(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Saudi Arabia is preparing a possible offensive against Houthi positions along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, seeking to restore access through Bab el-Mandeb as pressure on its western oil export corridor compounds the disruption affecting the Strait of Hormuz.

The proposed campaign remains unconfirmed by Riyadh, with preparations described on October 2 encompassing Yemeni ground forces and Saudi air power, making its scope, timing and operational readiness consequential uncertainties rather than settled indicators of an imminent assault.

September’s Houthi advance reportedly captured Mocha, extended south toward Dhubab and reached islands overlooking the shipping lanes, transforming the southern coastline from a government logistics corridor into a potential platform for surveillance, maritime coercion and sustained territorial leverage.

That shift matters because Saudi’s East–West Pipeline was intended to bypass Gulf vulnerability, yet tankers loading at Yanbu still require secure onward routes, exposing the limits of infrastructure redundancy when both maritime exits face simultaneous security pressure.

Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree claimed the offensive expelled Saudi-backed forces from six districts covering approximately 5,400 square kilometres, although disputed consolidation near Dhubab and unverified casualty figures prevent that declaration from establishing an uncontested picture of battlefield control.

Houthi assurances that navigation remains safe for vessels outside the Saudi-linked category do not eliminate commercial risk, because selective targeting can deter operators, raise insurance premiums and disrupt energy deliveries without producing a formally declared closure of the strait.

The planning reportedly includes either a limited coastal counteroffensive or coordinated pressure across several interior fronts, presenting Riyadh with a choice between concentrating resources around the export gateway and accepting a larger, more demanding campaign against dispersed Houthi forces.

More than 100,000 Yemeni troops could reportedly be mobilised under the broader option, but that upper planning figure provides no confirmed order of battle, readiness assessment or evidence that fragmented formations can sustain coordinated operations across multiple contested fronts.

Former United States ambassador to Saudi Arabia Michael Ratney has assessed the likely objective as a limited coastal recovery, a distinction that places restored shipping access and negotiating leverage above the much larger military task of defeating the Houthis outright.

Saudi commentator Ali Shihabi has emphasised the performance of local forces, identifying the campaign’s central dependency: Saudi aircraft may strike positions and disrupt movement, but Yemeni units must capture terrain, secure supply routes and retain control after initial advances.

External assistance reportedly centres on intelligence, equipment and infrastructure protection, while direct allied ground participation is not expected, leaving Riyadh to balance offensive support for Yemeni formations against defensive requirements at ports, pipelines, borders and exposed population centres.

DSA’s assessment is that the decisive measure would be sustained commercial passage rather than territory captured, because an offensive that recovers coastal positions while provoking renewed attacks on export infrastructure could change the front line without resolving Saudi’s strategic vulnerability.

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Bab el-Mandeb: Houthi Coastal Leverage

The advance developed from pressure around Mocha in August into breakthroughs inland during September, indicating that the coastal collapse followed losses of supporting terrain rather than an isolated port seizure, with implications for any attempt to reconstruct a defensible government corridor.

Houthi forces reportedly entered Mocha on September 10 after National Resistance Forces under Tariq Saleh withdrew south, removing a headquarters and logistics node that had supported coastal monitoring, weapons-smuggling interdiction and connections toward Taiz for government-aligned units there.

Mocha lies approximately 75–80 kilometres north of Bab el-Mandeb, meaning its recovery would offer a staging and supply point for subsequent operations, although restoring port access would still require secure approaches and reliable protection of onward ground movements.

The subsequent movement toward Dhubab brought Houthi forces closer to positions facing the strait, where geographic proximity can improve observation of shipping and reduce the distance between coastal operating areas and maritime targets without demonstrating a complete targeting capability.

Perim, also known as Mayyun, divides Bab el-Mandeb into two channels and sits roughly four kilometres from Yemen’s mainland, giving an occupying force a strategically placed observation position while making its own resupply dependent on exposed connections across nearby waters.

An airstrip previously established by UAE-backed forces adds potential operational utility to the island, but supplied information does not establish its condition, aircraft deployment or Houthi use, limiting conclusions about any immediate change in local air operations.

The Hanish archipelago, including reported gains around Zuqar and Greater Hanish, extends the maritime geography under pressure northward, potentially weakening the surveillance and interdiction network that government-aligned forces had used to monitor movements along Yemen’s southern Red Sea approaches.

These positions supplement the Houthis’ existing northern coastline around Hodeidah, potentially providing operating depth and dispersal opportunities, although possession of more shoreline does not establish the number, readiness or location of anti-ship missiles, drones or associated surveillance systems.

The Houthis had already disrupted shipping with missiles and drones before these territorial gains, so a coastal counteroffensive would address newly acquired geographic advantages while leaving an unresolved requirement to constrain attacks launched from positions beyond the assault area.

