(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Iran is continuing construction and selective repairs at its Eagle 44 underground airbase after at least three reported strike rounds in 2026, exposing the contest between mountain protection and vulnerable surface access near the Strait of Hormuz.

Satellite imagery dated September 29, described in an October 22 assessment, shows a cleared runway, advancing taxiway construction and persistent damage, indicating renewed investment in aircraft access without establishing that the underground complex has recovered its combat function.

The development matters because Eagle 44, also known as Oghab 44, sits in southern Hormozgan province, where surviving aircraft or unmanned systems could support maritime interdiction, provided Iran can restore the infrastructure connecting protected storage to usable launch surfaces.

Four tunnel entrances appear externally intact, but their appearance cannot establish whether passages remain open internally, whether aircraft survived earlier attacks, or whether fuel, maintenance and weapons support can sustain operations from a site still carrying visible wartime damage.

The approximately 4.3-kilometre runway appears clear of earlier obstacles, while work on a second taxiway suggests an effort to reduce dependence on one established route between the mountain hangars and the exposed airfield beyond their protective limestone cover.

That distinction is operationally decisive: an aircraft can survive inside a hardened shelter yet remain unavailable for combat if damaged taxiways prevent departure, converting apparently preserved equipment into inaccessible inventory until engineering teams restore a continuous movement route.

At the February 2023 unveiling, then armed forces chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri said attacks against Iran would draw responses from bases including Eagle 44, presenting underground basing as a mechanism for preserving retaliation despite superior adversary airpower.

Iranian officials described the facility as lying “hundreds of meters under the mountains,” but that protective claim does not establish measured overburden, resistance to particular weapons, or the ability of its exposed access system to survive repeated precision strikes.

Conversely, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s description of Iran’s air force as “wiped out” remains an official assessment of broader degradation, rather than site-specific evidence establishing the destruction of every aircraft or operational subsystem potentially sheltered at Eagle 44.

The supplied record identifies no public confirmation from Iran, the Pentagon or US Central Command naming specific attacks on the base, making strike chronology, responsibility and intended effects matters requiring greater qualification than the visible surface damage itself.

DSA’s assessment is that the repair pattern reflects an effort to preserve future operational options, although continued construction alone cannot distinguish an intended combat recovery from precautionary storage, infrastructure completion or strategic messaging about Iran’s capacity to absorb attack.

For Gulf security planners, the central question is therefore whether repaired access can reconnect surviving assets with fuel, weapons, crews and targeting support, because a functioning sortie chain would matter more than either intact portals or declarations of destruction.

(READ) Eagle 44: Iran’s Underground Nerve Center in Times of Conflict

Eagle 44 Repairs Expose the Taxiway Bottleneck

The clearest construction progress lies along the western taxiway, where a completed concrete segment approaches a passage through a smaller ridge, potentially strengthening the connection between the runway and underground hangars if the remaining unfinished sections are subsequently completed.

Beyond that passage, prepared subgrade indicates continuing work but does not constitute a finished taxiway, leaving the western route short of the continuous paved connection needed to move aircraft reliably between protected spaces and the runway under operational conditions.

Impact craters remain farther south near the western tunnel entrances, meaning visible progress on one segment cannot be treated as proof that the entire route is usable or that aircraft can already transit between those hangars and the airfield.

Completion would offer an alternative to the eastern taxiway, previously described as the sole operational connection, reducing the vulnerability created when one damaged movement corridor can interrupt access for aircraft housed within different portions of the underground complex.

However, route redundancy would improve resilience only where both paths remain physically passable, since two nominal taxiways would provide limited operational benefit if unfinished paving, residual craters or inaccessible tunnel sections continued to constrain movement at their southern ends.

On the eastern route, two dark streaks extending beyond the pavement are interpreted as traces of struck equipment pushed aside, suggesting clearance activity while leaving the equipment’s identity, the circumstances of its destruction and its operational significance unresolved publicly.

Removing wreckage from pavement could restore movement space without restoring the capability that equipment previously supported, a distinction that prevents cleared surfaces from becoming an unreliable proxy for recovered maintenance capacity, construction throughput or combat readiness inside the base.

The runway’s earlier mounds or barriers have also disappeared, reversing an obstruction apparently intended to prevent unauthorized landings, although the imagery does not establish whether their removal supports imminent flight activity, construction access or a change in protective arrangements.

No major new runway damage is described in the September imagery, but the absence of highlighted fresh craters cannot establish flight certification, navigation equipment serviceability or the availability of emergency support required for safe and repeatable aircraft operations there.

