Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder Poised for Central Asian Breakthrough as Uzbekistan Nears Fighter Jet Deal
According to authoritative regional defence sources, Tashkent is nearing a final decision to acquire the JF-17, co-developed by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG), as part of a broader realignment towards cost-effective yet potent defence technologies.
(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) – The Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder multirole combat aircraft is on the cusp of clinching another strategic export success, as Uzbekistan reportedly inches closer to selecting the platform to modernise its ageing air force fleet.
According to authoritative regional defence sources, Tashkent is nearing a final decision to acquire the JF-17, co-developed by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG), as part of a broader realignment towards cost-effective yet potent defence technologies.
While official confirmation from the Uzbek government remains pending, video footage circulating on Uzbek social media appears to show an Air Force pilot undergoing training on a Chinese-origin fighter jet, suggesting serious progress in the procurement process.
A source closely linked to Uzbekistan’s Defense Industry Agency, operating under the Ministry of Defence, has reportedly confirmed that Beijing has greenlit the sale of the JF-17 to Tashkent—an indicator of growing strategic trust between China and Uzbekistan.
Should the deal be formalised, Uzbekistan would become the fourth confirmed export customer of the JF-17, after Myanmar, Nigeria, and the lead operator Pakistan, whose air force operates over 140 aircraft across the Block I, II, and the highly upgraded Block III variants.
Designed to provide a low-cost, high-performance alternative to expensive Western fighters, the JF-17 Thunder serves as a key pillar in Pakistan’s airpower doctrine and a centrepiece of China’s rising influence in the global light fighter market.
At its heart lies the Klimov RD-93 engine, a derivative of the Russian MiG-29’s propulsion system, delivering 49.4 kN of dry thrust and up to 84.4 kN with afterburner—allowing the aircraft to sustain supersonic flight and rapid combat manoeuvrability.
JF-17 “Thunder”
The aircraft boasts a maximum speed of Mach 1.6 and an operational range of approximately 1,200 km, with a combat radius of 700–800 km depending on payload and fuel configuration—ideal for air policing, interdiction, and point defence missions.
With an empty weight of 6,586 kg and a maximum take-off weight of 12,700 kg, the JF-17 combines tactical agility with strategic payload flexibility in regional combat scenarios.
Equipped with seven hardpoints, the fighter can carry up to 3,600 kg of ordnance, including beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles, precision-guided munitions, electronic warfare pods, and drop tanks, enabling it to perform a full spectrum of strike, air-to-air, and ground support roles.
The Block III variant represents a quantum leap in capability, integrating fifth-generation features derived from China’s J-20 “Mighty Dragon,” and positioning the aircraft as a formidable force multiplier in contested airspaces.
One of the most critical enhancements is the integration of the KLJ-7A Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, developed by China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), offering superior target tracking, jamming resistance, and multirole engagement options.
Chinese defence analysts assert that the KLJ-7A rivals the performance of the U.S.-made AN/APG-81 radar found on the F-35 Lightning II and the Russian N036 radar employed by the Su-57 Felon, signalling a dramatic capability shift in lightweight fighter classes.
JF-17 “Thunder”
For air-to-air engagements, the JF-17 Block III will be armed with the PL-10 short-range infrared-guided missile, the same off-boresight missile fielded by the J-20, and considered equivalent to the U.S. AIM-9X Sidewinder in terms of agility and target acquisition.
It will also carry the PL-15 beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile, with an estimated range of 200–300 km, providing long-range strike capability that outclasses many Indian-origin and legacy Russian missiles in Central Asia’s regional air power matrix.
Uzbekistan’s potential acquisition of the JF-17 underscores a deeper geopolitical pivot toward Beijing, reflecting a broader trend among Central Asian states rebalancing their defence partnerships in light of Russia’s overstretched military-industrial capacity.
Beyond defence hardware, the Uzbekistan-China strategic axis increasingly encompasses training, logistics, and co-development—areas where China is leveraging its technological clout to displace Moscow’s historical dominance in the region.
China’s emergence as the principal arms supplier to Central Asia represents a profound shift in the region’s strategic calculus, as states like Uzbekistan seek more reliable partners amid Russia’s reduced defence export footprint due to the Ukraine conflict.
In February, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev visited the nation’s Innovative Technology Center, under the Defence Industry Agency, where observers noted the prominent display of Chinese air defence systems beside indigenous prototypes—signalling a deepening procurement synergy.
PL-15 Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM)
The exhibition included the FM-90 short-range air defence system and the KS-1C medium-range system, both of which are part of China’s expanding suite of missile defence solutions now making inroads into Eurasian markets.
With these acquisitions, Uzbekistan follows a regional trend set by Turkmenistan, which already operates a multi-layered Chinese air defence ecosystem featuring the FD-2000, FM-90, and KS-1C systems—strengthening its aerial denial capabilities.
Visual documentation of the visit reveals not only the presence of Chinese systems but a clear commitment to deepening bilateral defence cooperation, as Tashkent pursues strategic autonomy through diversified procurement.
Uzbekistan’s tilt toward Chinese defence solutions also reflects an effort to move beyond legacy Soviet-era weapons and reduce its dependency on Russian platforms, many of which face obsolescence and logistical strain.
Although modernised by Moscow over the years, Tashkent’s Soviet-derived arsenal lacks the digital sophistication, BVR capability, and sensor fusion found in current Chinese offerings, making platforms like the JF-17 attractive from both capability and cost perspectives.
The FM-90 and KS-1C air defence systems manufactured by China are now operated by the Uzbek Armed Forces..
Crucially, Beijing’s defence exports come with attractive options for technology transfer, local assembly, and industrial partnership, making them appealing for countries like Uzbekistan seeking to develop indigenous defence manufacturing capacity.
These agreements are more than arms deals—they form the foundation for a longer-term strategic relationship that enables Tashkent to gradually shift from buyer to builder, aligning with its broader vision of self-reliant national defence.