Recovering islands and shoreline could therefore reduce direct oversight of the shipping lanes, but reopening the corridor would additionally depend on persistent surveillance, credible defensive coverage and a demonstrated reduction in attacks sufficient to influence commercial routing decisions subsequently.

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Saudi Oil Exports: East–West Pipeline Constraints

Saudi’s western export system became more consequential after Hormuz traffic was constrained from late February, shifting the strategic value of Yanbu from an alternative terminal toward a principal outlet whose security increasingly determines access to the kingdom’s Asian customers.

The East–West Pipeline’s nameplate capacity of approximately seven million barrels per day describes potential infrastructure throughput rather than guaranteed export availability, because actual delivery also depends on operating conditions, terminal loading capacity and safe tanker departures.

Yanbu crude loadings reportedly increased from approximately 750,000 barrels per day before the war to between 3.8 million and 4.2 million during April–June, demonstrating how Gulf disruption concentrated Saudi seaborne export activity around a previously secondary western maritime route.

The reported June figure placing about 92 percent of Saudi seaborne oil exports through Yanbu illustrates that concentration, although it represents one period rather than a permanent operating pattern and cannot establish the distribution of exports after subsequent disruptions.

The Houthi declaration targeting Saudi-linked shipping on July 20 placed pressure directly on that rerouted trade, with subsequent tanker attacks reportedly cutting weekly southbound Saudi cargo volumes by roughly half and encouraging operators to abandon the shorter passage toward Asia.

Diversions north through the Suez Canal or Egypt’s SUMED pipeline preserve an alternative path for crude, but onward voyages around Africa reportedly extend delivery times from roughly 24 days to more than 50 for some Asian destinations, absorbing additional tanker availability.

Red Sea refinery products face a separate constraint because they cannot use SUMED, making the distinction between crude evacuation and product shipping operationally significant when assessing whether northern routing can sustain the wider Saudi export system during prolonged southern disruption.

A September 10–11 drone strike that Riyadh blamed on Iraqi militias reportedly interrupted the pipeline for approximately ten days, demonstrating how an overland bypass can become a contested link rather than an assured solution to maritime insecurity on either coast.

Following its restart around September 22, throughput was reportedly between two million and 2.65 million barrels per day against approximately 5.5 million before the attack, leaving pipeline recovery an independent constraint even if security conditions around Bab el-Mandeb were to improve.

DSA’s assessment is that export resilience requires functioning infrastructure and commercially usable shipping routes together, because restoring only one element leaves Riyadh exposed to bottlenecks that can limit deliveries, constrain revenue and reduce the practical value of available production capacity.

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Yemeni Ground Forces and Saudi Air Power: The Logistics Test

A limited operation would concentrate on Dhubab, the southern coastline and positions influencing Bab el-Mandeb, potentially narrowing the ground objective while still requiring coordinated support for formations advancing through territory where previous government defences had collapsed during September.

The broader alternative would add pressure in Al-Bayda, Marib, Taiz and Al-Jawf, seeking to divide Houthi attention and reinforcement options while increasing the government side’s own demand for transport, ammunition, maintenance, communications and command coordination across separate operational areas.

This creates a force-structure tradeoff: additional fronts could complicate Houthi concentration along the coast, yet geographically dispersed government units would need sufficient logistical endurance to prevent simultaneous attacks from becoming isolated efforts that consume resources without producing mutually reinforcing effects.

The supplied planning envisages Yemeni ground combat backed primarily by Saudi airstrikes, leaving the availability and cohesion of local formations as the constraint on exploiting aerial pressure and translating damage to Houthi positions into durable control of terrain.

Fragmentation among government-aligned factions complicates more than command arrangements, because differing unit performance can expose adjacent sectors, interrupt supply movements and force stronger formations to divert manpower toward stabilising positions that weaker partners cannot reliably defend during advances.

Mocha’s loss compounds those difficulties by removing an established coastal logistics node, making its potential recovery relevant to sustaining operations further south while requiring planners to account for damaged facilities, contested road access and the vulnerability of concentrated supplies there.

Saudi air power can support interdiction and attacks on identified positions, but supplied material provides no sortie generation figures, aircraft numbers or targeting assessment, preventing a quantified judgment about whether aerial support could sustain either proposed campaign option.

The United States reportedly supplies intelligence and targeting assistance while President Donald Trump has declined requests for direct strikes, an arrangement that could improve Saudi operational awareness without transferring responsibility for ground progress or campaign escalation to American combat forces.

Houthi claims of intensive Saudi airstrikes, including 94 within one period, remain claims rather than verified measures of military effectiveness, because strike counts alone do not reveal target damage, reduced missile activity, ground-force attrition or reinforcement of contested positions.

The existing escalation therefore cannot establish that a larger assault is ready, particularly when proposed launch estimates range from approximately a week to after the November United States midterm elections, and no public operational timetable or confirmed mobilisation sequence has emerged.

