Pralay vs China’s HQ-9B: Why the Philippines Wants India’s Tactical Ballistic Missile for South China Sea Defence

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — The Philippines is weighing the acquisition of India’s next-generation Pralay tactical ballistic missile in a move that could dramatically reshape Manila’s deterrence posture against an increasingly assertive China in the South China Sea.

If finalised, the deal would represent the Philippines’ second major missile procurement from New Delhi, following the landmark 2022 purchase of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile system worth $375 million (RM1.75 billion), a contract that marked India’s entry into the Southeast Asian missile market.

This latest interest in the Pralay system signals Manila’s determination to accelerate the transformation of its armed forces from a primarily counter-insurgency structure into a credible conventional deterrent force capable of standing up to regional great-power pressure.

The potential acquisition comes at a time when China has intensified its militarisation of disputed islands in the South China Sea, deploying advanced HQ-9B long-range surface-to-air missile batteries, YJ-62 and YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missiles, and expanding runways capable of supporting J-16 fighters and H-6K strategic bombers.

For Manila, the prospect of fielding a land-attack ballistic missile such as the Pralay adds a new layer of deterrence against Beijing’s growing air and missile umbrella, enabling the Philippines to threaten key Chinese military infrastructure across the Spratly and Paracel Islands.

Unlike the BrahMos, which primarily provides sea-denial capability by targeting hostile warships, the Pralay would allow the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to project power inland, holding at risk radar networks, command posts, logistics hubs, and forward airbases critical to China’s operations in the region.

Regional analysts argue that this shift represents Manila’s intent to build a multi-layered strike ecosystem, combining BrahMos for coastal defence with Pralay for land-based interdiction, thereby creating an asymmetric deterrent that complicates Beijing’s military calculus.

The timing is equally significant, as the Philippines deepens its security cooperation with both India and the United States under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), while also hosting rotational US forces and pre-positioned munitions at critical bases such as Subic Bay and Basa Air Base.

Reports emerging in late July 2025 revealed that Manila has expressed preliminary interest in Pralay, a weapon optimised for precision land-attack missions with quasi-ballistic trajectories designed to evade advanced air defences, a feature reminiscent of Russia’s combat-proven Iskander-M system.

The talks remain at an early stage, but the geopolitical implications are undeniable, signalling a new phase in Indo-Philippine strategic alignment under Horizon 3 of Manila’s Armed Forces Modernization Program.

Social media platforms lit up with speculation in August 2025 as defence enthusiasts and military analysts debated the role of Pralay in the Philippines’ evolving deterrence posture, with many pointing to its potential to neutralise radar installations, command centres, and critical airfields in a contested battlespace.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has sought to reassure the region by reiterating that any missile purchases from India are purely defensive in nature, stressing, “These weapons are to secure our sovereignty and protect our people, not for aggression.”

Pralay: India’s Rising Tactical Strike Asset

Developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Pralay missile represents the cutting edge of India’s tactical strike doctrine.

The system is road-mobile, canisterised, and designed for rapid deployment, capable of firing within 10 minutes from a 12×12 high-mobility launcher.

Its export version boasts a range of 290 kilometres—compliant with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—and can deliver payloads between 350 and 1,000 kilograms.

Armed with advanced inertial navigation, satellite-based guidance, and DSMAC radio frequency seekers, the missile achieves pinpoint precision with a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of less than 10 metres.

Its manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) enables it to evade modern missile defence systems, a feature reminiscent of Russia’s Iskander-M that has proven highly effective in Ukraine.

Warhead options include High Explosive Preformed Fragmentation (HEPF), Penetration-Cum-Blast (PCB), and Runway Denial Penetration Submunitions (RDPS), giving the missile a versatile strike portfolio.

Recent trials in July 2025 validated both its minimum and maximum ranges, clearing the path for mass production as part of India’s Integrated Rocket Force, which envisions Pralay as the successor to the ageing Prithvi series.

Why the Philippines Wants Pralay

The BrahMos system already provides Manila with a formidable coastal defence shield, with its supersonic anti-ship missiles designed to hold Chinese naval vessels at constant risk within the contested waters of the South China Sea.

Pralay, however, offers a crucial land-attack dimension that would allow the Philippines to move beyond purely sea-denial operations and instead develop a credible strike capability against high-value ground targets.

With ranges up to 290 kilometres for the export variant, Pralay would enable the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to target radar installations, hardened command centres, forward-deployed logistics hubs, and Chinese airbases constructed on reclaimed reefs across the Spratly chain.

For an archipelagic nation like the Philippines, whose scattered islands and outposts make it vulnerable to rapid escalation, the ability to disperse and redeploy road-mobile missile launchers across rugged terrain provides a powerful asymmetric edge.

The system’s canisterised, solid-fuel design ensures high mobility and rapid launch readiness, making it far harder for an adversary to neutralise in a first-strike scenario.

China’s expanding military footprint in the South China Sea makes such a capability all the more vital, with Beijing deploying HQ-9B long-range surface-to-air missile batteries, YJ-12B coastal defence cruise missiles, and constructing runways capable of hosting J-16 fighters and H-6K bombers on outposts like Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reef.

