(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Taiwan plans to make every next-generation artillery system vehicle-mounted, a shift that places survival against attack drones and counter-battery weapons at the centre of ground-force modernisation while exposing the logistical demands of defending the island against a potential Chinese invasion.

The October 2026 policy direction covers howitzers across multiple calibres and both 120 mm and 81 mm mortars, extending mobility beyond selected heavy formations toward the wider fire-support network required to sustain dispersed defensive operations under persistent aerial surveillance.

Its operational premise is “strive for fast strike, fast withdraw,” a formulation linking firepower to exposure time because artillery that remains detectable after firing risks destruction before it can support another engagement or relocate to protect its crews.

Defence Minister Wellington Koo previously stated that towed artillery no longer meeting operational needs would gradually be phased out, connecting the current direction to an earlier modernisation position without establishing that every replacement programme has received funding or final approval.

The clearest procurement element in the supplied account is 60 M109A7 self-propelled howitzers, expected to begin entering service around 2030, leaving existing units responsible for maintaining credible counter-landing firepower throughout a transition that extends into the next decade.

 

Wheeled and tracked platforms remain under consideration for further acquisitions, but procurement sequencing, budgets and schedules are unresolved, making the announcement a directional commitment rather than evidence that Taiwan has already selected a complete replacement fleet or secured its delivery.

The battlespace consequence is substantial: mobility can shorten the interval available for an adversary to convert drone reconnaissance, counter-battery radar or electronic detection into a strike, although displacement cannot guarantee survival when surveillance follows vehicles beyond their original firing positions.

Taiwan’s August 2026 artillery training already rehearsed rapid occupation, firing and withdrawal with legacy self-propelled and towed systems, showing that the immediate response relies on changing procedures while the more extensive hardware transformation remains constrained by acquisition timelines.

The programme also encompasses a wider mobile-firepower architecture involving HIMARS, domestic wheeled gun vehicles, unmanned reconnaissance and counter-drone protection, but these systems perform different missions and should not be treated as interchangeable solutions merely because they move between engagements.

DSA’s assessment is that the decisive measure will be sustained combat output from dispersed positions, requiring ammunition distribution, maintenance, recovery and resilient command links to move with the guns rather than becoming stationary vulnerabilities that compromise the entire artillery force.

For Beijing, a successful transition would complicate efforts to suppress Taiwanese coastal defence before landing forces consolidate ashore, while for Taipei it would increase the importance of preserving trained crews and functioning support networks through repeated cycles of engagement.

The strategic question therefore extends beyond how quickly Taiwan can purchase mobile artillery to whether it can field an integrated force that continues delivering coordinated fires after surveillance, precision strikes, communications disruption and infrastructure damage begin reducing its freedom of movement.

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Drone Counter-Battery Warfare Makes Exposure Time Decisive

Taiwan’s existing artillery inventory includes M109A2 and M109A5 self-propelled howitzers and M110A2 heavy guns, while other howitzers and cannons remain towed, creating uneven displacement capabilities across formations that must respond to the same increasingly rapid targeting threats.

Most mortars similarly require manual handling or separate transport, with limited vehicle-mounted exceptions including CM22 and CM23 platforms and some M113 vehicles carrying approximately 106 mm mortars, leaving much of the close-support inventory dependent on slower preparation and recovery procedures.

The supplied performance comparison gives Taiwan’s current 105 mm towed howitzer a maximum firing rate of four rounds per minute, an approximately eight-person crew and several minutes to enter or leave position, illustrating how manpower requirements lengthen battlefield exposure.

By contrast, the cited Hawkeye-type mobile system offers eight rounds per minute, an initial shot approximately 90 seconds after arrival and withdrawal roughly three minutes after firing, although these example figures do not establish performance requirements for Taiwan’s future acquisitions.

The comparison matters because survivability depends on the entire engagement cycle rather than firing rate alone, with navigation, preparation, ammunition handling and displacement each consuming time during which an opposing sensor network may detect, classify and track the artillery position.

Attack drones add a threat that mobility must address beyond radar-directed counter-battery fire, because vehicles can remain vulnerable during movement and replenishment, making departure from a firing point one protective measure within a broader sequence of concealment and dispersion.

Wheeled platforms could support rapid movement through Taiwan’s road network, while tracked systems represent another mobility option, but the supplied material provides no comparative trials establishing which configuration best balances terrain access, protection, support burden and displacement speed.

Vehicle-mounted mortars would extend the policy into shorter-range tactical support, reducing dependence on separately transported equipment and manual emplacement, although their operational value would still depend on crew proficiency, ammunition availability and coordination with the formations they are assigned to support.

The resulting force posture would distribute firepower across changing locations rather than concentrate it in predictable positions, creating additional targeting demands for an adversary while requiring Taiwan to coordinate separated units without allowing communications activity to undermine their concealment.

