(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Turkish Aerospace Industries has moved its production-representative KAAN P1 stealth fighter into powered taxi testing, transforming Türkiye’s most ambitious combat-aircraft programme from an engineering demonstrator into a platform approaching the decisive risks of first flight.

Footage released on July 31, 2026, showed the largely primer-painted twin-engine aircraft taxiing under its own power at Kahramankazan, Ankara, while support vehicles monitored a ground-test sequence designed to expose propulsion, steering, braking and integration failures.

This milestone does not prove combat capability or production readiness, but it verifies that P1 has progressed beyond static integration into dynamic ground trials, where engine response and aircraft systems must function coherently under thrust before high-speed testing.

TUSAŞ General Manager and Chief Executive Officer Mehmet Demiroğlu has indicated that P1 should fly within several months, with P1 and P2 expected airborne before 2026 ends, although remaining ground-test results will determine whether those objectives hold.

Türkiye is simultaneously maintaining its target for initial Turkish Air Force deliveries in 2028, creating an unusually compressed pathway from representative-prototype testing to operational handover that depends upon parallel flight trials, certification maturity, supply continuity and disciplined configuration control.

For Ankara, KAAN is more than an F-16 replacement: it is the military-industrial mechanism through which Türkiye seeks sovereign control over combat-aircraft design, mission software, sensors, electronic warfare, weapons integration, sustainment and eventually high-performance fighter propulsion.

The programme accelerated after Türkiye’s 2019 removal from the F-35 partnership following Ankara’s acquisition of Russia’s S-400 air-defence system, turning strategic autonomy from an industrial aspiration into an operational requirement shaped by alliance politics and export controls.

P1 therefore carries consequences beyond Turkish airpower, because successful flight testing could establish a fifth-generation fighter pathway for states seeking low-observable capability, technology participation and supply arrangements outside established American, Russian, Chinese or European combat-aircraft ecosystems.

Indonesia’s announced commitment for 48 aircraft, valued at approximately US$10 billion or RM40 billion, places the Indo-Pacific inside KAAN’s strategic orbit, although decade-long delivery plans, technology transfer, local assembly and later Turkish-powered aircraft remain execution-dependent programme ambitions.

Advanced discussions involving Saudi Arabia, alongside reported participation or industrial interest from Egypt, Azerbaijan, Pakistan and other states, could distribute development costs and production capacity, but prospective quantities and arrangements must remain distinguished from Türkiye’s formal initial order.

The central near-term question is whether P1’s refined aerodynamics, reduced radar-cross-section measures, internal volume, avionics provisions and weapons-bay architecture can survive an intensive envelope-expansion campaign without forcing redesigns that disrupt Türkiye’s aggressive production and delivery schedule.

If P1 transitions safely through high-speed taxiing and first flight, KAAN will enter the phase where strategic claims meet measurable evidence, exposing the programme’s flight performance, systems integration, logistics footprint and industrial scalability to progressively harder verification.

Powered Taxi Testing Moves KAAN Beyond Its P0 Demonstrator Phase

The roughly 80-second release displayed rear, overhead, frontal and lateral views of P1 moving along the runway, providing visible confirmation of powered ground mobility while revealing no basis yet for judging low-observable performance, sensor effectiveness or airborne handling.

Reported low-speed taxi activity around July 24 preceded the publicised powered runs, which are intended to examine throttle response, nose-wheel steering, braking, ground handling and subsystem behaviour as thrust, vibration, electrical loads and thermal demands interact across the aircraft.

High-speed taxi testing is the expected next threshold because accelerating nearer take-off conditions progressively loads the landing gear, control logic, brakes and propulsion installation, while narrowing the margin for correcting directional instability or abort-system deficiencies before rotation.

The earlier P0 engineering demonstrator first flew on February 21, 2024, completing approximately 13 minutes at about 230 knots and 8,000 feet, before a second 14-minute flight on May 6 subsequently reached roughly 10,000 feet.

P0 subsequently conducted twin-engine afterburner ground tests and shifted toward systems and ground duties, allowing engineers to retain an instrumented platform for troubleshooting while P1 assumes the more demanding role of expanding the representative configuration’s flight envelope.

Unlike P0, P1 incorporates structural and geometric refinements intended to improve aerodynamics and radar-cross-section management, including revised air intakes and landing-gear placement changes that create additional internal volume for fuel, weapons, sensors and electronic-warfare equipment.

Those modifications make P1 strategically important but technically riskier, because every change affecting airflow, weight distribution, thermal management or internal packaging can influence stability, signature control, maintainability and mission-system performance when the aircraft enters real flight conditions.

P2 is being constructed in parallel to widen test capacity, while a planned fleet of approximately six flying and ground-test airframes is intended to distribute structural, avionics, mission-system and envelope workloads instead of placing sequential demands upon one prototype.

Parallelisation could compress the schedule by allowing separate aircraft to investigate different test points, yet it also requires tightly synchronised engineering baselines so discoveries on one airframe are incorporated across others without generating incompatible hardware, software or certification standards.