In such a heavily militarised environment, Pralay’s quasi-ballistic trajectory and manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) design dramatically increase its survivability against sophisticated Chinese air defence networks, including the HQ-9B and Russian-made S-400 systems.

By combining BrahMos and Pralay, Manila could establish a dual-layered deterrence architecture—threatening Chinese warships at sea while simultaneously holding vulnerable military infrastructure ashore at risk, complicating Beijing’s operational calculus.

The integration of Pralay also complements Manila’s ongoing defence cooperation with the United States under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which has seen expanded US access to Philippine bases and pre-positioning of American precision-guided munitions in Luzon and Palawan.

With Pralay, the Philippines would not only diversify its strike options but also reinforce its role as a key node in the emerging Indo-Pacific deterrence grid, linking Indian missile technology with American air and naval power projection in the region.

Analysts note that the missile would also serve as a counterweight to China’s deployment of its own land-based ballistic systems such as the DF-21D “carrier-killer” and the DF-26 intermediate-range missile, which Beijing has used to intimidate both regional states and US forces in the Western Pacific.

For Manila, adopting Pralay would thus send a strong signal of intent—that the Philippines is no longer content to remain militarily vulnerable, but is willing to invest in credible strike systems capable of imposing costs on any potential aggressor.

Wider Strategic and Regional Implications

If acquired, Pralay would cement India’s role as a rising defence exporter in Southeast Asia, further extending its influence after successful arms transfers to Armenia and beyond.

For the Philippines, it signals a bold leap towards building a credible anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy that resonates with US Indo-Pacific security frameworks.

Such a move is bound to heighten tensions with Beijing, which has already denounced Manila’s BrahMos purchase as “destabilising.”

Yet, from Manila’s perspective, these systems represent an asymmetric deterrent designed to offset China’s vast military advantage and reduce its vulnerability in the face of overwhelming naval and air superiority.

Deliveries of BrahMos are ongoing, with the second batch already received in April 2025, while discussions on further acquisitions of Akash air defence systems are reportedly underway.

Regional analysts caution that while Pralay and BrahMos provide significant capability boosts, they are still limited in number compared to China’s massive arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles.

Nevertheless, the symbolism of Manila openly aligning with India for strategic weaponry sends a powerful message that smaller nations in Asia are seeking credible partners beyond Washington.

Toward a New Indo-Pacific Deterrence Order

The Pralay acquisition, if concluded, would represent not only a tactical upgrade for the Philippines but also a strategic milestone in India’s growing role as a global arms exporter and defence partner in the Indo-Pacific.

For Manila, the deal dovetails neatly with Horizon 3 of the Armed Forces Modernization Program, which prioritises the development of external defence capabilities after decades of internal security focus.

By embracing advanced Indian missile technology, the Philippines positions itself as a trailblazer in Southeast Asia, potentially paving the way for other ASEAN nations such as Vietnam and Indonesia to explore similar acquisitions.

This represents a decisive shift toward multi-polarity in arms procurement, as smaller nations diversify away from overreliance on traditional Western suppliers like the United States, France, and Russia.

India, eager to expand its defence industrial footprint, is leveraging systems like BrahMos and Pralay as flagship exports to strengthen strategic partnerships and counterbalance China’s growing clout across Asia.

For the Philippines, Pralay enhances its ability to impose costs on any aggressor, transforming it from a vulnerable archipelago into a regional actor capable of wielding credible missile-based deterrence.

The strategic timing is critical, as the Indo-Pacific becomes the epicentre of great power rivalry, with the United States, China, India, and Japan all seeking to shape the regional security architecture.

China’s military modernisation—including the rapid deployment of its DF-series ballistic missiles and the expansion of its naval fleet—has already shifted the regional balance, compelling smaller states to adopt asymmetric capabilities like Pralay to avoid being overwhelmed.

If fielded, Pralay would complement ongoing US-Philippines defence cooperation, creating a more integrated deterrence network that blends American maritime dominance, Indian missile technology, and Philippine geography.

This layered deterrence model complicates Beijing’s operational planning in the South China Sea by forcing it to confront a multi-vector threat rather than a single source of resistance.

It also signals a new phase of regional balancing, where even smaller nations can credibly demonstrate that any aggression will carry unacceptable costs, regardless of China’s numerical and technological superiority.

At the broader geopolitical level, Pralay’s entry into Southeast Asia could catalyse a regional arms dynamic, encouraging states like Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand to pursue similar missile capabilities to harden their deterrence postures.

In this sense, the Philippines’ pursuit of Pralay is not merely a procurement decision but the opening salvo in a new Indo-Pacific deterrence order, one in which power is increasingly distributed and traditional hierarchies are being challenged.

Should this deal materialise, it will underline the reality that the South China Sea is no longer a one-sided theatre of Chinese dominance but an increasingly contested battlespace where missile parity, rather than sheer numbers, determines the future of deterrence.

— DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA