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[VIDEO] Türkiye’s EJDERHA Disables 51 Drones in Seconds, Testing a New Layer for Air Defense

ASELSAN’s EJDERHA AD reportedly disabled 51 drones in one engagement and two wired drones in a separate trial, showing how electromagnetic directed energy could reduce the demand for conventional interceptors.

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Türkiye’s ASELSAN says its EJDERHA AD high-power electromagnetic counter-drone system neutralized 51 simultaneously launched drones within seconds near Ankara, a demonstration that puts ammunition-free swarm defense at the center of a broader question about how militaries sustain protection as drone numbers rise.

The mid-November 2026 event at the Gölbek Firing and Test Center marked ASELSAN’s 51st anniversary, and the matching drone count gave the company a record claim with a practical military benchmark, the number of aircraft affected during one engagement in a reported test.

In a separate scenario, EJDERHA reportedly disabled two wired drones at approximately 1,000 meters, putting a second problem before air-defense planners because cable-linked aircraft can retain control under conventional radio-frequency jamming while remaining dependent on onboard electronics to stay airborne.

ASELSAN President and CEO Ahmet Akyol described EJDERHA as “the world’s first system to successfully neutralize 51 drones with a single push of a button,” a company claim whose military significance depends on how consistently that result can be reproduced.

EJDERHA uses vacuum electronics to generate high-power electromagnetic waves that affect onboard circuits, giving Türkiye’s layered air-defense architecture an engagement method that can interrupt several aircraft in a short interval and reduce the number of individual interceptions demanded of other defenses.

The distinction matters for first-person-view drones, whose control links and flight electronics present different defensive problems, because an effector directed at the aircraft’s circuits can retain military relevance when a wired control method removes the radio link that a conventional jammer would engage.

The distance to the 51-drone group remains undisclosed, leaving the wired-drone trial as the only engagement in the anniversary demonstration with a stated distance and preventing planners from treating the headline swarm count as evidence of equivalent coverage at one kilometer.

Akyol said EJDERHA had “reached operational deployment, entered serial production,” placing Türkiye’s program beyond a laboratory demonstration in the company’s account and shifting attention to how many units can be fielded, supported and integrated into formations with different air-defense requirements.

The closest public benchmark in the reported comparison is the United States’ Epirus Leonidas, which defeated 49 drones in one engagement during a 2025 trial, giving procurement officials two large demonstrations to examine while leaving comparative effectiveness under equivalent conditions unresolved.

For Türkiye’s ÇELİKKUBBE, or Steel Dome, the fielding question is how electromagnetic effects will change the workload shared by jammers, lasers, guns and interceptor drones, particularly when defending forces must preserve conventional ammunition for targets that survive or fall outside another layer’s coverage.

The reported development also makes electrical supply, sensor support and maintenance part of the cost comparison, because repeated engagements may reduce expenditure on rounds or missiles while transferring more of the burden of sustained defense to equipment availability and power infrastructure.

The Gölbek result therefore raises a force-planning question with consequences beyond Türkiye and the United States, since the value of high-power electromagnetic defense depends on whether it can preserve protection through repeated pressure while leaving other air-defense assets available for different threats.

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What EJDERHA’s 51-Drone Test Established

ASELSAN reports that all 51 drones took off simultaneously and were neutralized within seconds after one activation, demonstrating a reported effect against a large group in one test and providing a measure of engagement capacity under the conditions at Gölbek.

Simultaneous launch establishes the timing of the test, while the degree of coordination among the aircraft remains unclear, a distinction that matters because swarm defense may require coping with formations that change their behavior as an engagement unfolds and the defender responds.

The undisclosed engagement distance also limits geographic interpretation, because a drone count establishes how many aircraft were affected under the test conditions while the distance helps determine how much space a system might protect around an installation or a deployed force.

Akyol’s description of one button press identifies the operator action behind the reported engagement, while the number and sequence of emissions remain undisclosed, leaving a gap when comparing Türkiye’s demonstration with the single pulse reported for the American Leonidas system.

The few seconds reported for neutralization describe the effect during the swarm event, while the full interval from detection through engagement remains unspecified, limiting any estimate of the time EJDERHA would give adjacent defenses to respond during an actual alert.

The term neutralized also covers several possible outcomes, from temporary interruption and electronic reset to lasting damage, so the reported count gives no breakdown of how many drones lost function permanently or whether any could have recovered after an interruption.

The wired-drone scenario adds an engagement distance and a different target category, giving the account two distinct measures of performance, although extrapolating the one-kilometer result to a large group would require comparable information about the geometry and conditions of that engagement.

The publicly reported comparison supports ASELSAN’s claim to a larger single-engagement drone count than Leonidas achieved in its 49-drone scenario, while independent verification of world-record status and standardized testing across the two systems remain unresolved in the available account.