Together, these observations indicate selective progress in restoring surface connectivity, while the gap between a cleared runway and a fully functioning airbase remains defined by unfinished pavement, unresolved access conditions and unverified support systems rather than mountain protection alone.

(READ) Iranian Military, Political Leaders Reportedly Take Refuge in Underground Military Base “Eagle 44”

Repeated Strikes Target Access Rather Than Proven Tunnel Destruction

The supplied chronology places the first apparent attacks around the opening phase of the US–Israeli campaign beginning February 28, although low-resolution imagery reviewed through mid-March reportedly showed limited clearly visible damage and cannot support a precise reconstruction of effects.

More substantial late-March damage included taxiway craters and a leveled construction-related building, a combination consistent with interrupting aircraft movement and weakening repair capacity, although physical effects alone cannot establish the attackers’ complete targeting rationale or intended duration of suppression.

Because the tunnels depend on surface connections, damage near their approaches could deny access without requiring penetration of the mountain, offering a mechanism for suppressing operations even where the condition of protected aircraft and internal facilities remains entirely unknown.

The July sequence is less firmly established at site level, with analysis of July 16 imagery identifying four purported impact points after wider US strikes, but the supplied account explicitly notes that this particular assessment lacked independent verification elsewhere.

Those reported points included two along the connecting taxiway and two near supporting infrastructure, reinforcing an access-denial interpretation while leaving uncertainties over attribution, weapons employed, the timing of individual impacts and the extent of damage to operational equipment unresolved.

Neither the exact munitions used against Eagle 44 nor any successful penetration of its underground spaces is established, so references to bunker-buster attacks against other Iranian facilities cannot legitimately demonstrate comparable weapon use or subterranean destruction at this location.

By September, two buildings in the western support compound remained destroyed and another damaged, with no visible rebuilding, suggesting an uneven recovery in which movement routes received attention while at least part of the supporting surface infrastructure remained unrepaired.

That sequencing could reflect constrained resources or a decision to prioritize access, but the imagery does not identify those buildings’ complete functions, preventing a confident assessment of whether their loss principally affects construction, maintenance, administration or other support activities.

Externally intact portals similarly do not settle whether debris, damaged doors or deeper obstruction limits passage, because the viewing angle cannot inspect the interior and therefore cannot distinguish surviving entrances from an operationally accessible underground hangar network with confidence.

The defensible conclusion is narrower than either total destruction or demonstrated survival: repeated reported attacks left enduring surface damage, while subsequent engineering activity shows continuing Iranian investment without resolving the condition of the base’s concealed military contents or infrastructure.

Strait of Hormuz Position Gives Residual Airpower Strategic Relevance

Eagle 44’s position approximately 160 kilometres northwest of the Strait of Hormuz places it inland from a critical maritime chokepoint, creating a potential protected support location for operations directed toward Gulf shipping routes rather than an isolated infrastructure project.

Its operator is the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force, rather than the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force, a distinction that matters when assessing whether the site supports conventional aircraft, unmanned systems or broader claims about Iranian strike capacity.

The facility’s proposed maritime interdiction role rests on its geography and advertised capabilities, but location alone does not establish an ability to find, track and engage moving vessels against opposition from naval aviation, air defences or other protective systems.

Should aircraft operations resume, their potential significance would lie in preserving another attack axis near the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, although the supplied information provides no evidence of current maritime patrols, targeting coverage or operational anti-ship missile sorties.

Aircraft concealed underground could complicate assessments of remaining force strength, yet uncertainty over their presence must not be converted into assumed capability, particularly when the same record leaves their numbers, serviceability, weapons availability and current crew readiness publicly unconfirmed.

The base’s advertised ability to support longer-range weapons would theoretically reduce how close launch aircraft must approach defended targets, but no confirmed weapon inventory or operational integration status is provided for the facility after the reported 2026 strike rounds.

References to Asef missiles and other Iranian munitions therefore describe the intended capability envelope, rather than proving that armed aircraft can presently emerge from Eagle 44 and conduct effective standoff attacks against naval forces operating around the Hormuz approaches.

Similarly, a surviving underground storage function could preserve military options without producing sustained crewed sorties, meaning strategic value may derive from retaining assets for later employment rather than immediately contesting adversary air superiority over southern Iran or adjacent maritime areas.

Bagheri’s earlier warning positioned Eagle 44 within Iran’s retaliation narrative, but credible deterrence would depend on an adversary judging that protected assets can actually exit, launch and reach relevant targets, rather than simply survive beneath a mountain during bombardment.

For international maritime security, the resulting implication is conditional but material: restored operational access could preserve a residual Iranian threat near Hormuz, while construction activity alone provides no basis to assert imminent shipping attacks or an effective chokepoint closure capability.

