(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Russia’s reported $15 billion in 2025 military export revenue places it second in a new global ranking, signalling that its defence industry continues to serve foreign customers while expanding production for its own armed forces.

The Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade, or CAWAT, assigned Russia a 12.55 percent share of identified commercial arms exports in 2025, behind the United States but ahead of every European and Asian supplier in its assessment.

For Moscow, the result supports a significant industrial claim: increased domestic military orders have not ended its ability to earn substantial foreign revenue, maintain export relationships and compete for future defence programmes.

President Vladimir Putin said on 30 January 2026 that Russia had delivered military products to more than 30 countries during 2025 and earned over $15 billion in foreign currency revenue from military technical cooperation.

His statement gives the export figure official standing, although the Kremlin has not published the customer, product and delivery records needed to independently establish how that revenue was divided among new equipment and support services.

That distinction does not diminish the importance of sustainment: spare parts, repairs and upgrades can preserve a customer’s combat capability for years after a platform is delivered, while keeping the supplier central to its force structure.

CAWAT estimated identified global commercial arms exports at no less than $119.5 billion in 2025, making Russia’s reported share substantial in a market shaped by rising demand, long production cycles and competition for industrial capacity.

The United States led CAWAT’s ranking with $44.603 billion, nearly three times Russia’s assessed value, but Russia’s second place indicates that its export business retained scale despite the demands of the Ukraine war.

Germany ranked third at $8.903 billion, followed closely by South Korea and France, leaving Russia considerably ahead of the next supplier in the center’s single year commercial assessment.

The result is especially consequential for customers operating Russian or Soviet designed equipment, because continuing export revenue can help sustain the industrial base that provides their aircraft components, air defence support and future upgrades.

Putin said export revenue would support factory modernisation, capacity expansion and research and development, linking overseas sales to the production capabilities Russia needs for both domestic orders and international commitments.

The central question is therefore how effectively Russia can convert reported revenue and signed contracts into equipment, munitions and support for foreign forces while its factories continue to prioritise national military requirements.

(CLICK): Russia’s Africa Arms Push: Lancet-E, Mi-28NE Lead AAD 2026 Offensive

Russia’s Place in the 2025 Global Arms Export Ranking

CAWAT placed Russia second with approximately $15 billion in exports, compared with $44.603 billion for the United States and $8.903 billion for Germany, giving Moscow a clear lead over the ranking’s third placed supplier.

Russia’s assessed 12.55 percent market share was slightly above the 12.32 percent CAWAT assigned it in 2024, when the center valued its exports at $13.75 billion, indicating continued reported revenue growth across two wartime years.

South Korea recorded $8.779 billion and France $8.630 billion in the 2025 ranking, placing both close to Germany but more than $6 billion below Russia’s assessed export value.

Israel followed at $5.995 billion, Italy at $5.225 billion and Turkey at $4.230 billion, demonstrating the breadth of competition beneath Russia among producers serving different air, land and maritime requirements.

Spain and China completed CAWAT’s top ten at $3.476 billion and $2.970 billion respectively, while the United States accounted for 37.32 percent of the market identified by the center.

For defence planners, Russia’s second place signals more than annual sales: a sizeable export operation can support supplier networks, maintenance capacity and engineering expertise needed to fulfil commitments across several countries.

The ranking covers commercial contracts and excludes Western military aid to Ukraine, so its percentages measure CAWAT’s defined export market rather than every international transfer of weapons during the year.

Its Russia figure also requires qualification because detailed Russian export statistics are no longer public, leaving CAWAT’s country ranking dependent in part on an expert assessment anchored to official revenue statements.

That limitation affects the precision of the market share, but Putin’s separate confirmation of more than $15 billion in foreign currency revenue establishes that Moscow itself reported a substantial military export business for 2025.

The combined picture is favourable to Russia within CAWAT’s defined measure: wartime domestic demand coincided with reported export growth, more than 30 customer destinations and a sizeable lead over its nearest ranked competitor. 

(CLICK): Russia’s New T-90M Tanks Reveal a Drone-War Survival Shift

Wartime Production Strengthens Russia’s Export Proposition

Russia’s defence factories have faced sharply increased state orders since the invasion of Ukraine, creating a demanding production environment in which maintaining foreign deliveries requires capacity beyond that needed for domestic contracts alone.

CAWAT assesses that Russia’s shift to wartime production helped industry expand output sufficiently to meet national requirements while continuing exports, an industrial performance claim that remains difficult to audit without factory level disclosures.

The reported $15 billion in overseas revenue nevertheless indicates that military technical cooperation remained commercially significant while Russian forces consumed equipment, munitions and repair capacity on a large scale.

Production depth matters to importers because a fighter or air defence system is only as useful as the supply of components, weapons and technical support that keeps it available for operations.

A manufacturer capable of serving domestic and foreign demand simultaneously offers customers a stronger basis for long term planning, particularly when their existing fleets require periodic upgrades and replacement parts.

Russia’s export relationships also span activities beyond new platform deliveries, allowing repairs, servicing and cooperation on production to retain value even when the timing of major equipment contracts varies.

Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov identified air defence, aviation, multiple launch rocket systems, unmanned systems and electronic warfare as areas of demand, pointing to capabilities around which Russia sees continued foreign interest.

Those categories have direct military relevance: air defence shapes the survivability of bases and formations, while unmanned systems and electronic warfare affect reconnaissance, targeting and the resilience of command networks.