For military planners, one successful group engagement offers evidence of an effect that can be examined in procurement trials, whereas force protection depends on how often the equipment delivers that effect over time and how it performs when conditions depart from the demonstration.

The anniversary event accordingly gives Türkiye a concrete figure for strategic signalling and gives foreign observers a reason to assess the program, with the strongest evidence attached to the outcome of the reported trial and larger conclusions dependent on further operational data.

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EJDERHA AD
EJDERHA AD

How EJDERHA Changes the Defense Against Wired FPV Drones

Conventional radio-frequency jammers seek to disrupt signals that carry instructions or data between an aircraft and its controller, so a wired first-person-view drone changes the defensive problem by routing that exchange through a physical connection and reducing the jammer’s opportunity to sever it.

EJDERHA’s high-power electromagnetic effect acts on the electronics aboard the aircraft, preserving an engagement option even when the drone carries instructions over a cable, because flight still depends on working circuits that process commands and govern the aircraft’s response in real time.

The two targets reportedly disabled at roughly one kilometer showed that a wired connection could coexist with vulnerability to an electromagnetic effector, a result that broadens the available defensive choices against aircraft whose control arrangements were intended to reduce exposure to radio jamming.

The reported category encompasses wired or tethered targets, while details of both test aircraft remain limited, so the trial answers whether EJDERHA could affect those two aircraft and leaves the breadth of its effectiveness against different wired configurations open for assessment.

Navigation, communications and command-and-control electronics are among the functions EJDERHA is designed to affect, allowing the engagement to remove an aircraft from the immediate threat picture if a disrupted function is essential to completing its flight, maintaining control or continuing its mission.

Time matters as much as the type of malfunction in force protection, because a temporary interruption may suffice if it ends the immediate threat, whereas rapid recovery could leave other defensive layers responsible for engaging an aircraft that remains in flight.

The potential application to autonomous drones follows from the same dependence on onboard electronics, although the reported 51-aircraft event provides no breakdown of autonomous behavior, and that distinction limits conclusions about performance against aircraft equipped to continue missions without external commands.

Reported field experience across mini and micro unmanned aircraft, low-altitude fixed-wing platforms and wired or wireless FPV drones extends the range of categories of interest, while differences among their electronics make the outcome across any one category a question for evaluation.

The reference to internal-combustion aircraft broadens the reported target set beyond aircraft identified by their control links, although it leaves uncertain which functions were affected and how consistently an electromagnetic engagement would interrupt flight across different engine and airframe configurations.

The force-structure implication is a broader division of labor between electronic warfare and directed energy, since conventional jammers can address vulnerable radio links while high-power electromagnetic systems offer a separate effect when the means of control makes link disruption less relevant.

Steel Dome Makes EJDERHA Part of a Layered Defense

EJDERHA forms part of ASELSAN’s layered counter-UAV approach within Türkiye’s Steel Dome air-defense architecture, where an electromagnetic system can add a distinct engagement option to defenses already employing jammers, laser directed energy, guns and interceptor drones against different classes of aerial threats.

Its radar provides active detection and electro-optical sensors support tracking, making the engagement dependent on a sequence that links target discovery, observation and pointing before the system applies its electromagnetic effect to aircraft within the conditions supported by the engagement.

A reported radar detection distance of approximately five kilometers and the demonstrated effect at roughly one kilometer against wired aircraft describe different parts of that sequence, so the figures cannot establish a single coverage radius for the complete counter-drone system.

If detection occurs farther away than the distance at which the effector can reliably act, the warning interval has value for tracking and handing targets to other layers, with its practical benefit depending on the quality and continuity of the information available.

The reported ability to use precise pointing or scan a wider area gives EJDERHA options for individual or grouped targets, while the undisclosed conditions of the swarm test limit what can be inferred about how the system distributes its effects across an engagement area.

GÖKBERK adds a laser capability to the wider defensive architecture, making the comparison within Steel Dome a question of how the laser and electromagnetic system handle different target presentations and how operators assign scarce engagement opportunities when several defenses are available.

Guns and interceptor drones provide additional engagement choices for targets that remain a threat after an electronic or directed-energy attempt, so the architecture’s value also depends on whether tracking information survives the handoff and tells operators which aircraft still require action.

The reported EJDERHA AD 210 upgrade adds a larger antenna, integrated radar and enhanced electro-optical equipment, changes that suggest attention to both the electromagnetic effector and its sensor chain while leaving system-level improvements to be established under comparable conditions.

The upgraded variant’s reported range increase lacks a published baseline and a common target reference in the account, so the relative claim offers a direction of development while leaving planners without an absolute distance for estimating how much coverage each unit could provide.