Consequently, Taiwan’s mobile artillery strategy should be assessed against exposure reduction and repeatable mission execution, since a platform that moves quickly but requires vulnerable replenishment or lengthy maintenance pauses may deliver less sustained defensive value than its headline mobility suggests.

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Legacy Guns Must Survive Before M109A7 Deliveries Begin

On 25 August 2026, Taiwan’s Third Operational Zone conducted artillery maintenance and tactical live-fire training at Kengzikou in Hsinchu, combining equipment checks with timed deployment and immediate displacement to prepare existing formations for hostile drone reconnaissance and related battlefield threats.

Participating systems included M109A2 self-propelled howitzers, M110A2 203 mm guns and 155 mm and 105 mm towed artillery, making the exercise relevant to the mixed inventory that must remain operational while newer platforms enter service.

Elements of the 21st Artillery Command, 269th Combined Arms Brigade, 206th Infantry Brigade, 109th Infantry Brigade and Lanyang Area Command participated, indicating that rapid displacement was being practised across different formations rather than confined to a single modernised artillery unit.

Maintenance firing checked serviceability, crew procedures and fire coordination before tactical firing tested movement from operational areas, occupation within limited time, engagement and relocation, linking mechanical readiness with the procedural speed required to avoid remaining exposed after a mission.

For the M110A2, substantial projectile firepower comes with a large signature, limited protection and slower procedures, making dispersion, terrain masking, camouflage, emissions control and prepared alternate positions central to preserving its contribution during the transition.

These measures reduce identifiable patterns but do not establish immunity from precision attack, and the exercise account supplies no measured displacement times, detection probabilities or combat outcomes demonstrating how effectively particular legacy formations could survive against a functioning adversary targeting network.

The immediate operational challenge is to preserve useful heavy firepower without treating older guns as static assets, integrating their engagements with newer networked systems while managing the different preparation times and support requirements that complicate coordinated missions.

Related activities described in the supplied material include UAV-supported reconnaissance and targeting during heavy-artillery exercises, introducing a parallel requirement to accelerate Taiwan’s own detection-to-fire cycle while reducing the exposure of the guns executing those missions.

Drone battalions under the 21st, 43rd and 58th Artillery Commands, alongside FPV attack training and Altius-600M activity, indicate an evolving relationship between conventional fires and unmanned systems, although the material does not establish their final wartime organisation or integration standards.

The transition period therefore carries strategic weight: disciplined employment of current systems must sustain defensive credibility until deliveries mature, because an acquisition plan scheduled into the 2030s cannot by itself resolve the vulnerability of formations operating today under persistent surveillance.

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M109A7 Firepower Depends on Its Ammunition and Recovery Fleet

The planned initial M109A7 package pairs 60 howitzers with 60 M992A3 ammunition resupply vehicles and 13 M88A2 recovery vehicles, demonstrating that mobile artillery modernisation involves a supporting vehicle fleet whose survival directly influences whether batteries can maintain repeated firing missions.

A one-to-one allocation of ammunition vehicles could support distributed resupply arrangements, but that ratio does not establish independent endurance without information on ammunition loads, replenishment routes, crew availability and the time required to restore each battery after successive engagements.

The supplied package also includes 42 International Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems and 4,080 Precision Guidance Kits, connecting platform mobility with digital fire coordination and guided ammunition rather than presenting chassis replacement alone as the mechanism for improving battlefield effectiveness.

Precision Guidance Kits are intended to improve munition accuracy, but the supplied information does not establish guaranteed performance under navigation disruption, while the cited range beyond 30 kilometres depends on ammunition configuration rather than representing an inherent property of the guidance kit.

The M109A7’s Bradley-derived chassis, automated fire control, GPS positioning and digital command capabilities are intended to improve mobility and mission execution over older M109 variants, with a cited maximum speed near 61 kilometres per hour that should not be confused with tactical displacement performance.

An approximately US$4 billion notification figure is given for the package, but notification value, programme expenditure and final contractual cost are different accounting measures, and the supplied material does not provide a reconciled dollar total establishing their precise relationship.

The procurement programme spans 2026–2032, with deliveries expected from 2030 and completion extending into the early 2030s, while American production priorities introduce a constraint that Taiwan cannot resolve solely by declaring greater urgency or revising its domestic force structure.

Reports of a possible second batch bringing the total to 120 systems, and earlier ambitions reaching 168, describe different planning levels rather than equivalent commitments, making the initial 60 vehicles the appropriate baseline for assessing the supplied acquisition picture.

Operationally, recovery vehicles matter because a disabled howitzer or resupply carrier can interrupt an entire firing cycle, while dispersed deployment places additional demands on maintenance teams that must restore equipment without concentrating supporting assets into readily identifiable locations.

DSA’s assessment is that procurement success should consequently be judged through battery availability, replenishment continuity and communications resilience, since the logistics footprint determines whether faster individual platforms translate into sustained brigade-level fires during coastal defence.

