacing roughly 6,000 tonnes submerged, equipped with heavyweight torpedoes, anti-ship cruise missiles, and increasingly sophisticated sonar suites optimised for both anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare.

The Type 093A variant introduced incremental but critical improvements in vibration isolation, hull coatings, and propulsor refinement, narrowing the acoustic gap with older Russian SSNs and complicating adversary tracking in littoral and open-ocean environments.

China’s numerical advantage over Russia is driven primarily by the emergence of the Type 093B guided-missile nuclear submarine, assessed to number 14–16 hulls, a platform that integrates vertical launch systems capable of deploying YJ-18 anti-ship missiles and CJ-10 land-attack cruise missiles.

Displacing approximately 6,200 tonnes, the Type 093B embodies Beijing’s philosophy of mass-produced nuclear platforms that prioritise missile volume and salvo saturation, enabling coordinated strikes against carrier strike groups and land targets that could overwhelm layered missile defences.

This submarine expansion is made possible by China’s unparalleled shipbuilding infrastructure, particularly at facilities such as Bohai Shipyard in Huludao, where satellite imagery in 2025 revealed simultaneous construction of multiple nuclear submarine hulls, a production tempo unmatched by Western or Russian yards.

China’s Ballistic Missile Submarines and the Maturation of Nuclear Deterrence

China’s nuclear submarine surge is strategically anchored by the expansion and refinement of its sea-based nuclear deterrent, centred on the Type 094 and 094A Jin-class ballistic missile submarines, of which nine boats are assessed to be operational.

These SSBNs are armed with JL-2 and the longer-range JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, with the latter estimated to possess ranges approaching 8,000 kilometres, enabling China to hold continental U.S. targets at risk from secure patrol areas within the South China Sea.

The Type 094A variant incorporates incremental acoustic improvements, reactor quieting measures, and enhanced missile handling systems, reducing detectability to levels comparable with older Russian Delta-class SSBNs, while still trailing contemporary U.S. platforms.

Beijing’s emphasis on bastion operations mirrors Soviet Cold War doctrine, leveraging geography, layered air and naval defences, and dense sensor networks to protect SSBN patrol areas and ensure second-strike survivability.

From a strategic deterrence perspective, China’s growing SSBN fleet fundamentally alters nuclear stability calculations by reducing vulnerability to first-strike scenarios and strengthening Beijing’s assured retaliation posture.

The forthcoming Type 096 SSBN, currently under construction, is expected to represent a qualitative leap, potentially featuring up to 24 missile tubes, advanced propulsion systems, and acoustic performance approaching modern Western standards.

Defence analysts estimate that each Type 096 SSBN could cost between USD 3–4 billion (approximately RM14.1–18.8 billion) per unit, underscoring the scale of Beijing’s financial commitment to undersea nuclear deterrence despite the absence of publicised budget figures.

When combined with improvements in command-and-control resilience and satellite communications, China’s SSBN modernisation signals a transition from a minimal deterrent to a more robust, survivable nuclear triad.

Russia’s Eroding Undersea Advantage and Structural Constraints

Russia’s decline to third place in global nuclear submarine numbers reflects not a collapse of capability, but the cumulative impact of industrial stagnation, fiscal strain, and strategic distraction that has constrained fleet renewal and operational readiness.

The Russian Navy currently operates 25–28 nuclear-powered submarines, including approximately 10 Borei-class SSBNs equipped with Bulava SLBMs, platforms that remain central to Moscow’s strategic deterrent.

Russia’s premier attack and strike assets, the Yasen and Yasen-M class SSGNs, numbering around eight hulls, retain formidable capabilities through Kalibr and Zircon hypersonic missiles, posing persistent threats to surface fleets and land targets.

However, legacy platforms such as Oscar-II SSGNs and Akula-class SSNs remain in service beyond optimal lifespans, inflating fleet numbers while diluting overall combat effectiveness.

Maintenance backlogs, exacerbated by sanctions imposed after 2022, have sidelined multiple submarines, reducing Russia’s operational availability to an estimated 60–70 percent, with many boats confined to Arctic bastions.

The decommissioning of the Dmitry Donskoy, the last Typhoon-class SSBN, in 2023 symbolised the end of an era, while delays in the Laika-class next-generation SSN programme highlight systemic industrial bottlenecks.

Russia’s primary submarine yard at Sevmash continues to deliver new hulls at a fraction of China’s output rate, with cost overruns and workforce limitations constraining serial production.

Strategically, Moscow’s submarine force is increasingly focused on NATO deterrence in the Arctic and North Atlantic, limiting its ability to sustain a credible undersea presence in the Indo-Pacific.

The United States’ Enduring Lead and Emerging Industrial Strains

The United States Navy retains a commanding undersea advantage with approximately 71 nuclear-powered submarines, comprising Virginia-class SSNs, Ohio-class SSBNs, and Ohio-class SSGNs, collectively representing the global benchmark in acoustic stealth and mission versatility.