For Turkish force posture, Steel Dome integration is significant because the number of electromagnetic systems available, the areas they can cover and their coordination with other layers will determine how much the technology changes protection across the wider air-defense network.

Serial Production Puts Power and Sustained Readiness at the Center

Akyol’s statement on operational deployment and serial production changes the terms of assessment from whether Türkiye has demonstrated electromagnetic swarm defense to whether it can provide enough maintained, powered and trained units to deliver reliable coverage across the forces assigned to operate them.

The reported Turkish Land Forces inventory connection points to a role alongside electronic warfare systems, although the account gives no confirmed fleet size, distribution or readiness data from which to judge the present scale of protection available to deployed formations.

Public imagery shows a substantial dish antenna and vehicle-associated configurations, indicating a physical footprint that matters for movement and siting, while the photographs leave questions about supporting equipment and the time required to move a unit from transport to operating readiness.

Because EJDERHA uses electrical energy for its engagement, its logistics advantage lies in replacing some consumption of rounds or interceptors with demand for power and equipment availability, shifting part of the resupply burden even as other elements of the defensive network retain ammunition requirements.

The near-zero cost per engagement cited for electrical energy describes a narrow marginal expense, while comparing whole systems requires accounting for procurement, crews, power provision, maintenance, sensor support and the conventional interceptors retained to address threats that the electromagnetic layer leaves unresolved.

Repeated operation matters more to readiness than the duration of any single effect, because an engagement completed within seconds still leaves questions about how quickly the system is available again and how consistently it can operate through successive periods of drone activity.

The absence of disclosed power output and sustained engagement data leaves the support requirement difficult to estimate, particularly where commanders must decide whether available power and maintenance capacity can sustain both the electromagnetic effector and the sensors that make its engagements possible.

Industrial capacity matters because serial production can expand coverage only as complete systems, spare parts, trained operators and maintenance support become available, making the production announcement an indicator of program maturity while leaving the pace and scale of fielding uncertain.

For acquisition authorities, the cost exchange turns on how many successful engagements can be sustained over a deployment, since lower expenditure on munitions has force-wide value only if system availability remains high enough to reduce the actual call on conventional defenses.

Türkiye’s strategic signal is strongest where industrial status and operational claims intersect, since a domestic counter-drone system reported in production and service gives Ankara a practical basis for developing its layered defense while leaving the extent of present coverage to be established.

EJDERHA and Leonidas Set the Terms for Global Swarm-Defense Comparisons

Epirus reported that its Leonidas high-power microwave system defeated a 49-drone swarm with a single pulse in an August 2025 demonstration, placing a publicly stated American result alongside the Turkish test and making directed-energy capacity against large groups a tangible procurement issue.

Leonidas reportedly neutralized 61 of 61 aircraft across the broader event, so its 49-aircraft result supplies the relevant single-engagement comparator and its total documents a separate measure of performance across scenarios that cannot be combined with the Turkish swarm count.

Both programs have reported engagements against wired or fiber-optic-controlled drones, suggesting that military demand for electromagnetic effects extends beyond raising the number of simultaneous interceptions to countering aircraft that can remain controllable when a conventional radio-frequency jammer engages their operating area.

The two-aircraft margin in the publicly reported swarm counts gives ASELSAN a straightforward claim for international audiences, while the absence of shared conditions, range data and effect criteria limits what the comparison can establish about either system’s military value under pressure.

For countries assessing directed energy, the choice between electromagnetic systems and lasers involves the relationship between the targets presented, the engagement conditions and the available support, particularly where a defense must sustain coverage over repeated encounters rather than demonstrate one successful event.

An electromagnetic layer also changes how a defender assesses countermeasures, because the relevant question extends from preserving a control link to whether the aircraft’s onboard electronics remain functional under exposure, a variable that the reported Gölbek outcomes leave undefined across different drone designs.

The international force-posture consequence is a potential redistribution of missions within air defense, as electromagnetic systems that reliably handle some small-drone engagements could preserve interceptor inventories and operator attention for threats whose characteristics require other effectors elsewhere in the network.

For militaries with limited air-defense resources, the decision turns on whether one system can protect a militarily useful area for long enough to justify its support footprint, an issue that the undisclosed swarm distance and limited endurance data leave unresolved.

Ankara can point to a domestic system associated with a national air-defense architecture and a reported production program, a combination with implications for Türkiye’s defense-industrial standing even while deliveries, coverage and comparable operational outcomes remain the measures that would establish its broader impact.

EJDERHA’s next measure of military value is how much coverage operational units can sustain through repeated encounters, using the 51-drone event and the separate one-kilometer wired-drone trial as benchmarks for evaluating whether fielded systems can ease the burden on the rest of Steel Dome.

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