Allied Air Defence and Infrastructure Protection Shape Saudi Force Posture

Türkiye and Pakistan reportedly contribute equipment and advisers rather than an announced ground intervention in Yemen, positioning their support around Saudi capacity and protection while leaving the offensive’s territorial objectives dependent on government-aligned Yemeni formations operating under Saudi oversight.

The equipment described includes Turkish drones alongside Pakistani air-defence systems, light artillery and counter-drone gear, a combination that could support surveillance and defensive resilience, although platform identities, quantities, integration arrangements and deployment locations remain unspecified in the planning account.

Pakistani personnel in Saudi Arabia are reported at between 30,000 and 40,000, but their described border and missile-defence roles should not be converted into an expeditionary order of battle, particularly without confirmation of force composition, operational authority or deployment dates.

France’s reported dispatch of defensive systems and personnel to Yanbu reflects the export terminal’s importance beyond Riyadh, while the absence of system specifications prevents a reliable assessment of coverage, interception capacity or protection against the range of threats described.

Protecting Yanbu would address one critical node, yet the pipeline, Jizan and other exposed locations create a wider defensive footprint, requiring planners to consider how geographically distributed infrastructure affects the concentration of available surveillance assets, interceptors and supporting personnel.

Counter-drone equipment and air defence can reduce vulnerability in principle, but their contribution depends on detection, warning and engagement performance, and no information establishes how allied equipment would be combined into a coordinated defensive architecture across Saudi export infrastructure.

A potential Houthi response involving intensified missile and drone attacks could force Riyadh to allocate additional resources to homeland protection, making offensive tempo partly dependent on whether defensive commitments consume the assets and personnel needed to sustain pressure in Yemen.

The allegation of Iraqi-militia involvement in the pipeline strike remains Riyadh’s attribution, with no independent substantiation supplied, but the possibility of separate attackers complicates planning because defensive requirements could persist even if Houthi coastal positions are pushed back successfully.

The distinction between offensive assistance and direct allied combat participation also shapes strategic signalling, allowing partners to support Saudi infrastructure protection while retaining different thresholds for involvement in a campaign whose scope and prospective escalation remain publicly undefined currently.

DSA’s assessment is that this support architecture seeks to protect the kingdom’s capacity to absorb retaliation, but equipment deliveries and advisers alone cannot establish either sufficient defensive coverage or the ground-force effectiveness required to secure the southern Red Sea corridor.

Global Shipping, Iran and the Risk of a Wider Yemen War

Bab el-Mandeb normally carries an estimated five to eight percent of global seaborne oil and approximately a tenth of world trade, making a Saudi-focused targeting campaign consequential for international shipping even when vessels without Saudi links are nominally permitted passage.

Reported war-risk premiums rising from approximately 0.3 percent toward one percent of hull value illustrate how selective attacks impose costs beyond physical losses, although individual premiums vary and those indicative figures cannot describe every vessel, cargo or voyage through the corridor.

Asian buyers face longer delivery cycles and increased freight exposure when Saudi cargoes detour around Africa, while European diesel and jet markets can encounter secondary pressure from disrupted product flows, spreading the consequences beyond the states directly involved in Yemen’s fighting.

Egypt faces a related revenue problem after Suez earnings reportedly fell from more than US$10 billion in 2023 toward US$4 billion, with partial recovery vulnerable to renewed insecurity that discourages shipping from using the canal’s southern approach through the Red Sea.

Brent’s reported moves through US$100–110 per barrel during disruption episodes show the market sensitivity surrounding these routes, but supplied information cannot isolate the price effect of Yemen from other wartime influences or quantify the premium attributable to a prospective assault.

Saudi Vision 2030 increases the domestic stakes because western ports, industry and logistics projects extend the Red Sea’s significance beyond oil evacuation, making prolonged insecurity relevant to investment expectations, infrastructure utilisation and the kingdom’s broader plans for changing its economic geography.

Iran could benefit strategically from continued pressure on Saudi’s western outlet even if negotiations ease Hormuz restrictions, but that potential advantage does not establish Iranian command of individual Houthi operations or prove coordination behind every attack affecting Saudi infrastructure and shipping.

A negotiated reopening of Hormuz would consequently not guarantee secure Bab el-Mandeb passage, because the Houthis’ selective blockade introduces a separate source of leverage that could survive a Gulf arrangement unless maritime access through Yemen’s adjoining waters is addressed directly.

The World Health Organization’s cited toll exceeding 800 deaths since renewed fighting underscores the costs already accumulating, while reported displacement of more than 11,400 households adds civilian pressure that could complicate local administration, stabilisation and sustained control after any territorial recovery.

For Riyadh, a successful campaign would require both recoverable ground objectives and declining disruption across the export chain, while failure could deepen the connection between Yemen’s fragmented battlefield, contested maritime gateways and the international market’s ability to access Saudi oil reliably.