HIMARS and Cheetah Add Different Layers of Mobile Firepower

Taiwan’s planned HIMARS expansion comprises 82 additional launchers beyond an earlier order of 29, producing a prospective total near 111, although planned force size must remain distinct from delivered equipment, trained units and launchers available for operations.

The supplied account associates the expansion with 420 M57 ATACMS missiles and more than 1,200 GMLRS rockets, giving the mobile rocket force a separate long-range precision role while leaving actual wartime expenditure rates and replenishment capacity unspecified.

ATACMS production arrangements extend into 2031 and the main systems schedule reaches approximately December 2032, creating another interval during which projected strike capacity exceeds fielded capability and requiring planners to distinguish future inventory from resources available during an earlier contingency.

HIMARS can support dispersed strikes against landing forces, staging areas and deeper targets, but operational effects depend on target identification and available munitions, meaning launcher numbers alone cannot establish how effectively Taiwan could disrupt a coordinated amphibious operation.

The domestic Cheetah programme instead centres on a 105 mm wheeled gun vehicle derived from the Clouded Leopard 8×8 family, providing mobile direct-fire support whose battlefield role differs from both self-propelled howitzer batteries and longer-range rocket artillery formations.

A planned 178 vehicles would enter production from 2027 through 2033, beginning with eight vehicles in the first year, under an approximately US$1.8 billion programme whose gradual delivery profile limits how rapidly domestic manufacturing can alter the existing force balance.

Its low-recoil gun, approximately 2.95-metre height, multi-axle steering and 600-horsepower engine reflect adaptation to restrictive terrain and road movement, while September 2026 firing demonstrations included slope engagements and hunter-killer operation without establishing performance across combat conditions.

Proposed anti-drone cages and possible future automatic cannons remain development options rather than demonstrated comprehensive protection, and the supplied material does not justify treating either feature as a proven defence against the full range of attack drones or loitering munitions.

Vehicle-mounted 120 mm and 81 mm mortars would occupy another layer of this architecture, giving tactical formations mobile close support while reinforcing the need to match each platform’s mission, ammunition supply and command arrangements to its intended defensive position.

Together, these programmes could create overlapping engagement options across tactical and operational ranges, but their combined effectiveness requires coordination and sustainment rather than simple numerical aggregation, particularly when different delivery schedules leave formations operating with an uneven mixture of old and new equipment.

Taiwan Strait Deterrence Hinges on Integration and Survivability

The broader strategic logic follows deterrence by denial associated with former Chief of the General Staff Admiral Lee Hsi-min’s Overall Defense Concept, using dispersed, survivable capabilities to obstruct an invasion rather than seeking a symmetrical match with China’s larger conventional forces.

Admiral Samuel Paparo, identified in the supplied account as United States Indo-Pacific Command commander, popularised the “unmanned hellscape” concept, linking extensive uncrewed systems with disruption of amphibious operations, but that formulation should not be mistaken for a guaranteed intervention commitment.

A February 2026 CNAS proposal by Stacie Pettyjohn and Molly Campbell envisages a Taiwanese-led layered defence integrating unmanned systems, artillery, mines and mobile air defence, describing an analytical operational concept rather than proving that its entire architecture is already deployed.

Its outer zone extends approximately 80–40 kilometres offshore, a middle zone spans roughly 40–5 kilometres, and inner defences cover nearby approaches and beaches, assigning different weapons complementary roles without establishing that geographic layering alone can defeat a protected invasion force.

Within this framework, mobile tube artillery would help contest landing areas and beachheads, while longer-range precision fires and unmanned systems could disrupt approaching forces, provided that sensors and command links continue supplying usable targeting information.

Taiwan’s described plans for more than 200,000 aerial and maritime drones and over 1,000 uncrewed surface vessels illustrate intended scale, but the account also identifies changing budgets and quantities, preventing those ambitions from being treated as an established operational inventory.

Counter-drone protection would support artillery survival through soft-kill and hard-kill measures, yet the supplied plans do not specify coverage density or effectiveness under saturation, leaving a gap between acquiring protective equipment and shielding dispersed batteries, resupply vehicles and maintenance locations.

Legislative funding decisions, American production capacity and domestic industrial expansion will shape implementation, while training and doctrine must integrate separate acquisitions into a coherent force capable of operating when jamming and damaged communications interrupt central coordination or targeting support.

Strategically, Beijing would face a more difficult suppression problem if Taiwan preserves distributed fires across successive attack cycles, but that outcome remains conditional on deployment discipline and sustainment rather than following automatically from announced purchases or the adoption of vehicle-mounted designs.

Taiwan’s artillery pivot therefore signals an effort to preserve combat power in a drone-intensive battlespace, with its ultimate deterrent value resting on whether mobile guns, sensors and logistics can sustain coordinated resistance long enough to prevent landing forces from consolidating ashore.