Consequently, powered taxiing is a turning point rather than a victory declaration: it confirms maturation beyond P0’s proof-of-concept role, but high-speed ground trials and subsequent flight evidence must validate whether P1 genuinely represents a credible production pathway.

F110 Propulsion Enables Speed but Preserves a Critical Foreign Dependency

KAAN’s prototypes and roughly the first 20 to 40 production aircraft are planned around two General Electric F110-GE-129 turbofans, each producing approximately 29,000 to 30,000 pounds-force, or 129 to 133 kilonewtons, with afterburner engaged during testing.

Using a mature engine reduces near-term propulsion uncertainty and supports Block 10 flight testing, certification and initial production, while secured engines and further approvals provide a bridge toward deliveries that Türkiye could not realistically sustain using an immature domestic turbofan.

That bridge nevertheless creates strategic exposure because the initial KAAN force will depend upon American-origin propulsion, associated approvals and support arrangements, leaving engine availability, spares, overhaul capacity and upgrade freedom connected to an external political and industrial relationship.

Türkiye’s answer is the TF35000, an indigenous TEI and TRMOTOR turbofan targeting approximately 35,000 pounds-force, or 156 kilonewtons, whose additional thrust class is intended to support later configurations while advancing national control over fighter propulsion technology.

Design reviews are progressing and ground testing has been targeted for 2026, but integration is envisaged around 2032–2033 for Block 30 or comparable later aircraft, making full propulsion sovereignty a longer-term objective rather than a capability demonstrated by P1.

Replacing F110 engines involves considerably more than exchanging powerplants, because altered mass, dimensions, airflow, heat rejection, electrical generation, control software and vibration characteristics can trigger renewed testing across the inlet, airframe, avionics and low-observable treatment architecture.

The dual-track strategy therefore trades absolute near-term independence for programme momentum: foreign engines enable prototype flight and early force generation, while domestic development attempts to prevent Türkiye’s future fleet and exports remaining permanently constrained by third-country propulsion decisions.

Its success will influence export credibility because prospective operators must assess whether Türkiye can guarantee engines, spares and depot-level sustainment throughout decades of service, especially where buyers maintain politically complicated relationships with Washington or face shifting technology-release conditions.

For the Turkish Air Force, propulsion choice will also shape logistics footprints, requiring training, test equipment, technical publications, spare modules and overhaul arrangements for early F110-powered fleets before potentially introducing a separate TF35000 sustainment ecosystem across later blocks.

P1’s taxi runs consequently test more than immediate engine response; they begin validating the integration architecture supporting Türkiye’s accelerated schedule, while exposing the paradox at KAAN’s centre: strategic autonomy initially depends upon a powerful but externally supplied propulsion system.

Sensors, Internal Weapons and Uncrewed Teaming Define the Intended Battlespace

KAAN is designed as a single-seat, twin-engine low-observable multirole and air-superiority fighter measuring approximately 20.3 to 21 metres long, spanning about 13.4 to 14 metres, and carrying a projected maximum take-off weight near 34,750 kilograms.

Performance objectives include Mach 1.8, a service ceiling around 55,000 feet, supercruise potential and manoeuvre limits of positive nine to negative 3.5 g, but these remain design targets requiring systematic flight-envelope validation rather than operationally proven attributes.

The intended combat advantage rests upon signature management, internal weapons carriage and sensor fusion, enabling the aircraft to detect, classify and engage threats while reducing external-store reflections that would compromise survivability inside increasingly dense integrated air-defence environments.

ASELSAN’s planned gallium-nitride active electronically scanned array radar, associated MURAD or IRFS architecture, and electronic-warfare, synthetic-aperture and cognitive functions could provide detection and adaptive-spectrum advantages, although effective performance depends upon hardware maturity, software stability, cooling and threat-library quality.

The electro-optical architecture is intended to combine TOYGUN targeting, KARAT infrared search-and-track, missile-approach warning, directed infrared countermeasures and laser warning, giving pilots passive detection and defensive awareness without relying exclusively upon radar emissions that reveal position.

Advanced communications, navigation and identification systems, a large-area cockpit display, TULGAR helmet-mounted presentation, cybersecurity protections and fused mission data are meant to reduce pilot workload, yet integrating these elements represents one of the programme’s most software-intensive certification challenges.

Plans for secure control of ANKA-III and Kızılelma uncrewed aircraft could extend KAAN’s sensing, electronic-attack and weapons reach, distributing risk across crewed-uncrewed formations while complicating enemy targeting and expanding the number of tactical nodes within contested airspace.

However, loyal-wingman operations require resilient data links, command authorities, electromagnetic-spectrum discipline and predictable autonomous behaviour under jamming, meaning platform connectivity could become either a force multiplier or an exploitable dependency against sophisticated electronic and cyber warfare.

The proposed arsenal includes an internal 30-millimetre gun, as many as eight internal hardpoints, external stations, GÖKTUĞ and Bozdoğan air-to-air missiles, SOM cruise missiles, KUZGUN variants and multiple guided-bomb families for air-superiority and precision-strike missions.