F-4 Phantoms, Tunnel Geometry and the Sustainment Problem

The strongest public evidence of aircraft compatibility comes from the 2023 unveiling, when F-4D/E Phantom II fighters appeared inside the tunnels, establishing historical access for that aircraft family without confirming the presence of surviving Phantoms at the base today.

Footage also depicted one-way attack drones, supporting the advertised “hybrid” concept for crewed and unmanned systems, although imagery of an earlier presentation cannot determine what remains sheltered underground after subsequent strikes or whether any displayed systems were permanently assigned there.

Possible links to Bandar Abbas-based F-4 units describe a plausible alternative basing relationship, but the supplied record does not confirm a current deployment order, squadron strength or the number of aircraft transferred into Eagle 44 during the reported campaign.

Claims that the complex could accommodate dozens of aircraft remain unverified, and parking capacity would not by itself determine combat output because maintenance access, aircraft movement, fuel distribution and weapons preparation can constrain operations before physical storage space becomes limiting.

Tunnel geometry also complicates assumptions about future modernization, since the supplied assessments suggest access better suited to smaller aircraft configurations than the wider Su-35, without providing surveyed internal dimensions sufficient to establish a definitive compatibility judgment for every proposed type.

A silhouette or apparent mockup associated with a modern Russian fighter therefore cannot demonstrate delivery, basing suitability or operational integration, particularly where passage width, turning space and support arrangements remain unconfirmed inside a facility designed around earlier aircraft requirements.

Iranian officials listed underground command, maintenance, navigation and fuel facilities at the unveiling, presenting a support architecture intended to sustain sheltered operations, but those advertised components have not been independently shown to remain fully functional following the reported attacks.

For an aging fighter force, protection would retain value only if maintainers can preserve serviceability and replenish necessary supplies, making the logistics footprint central to any recovery assessment even when aircraft themselves remain concealed from exterior satellite observation and inspection.

The remote mountainous setting adds analytical importance to surface support activity, because construction machinery, accessible routes and functioning work areas connect protected infrastructure with the repair effort visible outside, although the supplied imagery does not quantify transport demand or resupply frequency.

US Central Command commander Admiral Brad Cooper’s reported assessment that Iranian combat sorties had fallen to zero underscores broader force degradation, but it cannot independently determine whether Eagle 44 retains stored aircraft or could contribute to a later, limited operational recovery.

Repair Capacity Will Determine Whether Hardening Produces Combat Power

Eagle 44’s development stretches back to tunnel work around 2013–2014, followed by runway construction from approximately 2021, indicating a long investment horizon that predates its public unveiling and helps explain why Iran might continue work despite persistent surface damage.

The base was still incomplete when revealed in 2023, so activity visible in September may combine original construction with wartime restoration, preventing every fresh paved segment from being interpreted as replacement of infrastructure destroyed in the reported strike campaign.

DSA assesses that the western taxiway project would be most consequential if it creates a genuinely usable second connection, because such redundancy could reduce the ability of localized damage to immobilize aircraft otherwise ready to operate from protected hangars.

Nevertheless, both routes ultimately serve an exposed runway, so additional taxiway capacity cannot eliminate dependence on surface infrastructure, and any claim of invulnerability would ignore the physical transition between underground protection and the open operating environment required for flight.

For an attacker seeking continued suppression, renewed construction could create a requirement to reassess whether earlier access denial still holds, but the supplied information cannot quantify surveillance demands, prospective reattack frequency or the weapons expenditure needed to maintain that effect.

For Iran, bulldozers and paving activity potentially offer a means to recover useful access without rebuilding the entire underground complex, although the record supplies no repair costs or completion timelines that would substantiate a precise financial comparison with repeated attacks.

Strategic signalling accompanies that engineering effort because visible work communicates persistence, yet the same imagery reveals unfinished sections and unrepaired buildings, presenting evidence of continued intent alongside operational limitations that constrain any confident assertion of restored combat capability at present.

The next meaningful indicators would include completed pavement, repaired cratered approaches and observable aircraft activity, but even those developments would require careful interpretation before establishing sustained sortie generation, weapons availability or an effective maritime strike posture near the strait itself.

No later imagery supplied here establishes the base’s condition after September 29, leaving a substantial distinction between the October publication date and the observation date that must remain explicit when judging how closely this assessment reflects current operational readiness there.

Eagle 44 consequently illustrates a conditional form of resilience: mountains may protect military assets, but only functioning access, repair capacity and sustainment can convert concealment into usable airpower, leaving Iran’s latest construction effort strategically relevant and its combat outcome unresolved.