Manturov’s list describes demand rather than a verified breakdown of 2025 deliveries, but it shows the range of capabilities Russian officials consider commercially important as production capacity expands.

For Russia’s defence industry, the strongest evidence of lasting export resilience will be sustained delivery and support across those categories, turning wartime industrial expansion into dependable capability for overseas customers. 

(CLICK): India’s S-400 Missile Shield Nears Full Strength as Fourth Russian Air Defence Regiment Arrives Amid Pakistan-China Tensions

The $70 Billion Backlog Extends Russia’s Industrial Horizon

Manturov told Putin in January 2026 that Russia’s signed defence export order book had reached approximately $70 billion, giving its factories a reported pipeline of international work extending well beyond one year’s revenue.

He compared that figure with a pre 2022 maximum of $55 billion, presenting the larger backlog as evidence that foreign customers continue to commit to Russian equipment despite wartime production demands.

An order book is not completed sales, but signed contracts give manufacturers a basis for scheduling labour, materials and investment while giving buyers a route toward future equipment deliveries.

At the reported 2025 revenue level of approximately $15 billion, a $70 billion backlog represents several years of potential work, although actual fulfilment will depend on contract terms, product mix and production schedules.

Rosoboronexport chief executive Alexander Mikheev separately reported a $57 billion company order book in late 2024, reflecting commitments handled by that organisation within the wider Russian export system.

The company figure and Manturov’s national figure should not be added together, because they describe overlapping commitments rather than separate pools of orders available to Russian factories.

For Moscow, the scale of the reported national backlog offers an industrial opportunity: long running contracts can sustain specialised production lines and support the investment needed to meet both domestic and export requirements.

For customers, its significance depends on delivery performance, since a contracted air defence system becomes a usable military capability only after equipment, interceptors, trained crews and command links are available.

CAWAT has discussed possible future annual exports of $16 billion to $19 billion if capacity becomes available, but that projection is separate from the completed 2025 revenue reported by Putin.

Russia’s reported order book therefore reinforces the positive export outlook indicated by its ranking, while the timing and military effect of those contracts will emerge through deliveries rather than contract value alone. 

Overseas Support Gives Russia a Wider Strategic Footprint

Putin said Russian military products reached more than 30 countries in 2025, indicating an export footprint broad enough to support continued defence relationships across multiple markets during a period of unusually heavy domestic demand.

He also identified Africa as a priority for new sales, maintenance of older equipment and licensed local production, an approach that can extend Russia’s commercial role beyond a single transaction.

Servicing established fleets has strategic value because aircraft, vehicles and air defence systems require parts and technical work throughout their operating lives, keeping customers connected to the original supplier.

Licensed production can deepen that connection through local industrial activity, although the operational benefit to a customer depends on which components and maintenance tasks can actually be handled within its own borders.

Putin reported more than 340 joint military technical projects underway or in preparation with 14 countries, suggesting a cooperation network broader than the annual count of export deliveries.

The 14 project partners should not be confused with the more than 30 countries receiving products in 2025, because the two figures describe different activities and cannot be combined into one customer total.

Russia’s traditional partner networks also provide scope for upgrades and support, particularly where existing inventories create demand for compatible parts, trained technicians and continuity in weapons supply.

CAWAT says Russian export data became less transparent partly to shield importers from potential United States and European Union secondary sanctions, making confidentiality itself a factor in the commercial relationship.

That secrecy prevents a public assessment of which customers received particular systems, but it does not erase the reported revenue or the operational importance of supporting equipment already in foreign service.

Russia’s overseas influence will be strongest where production and maintenance keep customer forces ready, allowing reported sales, technical cooperation and long term support to translate into durable defence relationships. 

Why Russia’s Export Resilience Matters Beyond the Ranking

Russia’s assessed second place indicates that its defence industry remained an important international supplier in 2025, with reported revenue, signed commitments and customer relationships continuing alongside wartime national production.

The United States held a much larger share of CAWAT’s commercial market, yet Russia’s lead over Germany, South Korea and France underscores its continued scale within the center’s single year assessment.

For countries operating Russian designed systems, a functioning export industry matters directly to force readiness because maintenance support and ammunition supply can determine how much of an existing fleet remains deployable.

For potential new customers, the relevant comparison extends from weapons performance to delivery timelines, local support arrangements and the supplier’s ability to sustain equipment after it enters service.

Russia’s expanded domestic production may strengthen that proposition if factories can maintain output for both markets, particularly in categories such as air defence and aviation that require specialised components and continuing technical support.

Its reported $70 billion backlog gives industry a substantial pipeline, while 2025 revenue above $15 billion shows that overseas military cooperation continued to generate funds during a demanding period for Russian production.

CAWAT’s annual dollar ranking should be kept distinct from SIPRI’s five year assessment of major arms transfers, which found a steep decline in Russia’s transfer volume compared with the preceding five year period.

Both findings are relevant: one describes Russia’s reported position in a defined 2025 commercial market, while the other tracks a longer change in the volume of major weapons moving internationally.

The public record does not disclose enough detail to assess every Russian delivery or customer’s readiness, making completed equipment transfers and sustained support the clearest future tests of the industry’s export performance.

For now, Russia’s reported second place, continuing foreign revenue and sizeable order book show an arms industry retaining global commercial reach while carrying a greatly expanded domestic military workload.