Weapons diversity strengthens sovereign mission flexibility, but each munition demands separation trials, fire-control integration, environmental qualification and software validation; therefore, the operational significance of P1 will ultimately depend on certified combat configurations rather than the breadth of planned armament.

The 2028 Delivery Target Tests Türkiye’s Production and Sustainment Capacity

Türkiye approved the programme in December 2010, began conceptual design during 2011–2013 and signed an approximately US$1.18 billion, or RM4.72 billion, development contract in 2016, creating technological infrastructure for a programme now entering its most demanding validation period.

Phase One broadly spans 2018–2029 and encompasses detailed design, reviews, prototypes and flight testing, while subsequent plans envision low-rate Block 1 production around 2030–2033 before more advanced configurations enter full serial production during approximately 2034–2040.

A formal May 2026 Turkish Air Force contract covers an initial 20 Block 10 aircraft using F110 engines, with deliveries targeted from 2028 and possible production ramp-up into 2029, although unit-cost estimates have moved above the earlier US$100 million benchmark.

At that earlier benchmark, each aircraft would exceed RM400 million, but the source information provides no settled current unit price; configuration, support, training, weapons, inflation and production scale will determine the actual acquisition and lifetime financial burden.

Planning that previously envisaged approximately two aircraft monthly by 2029 would require a stable supplier network, repeatable low-observable manufacturing, calibrated test facilities, skilled labour, quality assurance and timely engine deliveries, alongside final assembly capacity that avoids sacrificing reliability for cadence.

Early delivery ambition also compresses operational preparations because the Turkish Air Force must establish conversion training, simulators, maintenance instruction, mission-data processes, secure facilities, weapons support and spare-parts inventories while flight testing continues to define the aircraft’s final configuration.

Block evolution introduces another force-management problem, since early F110-powered Block 10 aircraft and progressively upgraded Block 20, Block 30 or Block 40 fleets could carry different sensors, software, weapons and engines, increasing configuration-control and sustainment complexity.

Conversely, incremental blocks permit Türkiye to field useful capability before every sovereign technology matures, preserving engineering momentum and allowing operational feedback to shape later aircraft instead of delaying the entire programme until the TF35000 and complete mission suite are ready.

The 2028 target should therefore be interpreted as an industrial and force-posture objective, not a guarantee, because taxi tests cannot resolve certification duration, flight-test discoveries, supplier disruptions, engine-support conditions or the production learning curve awaiting a new stealth aircraft.

Whether KAAN becomes operationally consequential will depend upon sortie generation, mission-system reliability, weapons certification and affordable sustainment, since a nominal delivery creates limited deterrent value unless aircraft, pilots, maintainers, spares and secure data can repeatedly generate combat-ready missions.

Export Partnerships Could Reconfigure Defence Alignment Across Three Regions

Indonesia’s announced 48-aircraft commitment, estimated at US$10 billion or RM40 billion, is KAAN’s most consequential export signal because it links Türkiye’s aerospace strategy with an Indo-Pacific operator seeking technology transfer, local participation and diversified access to advanced combat aviation.

Plans include local final assembly for some aircraft and an Indonesian maintenance, repair, overhaul and training facility, creating a regional sustainment footprint that could reduce dependence upon Turkish bases while transferring industrial knowledge across a decade-long delivery programme.

Later Indonesian aircraft are planned with Turkish engines, but that arrangement depends upon TF35000 maturation, certification and production; consequently, propulsion delays could affect delivery sequencing, configuration commonality and the autonomy benefits underpinning the bilateral industrial proposition.

Saudi discussions reportedly cover a potentially large purchase and possible local assembly aligned with Vision 2030, yet estimates ranging from roughly 20–50 to 100 aircraft remain negotiation reporting, not a firm order comparable with Türkiye’s signed initial batch.

Egyptian participation and co-production interest, Azerbaijani industrial cooperation, and Pakistani personnel involvement and factory discussions could broaden engineering capacity and political ownership, while reported interest from Spain, the United Arab Emirates and Ukraine remains less defined within the supplied information.

Such partnerships can amortise development costs, enlarge order volumes and support a distributed supply chain, but they also introduce requirements for technology protection, workshare governance, export permissions, configuration management and reliable quality across politically diverse industrial environments.

For buyers, KAAN offers potential access to fifth-generation design features and greater industrial participation outside traditional supply chains, although acquisition decisions must weigh schedule risk, interim American engines, unproven lifecycle costs and the maturity of indigenous sensors, weapons and software.

For NATO and Washington, KAAN creates a complex outcome: a capable Turkish fighter could strengthen allied airpower capacity, yet Ankara’s export autonomy and partnerships may dilute established leverage over advanced-aircraft access, technology conditions and regional force modernisation.

Across the Indo-Pacific, Middle East and Eurasia, successful exports could generate interoperable training, maintenance and weapons networks centred upon Türkiye, converting a national fighter programme into a durable defence-diplomacy architecture with consequences extending beyond individual aircraft transactions.

The P1 taxi milestone therefore matters because it supplies tangible evidence to customers evaluating promises, but only sustained flight testing, certified combat systems, dependable production and credible lifecycle support can convert geopolitical interest into deployable airpower and lasting strategic influence.