The Virginia-class, numbering 53 boats, integrates modular payload systems, advanced sonar, and multi-domain capabilities that enable roles ranging from anti-submarine warfare to intelligence collection and strike operations.

U.S. submarines are assessed to operate below 100 decibels, rendering them significantly quieter than most Chinese platforms and sustaining Washington’s qualitative edge in detection and survivability.

The forthcoming Columbia-class SSBN, scheduled to enter service in the early 2030s, will replace the Ohio fleet and maintain continuous at-sea deterrence with 16 missile tubes per hull, ensuring strategic continuity.

However, U.S. shipyards face acute challenges, including workforce shortages and supply-chain disruptions that have constrained annual SSN production to approximately 1.2 boats, well below the target of 2.33.

Each Virginia-class submarine costs approximately USD 3.6 billion (around RM16.9 billion), highlighting the financial intensity of sustaining undersea superiority amid budgetary pressures.

Delays in the SSN(X) next-generation attack submarine programme raise concerns that industrial constraints could gradually erode America’s numerical advantage if China’s production momentum continues unchecked.

In response, Washington has reinforced alliances such as AUKUS, expanded forward basing in Guam, and intensified joint undersea warfare exercises with Japan and India to counter the PLAN’s growing reach.

Strategic Consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the Global Undersea Order

China’s overtaking of Russia in nuclear submarine numbers amplifies strategic anxiety across the Indo-Pacific, particularly in contested maritime zones where undersea dominance directly shapes crisis escalation and deterrence credibility.

In a Taiwan contingency, PLAN submarines equipped with long-range cruise missiles could enforce anti-access strategies that complicate U.S. intervention timelines and strain allied maritime defences.

In the South China Sea, China’s expanding submarine presence strengthens its ability to enforce maritime claims, conduct coercive patrols, and shield SSBN bastions from foreign surveillance.

ASEAN states such as the Philippines and Vietnam face heightened undersea pressure, as increased PLAN submarine activity challenges their limited anti-submarine warfare capabilities and underscores asymmetries in naval power.

India views China’s submarine surge as a direct challenge to Indian Ocean sea-lane security, prompting deeper cooperation within the Quad and accelerated investment in indigenous SSBN and SSN programmes.

Globally, China’s strengthened second-strike capability enhances nuclear stability through assured retaliation, yet simultaneously raises escalation risks by compressing decision-making timelines in high-intensity crises.

Projections suggesting that China could approach or surpass U.S. nuclear submarine numbers by 2035 highlight the urgency of industrial reform and alliance coordination among Western navies.

As one Pentagon assessment noted, China “will continue to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces rapidly,” a trajectory that signals a long-term reordering of undersea power rather than a transient numerical fluctuation.

A New Underwater Balance of Power

China’s rise to second place in nuclear submarine strength, with 32 operational boats compared to Russia’s 25–28 and the United States’ 71, represents a structural transformation of the global undersea balance that will define maritime security for decades.

This submarine surge, driven by industrial capacity, strategic clarity, and sustained investment, enhances Beijing’s deterrence posture while intensifying regional and global competition beneath the oceans.

As the undersea domain becomes the decisive arena of great-power rivalry, the convergence of numbers, stealth, and missile capability underscores an unmistakable reality: the world has entered a new era of nuclear-submarine competition where China is no longer catching up, but actively reshaping the rules of undersea dominance.

China’s numerical breakthrough is strategically significant not merely because of hull counts, but because it compresses warning timelines for adversaries, complicates undersea domain awareness across the Indo-Pacific, and forces the United States and its allies to recalibrate long-standing assumptions about undersea superiority that have underpinned deterrence and crisis stability since the Cold War.

Unlike previous eras where qualitative superiority could offset numerical inferiority, China’s ability to produce nuclear submarines at scale increasingly erodes the margin of acoustic and operational dominance enjoyed by Western navies, particularly in regional theatres where proximity, sensor saturation, and layered A2/AD networks amplify the effectiveness of moderately quieter platforms.

This expanding undersea force also grants Beijing greater strategic elasticity, allowing it to simultaneously sustain SSBN deterrent patrols, deploy SSGNs for conventional strike missions, and maintain forward-deployed SSNs for sea denial and intelligence operations without exhausting fleet readiness or crew rotations.

From a geopolitical perspective, China’s submarine surge reinforces its bargaining leverage during crises, as the opacity of undersea operations injects uncertainty into escalation dynamics, raising the costs of intervention for external powers while strengthening Beijing’s confidence in controlled risk-taking below the threshold of open conflict.

Taken together, these developments signal that the global undersea balance is no longer defined solely by technological leadership, but by the fusion of industrial mass, strategic intent, and persistent presence—an equation in which China is rapidly positioning itself not as a challenger, but as a co-architect of the future nuclear-submarine order. — DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA